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KGB’S LEGACY:  TRANSPLANTING EFFICIENT FINANCIAL 
INFRASTRUCTURES WITHOUT EFFICIENCY 
YULIYA GUSEVA* 
ABSTRACT 
Transplantation of laws from a foreign country is an explicit 
regulatory choice.  It is a choice made by governments and influenced by 
local and international interest groups. This Article analyzes a complex 
junction where international legal transplantation encounters destructive 
transactional and behavioral patterns in countries-recipients.  The 
governments must respond to such inefficiencies and attempt to reduce 
resulting transaction costs by introducing corrections to a foreign model, 
i.e., a “domestic gradient.”  This research focuses on a very peculiar 
“gradient”:  combining public ownership of financial utilities with close 
regulatory oversight as a way to mitigate destructive socioeconomic, 
behavioral and transactional patterns in developing markets. 
The Article focuses on a relatively unchartered territory - 
transplanting of clearing and settlement (C&S) institutions.  First, the 
research analyzes the purposes and development of centralized C&S in the 
U.S. and Europe.  Second, the Article contrasts westernized C&S 
transplants with their application in the tumultuous economies of 
Ukraine, Russia, and Kazakhstan. 
Third, to assess the transplants, the research builds a theoretical 
“trust model.”  The model suggests that making the national 
governments active players in a financial industry like C&S, whose sole 
purpose is minimizing transaction costs and improving capital exchange, 
does not address the underlying behavioral and regulatory problems that 
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the “gradient” is supposed to remedy.  These problems, the Article 
emphasizes, are a multifaceted lack of trust among private parties, weak 
reputational constraints, the low observability of conversion from 
trustworthy to untrustworthy market actors, and an equally potent lack 
of trust towards government entities in the sample. 
The Article concludes by hazarding a few policy proposals on how to 
modify the destructive behavioral and regulatory patterns and thus 
improve C&S and capital markets.  Specifically, instead of transplanting 
and adjusting foreign law, the governments should resort to institutional 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
International legal transplanting is an explicit public choice.  It 
is a choice made by governments and influenced by local and 
international interest groups.  This Article analyzes a complex 
junction where international legal transplantation as a method of 
capital market development in emerging economies encounters 
destructive transactional and behavioral patterns in the countries-
recipients.  The governments must respond to such inefficiencies 
and attempt to reduce transaction costs by introducing what the 
Article refers to as a “domestic gradient,” namely, regulations 
adapting the model to local economic conditions.  This research 
focuses on a very peculiar “gradient”:  adding a public ownership 
component to purely private transplants and combining such 
ownership with close regulatory oversight. 
Substantively, the Article examines a very complicated 
transplant:  centralized clearing and settlement facilities (C&S) of 
transactions with securities and derivatives.  The underlying 
purpose of C&S is improving transactional efficiencies and 
reducing the costs of participating parties. The existing models of 
such financial infrastructures were designed as “accessories” 
added to the already established, mature capital markets to 
minimize transaction costs.1 
In a nutshell, C&S involve post-trade operations and exchange 
of assets and money in performance of trade obligations.  The basic 
purpose of clearing agencies is to assure a reliable exchange of 
assets for payment in every trade and reflect the trades in 
respective ownership records.  As part of an efficient institutional 
infrastructure, C&S institutions not only assure a reliable exchange 
but also, in theory, stimulate the development of capital markets.2 
                                                     
1  See infra Section 4. 
2  See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong 
Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 835-38 (2001) (reviewing studies on 
institutional growth precursors); Stephen J. Choi, Law, Finance, and Path 
Dependence: Developing Strong Securities Markets, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1657, 1683–91 
(2002) (summarizing a number of studies emphasizing the role of institutions); 
Douglas C. North, Institutions, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 97 (1991) (discussing network 
externalities and coordination effects of institutions); Troy A. Paredes, A Systems 
Approach to Corporate Governance Reform: Why Importing U.S. Corporate Law Isn’t the 
Answer, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1072-77 (2004) (discussing the typical “law 
matters” thesis and finding that systemic problems often follow adopting 
American corporate law in other countries).  
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In a way, it is an invisible mechanism behind all capital market 
transactions. 
The value of this instrument for an economy and the global 
market is enormous.  So are its dangers.3  Efficient C&S institutions 
represent regulated Pareto-superior financial conduits promoting 
trust, reducing transaction costs between trading parties and, inter 
alia, guaranteeing trade execution.4  Their economic benefits are 
significant in terms of the costs of capital and GDP. 5  
Unfortunately, C&S facilities have also become systemically 
important institutions, albeit they might not be originally designed 
to serve as such. 6   Therefore, on the downside, they may 
                                                     
3  In the wake of the recent financial crisis, both aspects of C&S, particularly 
C&S of certain derivatives like credit default swaps (CDS), were recognized by 
most jurisdictions and international standard setters.  See, e.g., Leaders Statement, 
The Pittsburgh G20 Summit, pmbl., ¶ 1 (Sept. 24–25, 2009) (“We meet in the midst 
of a critical transition from crisis to recovery to turn the page on an era of 
irresponsibility . . .”); Building Our Common Future: Renewed Collective Action for the 
Benefit of All, G20 Cannes Summit Final Declaration, ¶ 24 (Nov. 4, 2011) 
(proposing changes to the international system); COMM. ON PAYMENT AND 
SETTLEMENT SYS. & TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, 
PRINCIPLES FOR FINANCIAL MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES (2012) [hereinafter CPSS]. 
4  At its core, centralized C&S mechanisms do not differ from other 
trustworthy middlemen, well-known even in primitive societies.  See, e.g., JANET 
TAI LANDA, TRUST, ETHNICITY, AND IDENTITY: BEYOND THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL 
ECONOMICS OF ETHNIC TRADING NETWORKS, CONTRACT LAW, AND GIFT-EXCHANGE 
204–05, 10–15 (Timur Kuran, ed. 1994) (“One way of looking at the evolution of 
various exchange institutions is to focus on the incentive of profit-seeking 
middlemen to invent or create Pareto-superior institutions for achieving greater 
trust among trading partners so as to reduce transaction costs.”). 
5  See, e.g., Niels Schulze & Dirk Baur, Economic Impact Study on Clearing and 
Settlement, EUR. COMM’N (2006), at 18, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial-
markets/docs/clearing/draft/annex_2_en.pdf (finding that lower trading costs 
can help to increase the EU’s GDP and reduce capital costs). 
6  The systemic risk approach of the legislature is expressed, for instance, in 
the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act, mandating more extensive oversight of systemically 
important financial market utilities. Clearing agencies are on the list. The 
Financial Stability Oversight Council is in charge of monitoring systemically 
important institutions.  12 U.S.C.A. §§ 5461, 5322 (2010).  In addition, as early as 
the late 1980s, after the market crash, the SEC, CPSS/IOSCO, and the Federal 
Reserve Board concluded, the settlement systems for all financial instruments 
could become “a potential source of systemic disturbance to financial markets and 
to the economy.”  Securities Transactions Settlement, Securities Act Release No. 
8,398, Exchange Act Release 49,405, 69 Fed. Reg. 12922, 12926 (Mar. 18, 2004) 
[hereinafter SEC Release No. 8,398].  Whether C&S facilities were designed to and 
can function as such is an uncertain and troublesome issue.  See, e.g., Ben S. 
Bernanke, Clearing and Settlement During the Crash, 3 REV. FIN. STUD. 133, 143–46 
(1990) (explaining the systemic strengths and weaknesses of clearinghouses).  See 
also infra note 60 and accompanying text. 
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deteriorate into a systemic risk centerpiece. 
The transplanting novices are thus wading in the perilous 
waters where potential disturbances, in the words of Alan 
Greenspan in the wake of the 1987 market crash, represent a great 
“threat to the liquidity of . . . financial markets” and, at the same 
time, serve as a source of systemic risk.7  The key ensuing question, 
therefore, is the result of extrapolating a complicated systemically 
important conduit developed for relatively mature capital markets 
into a developing economy.  Even though such an economy may 
already have westernized capital markets and law, the aberrations 
associated with emerging markets will still likely affect it. 
What are those market and transactional aberrations?  To set 
the stage for the discussion, I would like to start with inviting the 
reader to imagine a country where corporate insiders routinely 
disregard the law; where contractual breach is commonplace; 
where the level of social trust is at a record low; where the Press 
Secretary of the President defiantly claims that the sheer volume of 
the work done in the run-up to the corruption-riddled 2014 
Olympics proves that [luckily] “not all the funds were embezzled;” 
where “bankruptcy” is perceived as a code word for corporate 
raidership; where businessmen are thrown in jail allegedly on a 
whim of parties having ties with the authorities; and where large 
chunks of the national financial system disappear overnight due to 
a sovereign debt default or sudden anticorruption campaign.  In 
that hypothetical country, entrepreneurs paradoxically view their 
release after a highly questionable imprisonment as a victory 
despite the resultant loss of their companies or market share to 
competitors.8  To complete this hypothetical picture, let us add to it 
a spectacular exchange of Molotov cocktails between the police 
and the restless multitudes. 
It would not be surprising to discover that, if continued far 
enough, such “events” had evolved into entrenched patterns and 
                                                     
7  Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve, Remarks 
at the Financial Markets Conference of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, at 7 
(Mar. 3, 1995).  See also SEC Release No. 8,398, supra note 6, at 12922.  
8  See infra notes 117, 140, 151, 154 & 157 and accompanying text.  See also D. 
Peskov: V Sochi vse gotovo k Olimpiade [Sochi is Ready for the Olympics], 
ROSBUS.CONSULTING [RBK] (Feb. 5, 2014, 9:23 PM), 
http://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/20140205212327.shtml (interviewing Dmitri 
Peskov, Press Secretary of the President of the Russian Federation, who admits 
that the construction for the Sochi Olympics has been problematic, but defends 
the project by pointing to the volume of infrastructure that has been built in Sochi 
as evidence that clearly not all of the construction funds were stolen). 
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undermined the interaction between local governments and 
regulated markets and among market participants.  In other words, 
the “events” might slowly accumulate into macro-level, “thick 
market” 9  practices and, by implication, customary regulatory 
approaches.  Incidentally, local parties would be continuously 
operating in a market with a low level of trust. 
Such phenomena are, generally, less characteristic of the 
developed economies where they are often controlled by a variety of 
evolutionary developed institutional mechanisms.10  By contrast, 
the emerging markets may be viewed as “developing jurisdictions” 
struggling to improve not only law but also the basic trust, 
reputation, and germane information sharing and monitoring 
mechanisms. 
Although many developing economies experience similar 
economic and transactional inefficiencies, 11  the above examples 
quite obviously paint a portrait of the ex-communist economies of 
Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan.  This Article unites these three 
jurisdictions into a coherent sample. 
The three countries share a number of characteristics including, 
not only a similar past, but also relatively comparable strong-arm 
political regimes, commodity-based economic policies, interlinked 
markets, high corruption rankings and problematic business 
environment.  These three economies cannot be easily ascribed to 
the market-based, Anglo-American or more regulatory, bank-
based German and Japanese models.  Neither do they boast similar 
evolutionary trust-building or market monitoring mechanisms.12 
                                                     
9  See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson et al., Contract and Innovation: The Limited Role of 
Generalist Courts in the Evolution of Novel Contractual Forms, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 170, 
173–74 (2013) (describing market “thickness” as a function of “the number of 
actors who understand themselves to be transacting under similar circumstances . 
. .”). 
10  See infra Section 4. 
11  See, e.g., Norman D. Bishara, Governance and Corruption Constraints in the 
Middle East: Overcoming the Business Ethics Glass Ceiling, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 227, 250 
(2011) (discussing corruption, cultural issues, and nepotism as challenges to the 
profitability and growth of businesses); Corruption in China: Not the Best Way to 
Clean Up, ECONOMIST, Apr. 19, 2007, http://www.economist.com/node/9040393 
(describing the rampant corruption problem in China and its effects). 
12  Trust-building mechanisms generally range from contractual to 
institutional and social.  See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson et al., Braiding: The Interaction of 
Formal and Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 
1377, 1410 n.104 (2010) (discussing contractual mechanisms and citing examples of 
social mechanisms conducive to trust building).  On the monitoring role of banks 
and capital markets, see infra Section 2.  Business practices become embedded into 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol36/iss2/4
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Another similarity is that Russia and Kazakhstan are members 
of the new Customs Union. In addition, traditionally, Russia has 
been capable of exerting significant political pressure on Ukraine,13 
which is mainly due to the interdependence of the two economies. 
Hence, it is possible that the three neighbors may preserve a 
somewhat close economic alliance, unless, of course, the unrest in 
Ukraine will continue to sway the government towards the EU. 
Overall, it is only natural to combine the three economies into a 
single sample. 
There is also an important procedural similarity.  Specifically, 
after missing out on more than a century of socioeconomic and 
technological revolution happening in the capitalist world, which 
was mainly due to the inadequacies of the tsarist and Soviet 
economies and law, 14  these post-communist jurisdictions were 
forced to redefine regulatory and behavioral modes fast and 
through non-evolutionary means. 
Often, they resorted to westernized statutory imitation.  In this 
respect, the countries seem to follow the same procedural 
timeframe:  they have already completed at least two primary or 
what I would like to call substantive and procedural stages of legal 
transition and are currently in the third stage where the objective 
to establish the basic contours of law, including administrative 
regulations, corporate and securities law, pertinent public 
oversight and judicial system, has been replaced with the search 
for efficiency and transaction cost reduction.  A part of this new trend 
is the brand-new C&S statutes.15 
                                                     
a local culture and often it “is unclear . . . how to shift a country’s social norms 
and institutions” to impact legal protections.  Choi, supra note 2, at 1695–96. 
13  See, e.g., A New Revolution on Maidan Square, ECONOMIST, Dec. 7, 2013, at 53 
(describing the “break-up of Ukraine’s [economic] deal with Europe as [Putin’s] 
triumph.”).  
14  It is nearly de rigueur to cite NIKOLAI A. BERDYAEV, THE ORIGIN OF RUSSIAN 
COMMUNISM 94–158 (1937); G.F. SHERSHENEVICH, NAUKA GRAZHDANSKOGO PRAVA V 
ROSSII [THE SCIENCE OF CIVIL LAW IN RUSSIA] 235–44 (1893). 
15  This distinction is crucial since countries in earlier stages of statutory 
development may need to start with transplanting basic concepts and fighting 
corruption.  See, e.g., Paredes, supra note 2, at 1127–28, 1133–43 (discussing the 
problems that most developing countries encounter when adopting financial 
systems from developed economies, and arguing that developing countries’ 
regimes should exercise more control to boost investor confidence).  By contrast, 
the sample countries have already established at least statutory “basics” and now 
pursue deeper institutional reforms.  On the first two stages, see generally WILLIAM 
E. BUTLER, RUSSIAN LAW 335–38 (1999); Lane H. Blumenfeld, Russia’s New Civil 
Code: the Legal Foundation for Russia’s Emerging Market Economy, 30 INT’L LAW 477 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015
GUSEVA (DO NOT DELETE) 4/20/2015  12:13 PM 
534 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 36:2 
The first transitional period was the time of unbridled and 
uncontrollable liberalization, of presidential decrees and massive 
sales of state-owned assets, followed by the enactment of major 
codes.  It was completed roughly by the late 1990s or early 2000s as 
the second period manifested itself through the enactment of more 
refined versions of the key substantive and procedural statutes in 
the areas of corporate and securities law and judicial procedure.16 
                                                     
(1996); Yuliya Guseva, Russian Mortgage Finance and Legal Reforms in Times of 
Financial Crises: Transplanting American Law Models, 3 COLUM. J. E. EUR. L. 75 (2009). 
The “third period” C&S statutes are: Federal’nyi Zakon RF o Kliringe i Kliringovoj 
Deiatel’nosti [FZ RF Clearing] [Federal Law of the Russian Federation on Clearing 
and Clearing Activities], SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ 
RF] [RUSSIAN FEDERATION COLLECTION OF LEGISLATION] 2011, No. 7, Item 904; 
Federal’nyi Zakon RF o Tsentral’nom Depozitarii [FZ RF CD] [Federal Law of the 
Russian Federation on the Central Depository], SZ RF 2011, No. 50, Item 7356; 
Zakon Respubliki Kazakhstan o Vnesenii Izmenenii i Dopolnenii v Nekotorye 
Zakonodatel'nye Akty Respubliki Kazakhstan po Voprosam Regulirovaniia 
Bankovskoi Deiatel'nosti i Finansovykh Organizatsii v Chasti Minimizatsii Riskov 
[ZRK RCB] [The Law of the Introduction of Changes and Additions to Several 
Acts Concerning the Regulation of Banking and Financial Institutions Connected 
with Risk Reduction], art. 77-1 to 82, VEDEMOSTI PARLAMENTA RESPUBLIKI 
KAZAKHSTAN [VP RK] [GAZETTE OF THE PARLIAMENT OF THE RESPUBLIC OF 
KAZAKHSTAN] 2011, No. 24, Item 196; Zakon Ukrainy pro Depozitarnu Sistemu 
Ukrainy [ZU DS] [Law of Ukraine on the Depository System], VIDOMOSTI 
VERKHOVNOI RADY [GAZETTE OF THE VERKHOVNA RADA] 2013, No. 39, Item 517; 
Zakon Ukrainy pro Nacіonal’nu depozitarnu sistemu ta osoblyvostі elektronnogo 
obіgu cіnnykh paperіv v Ukrainі [ZU NDS] [Law of Ukraine on the National 
Depository System and Special Features of Electronic Circulation of Securities in 
Ukraine], GAZETTE OF THE VERKHOVNA RADA  1998, No. 15, Item 67. 
16  See, e.g., (1) Russia: GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] 
[CIVIL CODE] pt. 1–2 (Russ.) (Russian civil code); ARBITRAZHNO-PROTSESSUAL’NYI 
KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [APK RF] [CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE] (Russ.) 
(delineating the procedures for arbitration); Federal’nyi Zakon RF o Rynke 
Tsennykh Bumag [FZ RF On Securities] [Federal Law of the Russian Federation 
on the Securities Market], SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ 
RF] [RUSSIAN FEDERATION COLLECTION OF LEGISLATION] 1996, No. 17, Item 1918 (the 
principal law on the Russian securities market); Federal’nyi zakon RF ob 
Aktsionernykh Obshchestvakh [FZ RF ob AO] [Federal Law of the Russian 
Federation on Joint-stock Companies], SZ RF 1996, No. 1, Item 1 (outlining the 
principal law on joint-stock companies); (2) Ukraine: Zakon Ukrainy pro Tsіnnі 
Papery ta Fondovyi rynok [ZU on Securities] [Law of Ukraine on the Securities 
and Stock Market], VIDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOI RADY [GAZETTE OF THE VERKHOVNA 
RADA] 2006, No. 31, Item 268 (articulating Ukraine’s foundational law on the 
securities market); Zakon Ukrainy pro Derzhavne Reguliuvannia Rynku 
Tsіnnykh Paperіv v Ukrainі [ZU on Securities Market Regulation] [Law of 
Ukraine on State Regulation of the Securities Market], GAZETTE OF THE VERKHOVNA 
RADA 1996, No. 51, Item 292 (providing clairification of Ukrainian governmental 
regulation of the national securities market); Zakon Ukrainy pro Aktsіonernі 
tovarystva [ZU pro AT] [Law of Ukraine on Joint-Stock Companies], GAZETTE OF 
THE VERKHOVNA RADA 2008, No. 50-51, Item 384 (specifying the Ukrainian law on 
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Simultaneously, the financial infrastructure and exchanges had 
matured and even started experimenting with more esoteric 
transplants of collateralized products.17 
In the current, third period, the sample countries still resort to 
incremental transplantation as the principal weapon of choice.  The 
objectives of the modern “imports” are improving efficiency of the 
existing market institutions, including clearing agencies.  
Incidentally, all three governments try to adjust the foreign models 
to local conditions.  Their “domestic gradient” is increasing 
domestic control over the transplants.  Specifically, most new C&S 
facilities and exchanges have some sort of government 
participation.18  
The central question is whether this approach is efficiency 
maximizing given the local conditions or if it represents the 
“legacy of the KGB,” i.e., a possibly mistaken belief that in private 
transactions, socioeconomic problems may be mitigated by 
reinforcing the state. Obviously, to the extent that such reforms do 
not address the underlying socioeconomic and trust issues, their 
success remains questionable.  
More research is needed with respect to the fluent but 
fundamental behavioral modes in the transplant-recipients and the 
role of the state as both a regulatory actor and a market participant.  
                                                     
joint-stock companies); GOSPODARS’KYI KODEKS UKRAINY [COMMERCIAL CODE] 
(Ukr.) (enumerating the Ukrainian commercial code); TSYVIL’NYI KODEKS UKRAINY 
[CIVIL CODE] (Ukr.) (the Ukrainian civil code); TSYVIL’NYI PROTSESSUAL’NYI KODEKS 
UKRAINY [CIVIL PROCEDURAL CODE] (Ukr.) (expounding the Ukrianian code of civil 
procedures); GOSPODARS’KYI PROTSESSUAL’NYI KODEKS UKRAINY [COMMERCIAL 
PROCEDURAL CODE] (Ukr.) (setting forth the Ukrainian code of commercial 
procedures); Oleg Batyuk, Shareholder Rights, Equitable Treatment and the Role of the 
State, OECD 2 (2002) (mentioning all early statutes); (3) Kazakhstan: 
GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS RESPUBLIKI KAZAKHSTAN (OBSHCHAIA CHAST’) [GK RK] 
[CIVIL CODE (GENERAL SECTION)] (Kaz.) (delineating the civil code of Kazakhstan); 
Zakon Respubliki Kazakhstan o Rynke Tsennykh Bumag [ZRK] [Law of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan on Securities Market], VEDEMOSTI PARLAMENTA RESPUBLIKI 
KAZAKHSTAN [VP RK] [GAZETTE OF THE PARLIAMENT OF THE RESPUBLIC OF 
KAZAKHSTAN] 2003, No. 14, Item 119 (expounding the law of Kazakhstan on the 
securities market); GRAZHDANSKII PROTSESSUAL’NYI KODEKS RESPUBLIKI 
KAZAKHSTAN [GPK RK] [CIVIL PROCEDURAL CODE] (Kaz.) (outlining the law on civil 
procedures of Kazakhstan); Zakon Respubliki Kazakhstan ob Aktsionernykh 
Obshchestvakh [ZRK ob AO] [Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Joint-Stock 
Companies], VP RK 2003, No. 10, Item 55 (presenting the law of Kazakhstan on 
joint-stock companies). 
17  See, e.g., Guseva, supra note 15, at 98–100 (examining Russia’s use of 
collateralized securities). 
18  See infra Section 5. 
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In this sense, the C&S facilities present a unique opportunity to 
explore a central economic institution evolving under such 
unstable conditions within an already established capital market 
and legal environment. 
To the best of my knowledge, no research has yet offered a 
combinatory analysis of the regulatory and behavioral C&S 
problems in the jurisdictions like the three sample countries. 
Moreover, the existing literature on transplanting and the 
importance of law in financial development lacks granularity as 
academics often disregard the various stages of statutory 
transplantation or cultural specifics and, by necessity, focus on 
historical data or accidentally miscode local rules.19  This may cast 
doubt on the prescriptive value of such research.20  In addition, 
while the general research on trust, cultural foundations and law 
abounds, matching specific policies with regulatory, transactional 
and societal patterns and already transplanted, ostensibly 
westernized, statutory premises remains understudied.21 
                                                     
19  See infra Section 2 (analyzing the Law and Finance and Legal Origin 
scholarship).  For a critique of coding errors in some Law and Finance articles, see, 
for example, Holger Spamann, The “Antidirector Rights Index” Revisited, 23 REV. 
FIN. STUD. 467 (2010). 
20  See, e.g., Black, supra note 2, at 849 (emphasizing the differences in the 
conceptual preoccupations of scholars in developed and developing countries); 
Mark J. Roe, Legal Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock Markets, 120 HARV. L. REV. 
460, 515 (2006) (warning of the potential repercussions of being “under the sway 
of the origins thinking”).  An apt example of the “quantitative debates” regarding 
the best legal tools is Rafael La Porta et al., What Works in Securities Laws?, 61 J. 
FIN. 1, 1–20 (2006); Howell E. Jackson & Mark J. Roe, Public and Private Enforcement 
of Securities Laws: Resource–Based Evidence, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 207, 208–09, 234–37 
(2009).  
21  See, e.g., Frank Upham, Mythmaking in the Rule of Law Orthodoxy, in 
PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD 77–79 (Thomas Carothers ed., 2006) 
(questioning “investing” in law reforms as a key method of economic 
development); Kevin E. Davis & Michael J. Trebilcock, The Relationship Between 
Law and Development: Optimists Versus Skeptics, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 895, 932–35 
(2008) (explaining why legal reforms often do not have the desired effect in 
societies where informal methods of societal and economic control prevail); Tom 
Ginsburg, Does Law Matter for Economic Development? Evidence from East Asia, 34 L. 
& SOC’Y REV. 829, 834, 850 (2000) (suggesting that more research is needed on the 
interrelation of formal and informal practices).  
 Overall, the criticism of legal transplanting and institutionalism is legion.  
Even major institutionalists place the market structures into a formal-informal 
continuum.  See, e.g., Douglass C. North, Five Propositions About Institutional 
Change 1 (Washington Univ., Working Paper, 1995), 
http://128.118.178.162/eps/eh/papers/9309/9309001.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 
2014) (presenting institutions as behavioral formal and informal constraints, 
enforcement policies, and codes of conduct).  Multiple scholars emphasize the 
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This Article seeks to bridge some of these gaps by zeroing in on 
the “trust problem” as part of regulatory, behavioral and, by 
extension, transacting and transplanting patterns.  The Article 
proceeds as follows:  Section 2 explains that off-the-rack 
transplanting may seem rational to local policymakers who have 
put their faith in the “law-market paradigm,” viz., the empirically 
proven interconnection between having efficient legal institutions 
and investor protection principles and capital market 
development.  From this perspective, for a national politician, 
transplantation both seems justified and is de facto much easier to 
implement procedurally than other alternatives.  Yet, as this 
Section emphasizes, transplanting is typically prone to produce 
efficiency losses, chiefly stemming from the crucial differences 
between a foreign economy-origin and the conditions on the 
ground.     
Section 3 builds a theoretical model explaining why and how 
the local low trust environment may undermine the efficiency of a 
transactional exchange, particularly an exchange involving a 
transplanted centralized intermediary, among other things, 
guaranteeing trade execution.  Sections 4 and 5 compare the 
western C&S models with their replicas in Russia, Ukraine, and 
Kazakhstan.  Section 6 foregrounds the concept that using the state 
to solve behavioral and transactional problems undermining 
private exchange is unavailing:  the necessary trust linkages are 
broken not only among private actors but also between the market 
and the state. 
The research concludes by hazarding a few policy proposals on 
how to efficiently modify the transplanted statutory foundations 
and recreate the environment conducive to strengthening trust in 
the state and the market.  In short, the Article suggests that 
although it is probably impossible to change national regulatory 
and behavioral patterns overnight, it may be plausible to mend the 
                                                     
importance of non-legal mechanisms and trust for transactional practices.  See, 
e.g., FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF 
PROSPERITY (1995); ROBERT PUTNAM ET AL., MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC 
TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY 88, 172 (1993) (discussing social trust and the value 
of cooperation in discouraging opportunistic behavior); Amir N. Licht et al., 
Culture Rules: The Foundations of the Rule of Law and Other Norms of Governance, 35 J. 
COMP. ECON. 659 (2007) (examining cross-cultural psychological values and their 
influence on corruption and rule of law).  Unfortunately, for the purposes of this 
paper, many scholarly conclusions lack the necessary specificity that would 
enable policy actors to improve specific reform outcomes. 
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broken trust linkages by transplanting not merely foreign law but 
an institutional umpire:  a purely foreign economic party. 
 
2. TRANSPLANTING:  A RATIONAL POLICY CHOICE                                     
OR SPECTACULAR MISTAKE? 
2.1. Rationality and Personal Gains 
 
Transplanting is a statutory method with a long history.  In 
theory, there is nothing inherently irrational about transplanting 
the best international practices and adapting them to local market 
conditions.  That is if, first, such practices are deemed conducive to 
jumpstarting a financial model or instrument and, second, the 
adaptation actually responds to the local market inefficiencies and 
realities. 
On the first point, it takes only one logical step to connect 
transplanting of foreign templates to better economic outcomes, 
which makes transplantation not only a natural solution but also a 
methodology supported by solid comparative data.  Indeed, there 
is a presumptive interconnection between having efficient legal 
institutions, investor protection and corporate law principles and 
capital market development across a number of markets.22  This 
interconnection appears to validate the enduring efforts of multiple 
international institutions to galvanize developing economies by 
exporting foreign law.23 
                                                     
22  See generally Simeon Djankov et al., The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, 
88 J. FIN. ECON. 430, 463 (2008); Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Legal Origins, 
117 Q.J. ECON. 1193 (2002); Rafael La Porta et al. (2006), supra note 20; Rafael La 
Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 285, 
291-98 (2008); Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, 57 J. 
FIN. 1147, 1147–49 (2002); Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate 
Governance, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 24 (2000); Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 
J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1113–17 (1998); Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of 
External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997); Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and 
Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 503–06; Jeffrey 
Wurgler, Financial Markets and the Allocation of Capital, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 187, 188–90 
(2000); Hans B. Christensen et al., Capital-Market Effects of Securities Regulation: 
Hysteresis, Implementation, and Enforcement (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research 
(“NBER”), Working Paper No. 16737, 2011), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w16737. 
23  Such reforms are often far from being a success story.  See, e.g., Gianmaria 
Ajani, By Chance and Prestige: Legal Transplants in Russia and Eastern Europe, 43 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 93, 115 (1995) (concluding that “[t]he influence of foreign models, and 
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Thus, from a perspective of a domestic policymaker, the 
following algorithmic simplification may appear both feasible and 
tempting:  certain law models, in tandem with enforcement, 
translate into (or are statistically associated with) more developed 
financial markets.24  This is, in a manner of speaking, the “national 
law-market paradigm.”  Transplanting is merely an accompanying 
procedural mechanism to do that, the mechanism palatable in 
terms of its efficiency and, even more so, due to its simplicity. 
For a national politician, transplantation is much easier to 
implement procedurally than resorting to other alternative 
methods.  First, it does not require substantial upfront investments, 
except a good translating service.  Second, the actual payoffs 
(whether profits or losses) are realized only in the next political 
cycle.  Finally, state actors may be less likely to spend resources on 
investigating an issue instead of committing to the well-tested best 
practices of a handful of jurisdictions-origins. 
To continue the agency costs story, to both politicians and 
business lobbies a foreign template may appear acceptable. 
Drafting parties may either believe that the foreign product is good 
“as is” and that the time and costs of drafting new rules would 
exceed the value of the ultimate statute or, alternatively, they may 
                                                     
their reception by the legislators of old and new post-socialist states has reached 
dimensions never before seen,” but that a “preliminary economic analysis of costs 
and benefits” of adopting should be carried out to ensure the new legislation is in 
the best interests of the country concerned); John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation 
Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 288, 294 (2010) 
(referring to the transplantation of American templates to facilitate the 
privatization of Russia and other developing economies); Richard A. Posner, 
Creating a Legal Framework for Economic Development, 13 WORLD BANK RES. 
OBSERVER 1 (1998) (outlining various examples of countries adopting foreign laws 
and noting that “[s]uch grafts do not always take”); Roe, supra note 20, at 464–65; 
(noting in particular that, if financial markets require political support, “then 
building the legal structures in the midst of a hostile polity would waste resources 
and risk disappointment.”); id. at 515–16 (discussing the cost of failed attempts to 
establish new legal systems). 
24  This simplification seems plausible even though it ignores causational 
analysis.  See, e.g., Black, supra note 2, at 835–38 (discussing the limitations of 
available data and finding that “[t]he most that can be said” is that this data is 
consistent with “correlations between strong investor protection and faster 
growth, and between strong capital markets and growth”); Choi, supra note 2, at 
1658 (considering how a country develops “good law” and whether that law 
should be mandatory); Thorsten Beck & Ross Levine, Legal Institutions and 
Financial Development 26 (NBER, Working Paper No. 10126, 2003), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w10126 (referring to analyses finding “a strong 
connection between investor protection laws and both ownership concentration 
and the private benefits of corporate control.”). 
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be affected by the typical cognitive biases.  Among others, regret 
aversion and normality bias may force them to minimize their risks 
and mimic the rest of the world’s behavior, particularly at the take-
off stage.  The drafting lawyers and lobbyists will be similarly 
affected by the aforesaid biases and merely follow the herd “[s]ince 
it is difficult to know what is a good innovation in contract [or, in 
our case, statutory model] design.”25 
Agency costs aside, borrowing a basic foreign template seems 
to represent an epitome of the collective wisdom of more 
developed markets. 26   Furthermore, uniformity across markets 
creates network externalities and increases switching costs, 27 
forcing the reformers to adopt a replica with certain minimal 
modifications.  This uniformity may become particularly useful in 
case of cross-border C&S requiring access by domestic members to 
foreign C&S entities, which follow international rules. 
To conclude, the reasons for replication may vary from the 
national “law-market paradigm” or typical agency costs and 
cognitive limitations leading to errors in judgment and drafting 
cost minimization to the legitimate signals to foreign 
counterparties that the national public and private institutions 
deserve to be admitted into the elite clubs of international market 
facilities and regulators.28  Hence, once a model is identified by 
leading foreign markets and irrespective of future regulatory 
frictions, which may be substantial in the case of implementing 
highly technical models like C&S,29 a foreign transplant is readily 
                                                     
25  MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE 
TRANSACTION 149 (2012).  See also Alan Watson, Legal Change: Sources of Law and 
Legal Change, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1121, 1153 (1983) (noting that rules may be 
adopted due to their perceived “logical elegance” without regard to practical 
effect). 
26  GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 25, at 74–79 (discussing “learning externalities 
and free riders”). 
27  Id. at 79–80.  In this analysis, Gulati and Scott’s contract drafting theory is 
analogized with transactional law drafting.  
28  On the benefits of joining regulatory clusters, see, for instance, Chris 
Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (and How It Doesn’t), 99 GEO. L.J. 
257, 289–305 (2011) (discussing “impediments” to international financial law 
compliance); Chris Brummer, Post-American Securities Regulation, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 
327, 331–32 (2010) (“[A] multilateral club will likely comprise a powerful lever for 
convergence, in part due to the low adjustment costs involved in cooperation and 
its relatively high reciprocal benefits for members.”). 
29  A key example of the “friction-creators” is the IOSCO Principles. 
Regulators even in the “most advanced” jurisdictions with a long history of C&S 
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accepted.  Such replication within the law-market paradigm 
becomes a politically palatable and procedurally easy solution for 
the followers. 
 
2.2. A Dearth of Alternatives 
 
The rationality of transplanting is also supported by the simple 
fact of life:  domestic actors often do not have an efficacious 
alternative. Procedurally, there are, obviously, several 
developmental strategies, whose efficiency and eventual impact on 
national economies differ substantially.  The nature and outcomes 






















                                                     
supervision are puzzled by how to implement them in practice.  See, e.g., Eur. Sec. 
& Mkts. Auth., Consultation Paper: Draft Technical Standards for the Regulation 
on OTC Derivatives, CCPs and Trade Repositories, ESMA/2012/379, ¶ 117 (June 
25, 2012) (observing that “in many cases, . . . global standards are not specific 
enough”); see also Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n, Derivatives Clearing 
Organizations and International Standards, 17 C.F.R. § 39, 140, 190, 78 Fed. Reg. 
50259 (Aug. 16, 2013) (outlining procedural standards for the IOSCO). 
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The first method is the natural, long-term evolution of a market 
or cluster of markets.30  Scholars may ascribe such evolution to 
                                                     
30  Examples of such evolution abound.  See, e.g., Black, supra note 2, at 792 
(“[A]udited financial statements and other disclosure requirements for public 
companies . . . can emerge [as a custom] through stock exchange rule or common 
practice, as it did in the United States.”); Brian R. Cheffins, Does Law Matter?  The 
Separation of Ownership and Control in the United Kingdom, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 459, 
460–82 (2001) (arguing that before the enactment of corporate laws the British 
capital market was already well developed); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of 
Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership and 
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“upstream” or “downstream” law production techniques or a 
combination thereof. 31   Regardless of the formats, the 
improvements, including the western C&S reforms, are never 
entirely alien to the markets-origins.32   
Since, self-evidently, that is not the story of countries like our 
three sample economies, the developing world, by necessity, 
should pursue other modi operandi.  Those methods are shortcuts 
employed by state actors, international institutions or local market 
players. 
The first subtype of such second-best reforms originates with 
the market actors themselves.  Specifically, companies may “bond” 
themselves to foreign institutions and best practices for the 
purposes of signaling their better quality to the global market.  By 
setting themselves apart from their domestic brethren, they seek to 
access foreign markets for goods and capital on cheaper terms.33 
How do companies do that? – usually, by way of cross-listing their 
securities on reputable foreign exchanges.34 
In theory, a certain point of saturation through “bonding”35 
may be reached in terms of (a) the number of cross-listing 
companies and (b) the typicality of the “bonding” practices.  The 
                                                     
Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 7 (2001) (“Much historical evidence suggests that legal 
developments have tended to follow, rather than precede, economic change.”) 
(citation omitted). 
31  On the procedural aspects of both methods, see Paul B. Stephan, Privatizing 
International Law, 97 VA. L. REV. 1573, 1584–88 (2011) (discussing “upstream” and 
“downstream” production of international law).  
32  Coffee (2001), supra note 30, at 24–58 (outlining the historical market 
development of U.K. and U.S. securities markets and contrasting these with those 
of France and Germany). 
33  See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of 
Enforcement, 156 U. PA L. REV. 229, 231–47 (2007); Edward M. Iacobucci, Toward a 
Signaling Explanation of the Private Choice of Corporate Law, 6 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 
319, 334–36 (2004).  
34  Coffee (2007), supra note 33, at 284–92 (providing the “bonding 
explanation” for cross listing and its impact); Yuliya Guseva, Cross-Listings and the 
New World of International Capital: Another Look at the Efficiency and 
Extraterritoriality of Securities Law, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 411, 425, 440 (2013) (providing 
examples of the effects of listings on home, United States, and other foreign 
markets). 
35  The term was primarily used by Professor Coffee.  See Coffee (2007), supra 
note 33, at 284 (explaining the “bonding hypothesis”); John Coffee, Jr., The Future 
as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its 
Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 641, 674–76 (1999) (discussing “bonding 
mechanisms” as an explanation for “abnormal price movement on a U.S. listing” 
and providing evidence in support). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015
GUSEVA (DO NOT DELETE) 4/20/2015  12:13 PM 
544 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 36:2 
bonding standards thus become substitutes for domestic law and 
may turn into a domestic exemplar.  This evolution may connote 
soft “transplantation through bonding.”  If one ignores other 
variables, such as the history of regulatory cooperation and close 
economic and political ties, one may view Canadian and Israeli 
companies, often cross-listing their securities in the U.S., as an 
example of transplanting through bonding. 
However, in the case of C&S, domestic actors cannot “bond” 
easily since domestic C&S facilities are dovetailed with domestic 
exchanges and broker-dealers operating within a certain 
jurisdiction and licensed as such.  In sum, it is not a mobile capital 
and cross-listing story.  Most importantly, bonding, as an indirect 
standard-setting method, seems only somewhat efficient, at least as 
concerns our sample jurisdictions, where only a few companies 
cross-list their securities abroad.  There is no evidence that bonding 
has been an influential factor in setting local market rules in the 
sample.36 
In the second subtype of the second-best reforms, the leading 
actors are powerful political groups, who push for purely 
economic changes.  Many developing economies, including 
Eastern Europe, have routinely resorted to this course of action to 
implement market reforms.  Among many characteristics of such a 
course of action is the absence of a solid statutory ground, which is 
built up later, when the market and courts begin to cope with new 
economic realities.  In the wake of the collapse of the USSR, for 
instance, East European countries, just like earlier in their history, 
resorted to a species of “benevolent dictatorships,” overturning 
existing social foundations first and building up institutional and 
statutory underpinnings for their economic progenies later.37 
                                                     
36  Only a handful of companies cross-list.  Guseva, supra note 34, at 501 
(graphing the number of cross-listed companies between 2007 and 2011); DR 
Directory, BANK OF N.Y. MELLON, 
http://www.adrbnymellon.com/dr_directory.jsp (last visited Oct. 19, 2014) 
(listing cross-listed companies).  Moreover, the stigma associated with the high 
riskiness of local peer-firms and unreliable institutions is not entirely washed off 
through cross-listings.  See, e.g., Black, supra note 2, at 784, 823 (discussing the 
downsides of cross-listing and noting that “[a] company’s reputation is strongly 
affected by the reputations of other firms in the same country”).  Id. at 784.  
37  On the concept of such “dictatorships,” see generally Ronald J. Gilson & 
Curtis J. Milhaupt, Economically Benevolent Dictators: Lessons for Developing 
Democracies, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 227 (2011).  Unfortunately, reforms involving 
private property cannot be fully explained by the “benevolence” or welfare 
concerns of the elites and implicate more sinister considerations and rent-seeking. 
See, e.g., Paul B. Stephan, Toward a Positive Theory of Privatization: Lessons from 
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Although such structural reforms usually produce long-term 
market consequences, there are several important caveats that 
militate against a liberal exercise of such democratized (vel non) 
economic dictatorship.  Specifically, the ultimate success of the 
reforms and the actual state of a thus modernized economy may be 
ex ante unpredictable.  This vitiates orderly reform processes.  An 
efficient implementation of this course of action requires at least 
some, if not substantial, knowledge and expertise on the part of 
market actors, courts and regulators, who have to adjust to new 
circumstances and monitor the transition.  All too often, that has 
not been the case in the developing economies.38  
Thus, a third, more neutral option for an “incipient” democracy 
is to introduce market-oriented statutes as fast as possible.  As 
discussed earlier in this Article, the most expedient way to set forth 
the contours of law is by “borrowing” foreign templates and 
incorporating them into local legal systems.39  After all, everyone 
hopes that having a “stellar” law will lead to a better marketplace, 
while local business lobbies, including exchanges and broker-
dealers, and politicians may be more inclined to subscribe to some 
international framework commitments.  This is precisely what 
happened in the sample jurisdictions, which looked to foreign 
clearing models and adopted them with some modifications. 
 
                                                     
Soviet-Type Economies, in ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: COMPARATIVE AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES 324, 357 (Jagdeep S. Bhandari & 
Alan O. Sykes eds., 1997) (“[T]he prevalence of spurious privatization suggests 
not only the work of rent seeking groups, but also the inability of such groups to 
reach a consensus as to their collective work.”). 
38  See generally Stephan, supra note 37, at 357; Daniel Berkowitz et al., The 
Transplant Effect, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 163 (2003); Bernard Black et al., Russian 
Privatization and Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1731 
(2000); John C. Coffee, Jr., Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from 
Securities Market Failure, 25 J. CORP. L. 1 (1999) (comparing the Polish and Czech 
reforms); Edward Glaeser et al., Coase Versus the Coasians, 116 Q.J. ECON. 853, 855–
56 (2001) (comparing the Polish, Czech and Hungarian capital market reforms).  
39  Alternatively, jurisdictions may create functional substitutes 
amalgamating new foreign and preexisting domestic components.  See, e.g., Coffee 
(2010), supra note 23, at 346–49; Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: 
Convergence of Form or Function, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329 (2001).  The following 
analysis of local “trust” problems is equally applicable to such partial substitutes.  
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2.3. The Downsides of Transplanting and the Necessity of a “Gradient” 
 
Unfortunately, the ease and feasibility of a process as such is 
not per se predictive of its successful outcome. 40   The 
transplantation technique is prone to well-acknowledged efficiency 
losses, usually stemming from the crucial differences between a 
foreign economy-origin and the conditions on the ground, in a 
transplanting jurisdiction.  Those may include path dependent 
legal or social cultures, inefficient domestic enforcement, 
inadequate judicial expertise, and other factors.41  As a result, even 
though transplanting, as a procedural option, is more convenient, 
expedient and plausible, its ultimate objectives may be thwarted by 
a combination of the foregoing factors, preventing engrafting a 
replica onto a foreign soil. Thus, it is rational for policymakers in 
developing economies not only to borrow but also to adapt certain 
provisions of a transplanted prototype to local realities by inserting 
a “domestic gradient.”   
When local market institutions already exist, the gradient may 
simply tweak the old infrastructure to facilitate a more efficient 
transactional exchange among a set of such preexisting economic 
actors. 42   The changes may also reflect the interests of such 
                                                     
40  See, e.g., Coffee (2010), supra note 23 (citing failures of Russian corporate 
law transplanting). 
41  See generally John Armour et al., The Evolution of Hostile Takeover Regimes in 
Developed and Emerging Markets: An Analytical Framework, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 219, 
280–83 (2011) (suggesting that law is the “least likely . . . pathway for change”); 
Berkowitz et al., supra note 38 (focusing on institutional underpinnings as part of 
“legality” and its economic consequences); Black, supra note 2, at 846–48 
(emphasizing that some institutions are not transplantable and that transplant-
recipients must solve “core problems, including the information asymmetry and 
self-dealing problems” as a precondition to convergence); Choi, supra note 2, at 
1694–95 (emphasizing the importance of pre-existing “country-specific 
environment” and path dependence); Coffee (2010), supra note 23, at 294–95, 350 
(noting that “scholars have found that transplanted legal rules tend to perform 
poorly . . . unless the local culture is receptive”); Glaeser & Shleifer (2002), supra 
note 22, at 1196–97 (emphasizing the mismatch between “the transplantation of 
rules designed for a system with a relatively benign government” and more 
autocratic regimes); Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and Its Effect on 
Developing Economies, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 97, 98, 112  (2002) (emphasizing the need 
for “complementarities between the new law and preexisting legal institutions”); 
Katharina Pistor et al., Law and Finance in Transition Economies, 8 ECON. TRANSITION 
325 (2000) (advocating legal arrangements that encourage outside financing). 
42  “Tweaking” can take various forms of course, ranging from functional 
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preexisting policy actors.43  For instance, the fully-fledged financial 
institutions in the three sample economies might have played a 
role in the drafting processes and reinforced their participation in 
the C&S facilities.44  Unfortunately, if the resultant gradient solely 
protects local vested interests and does not address the underlying 
cultural and socioeconomic differences between the jurisdiction-
origin and the transplant-recipient, the transplant may perform 
poorly.   
In the case of C&S, the general notion that transplants fail due 
to the differences between original and local conditions or a wrong 
gradient does not fully capture all potential problems.  The 
repercussions of a failure of a C&S institution are exacerbated by 
the very nature of these systemically important facilities.  Compare 
the following scenarios:  In one case, a new business association 
statute is imported in a jurisdiction-recipient.  If the relevant 
transplanting statute favors only certain parties, the market as a 
whole may ignore the transplant and employ alternative business 
association formats.  In another case, the transplant itself is a 
systemically important institution.  It is also a monopoly and local 
parties cannot switch to other providers of similar services or 
resort to alternative methods of transacting. The latter example is 
the case of C&S.  
The combination of a market monopoly and systemic 
importance implies that the transplanted institution and the local 
market participants continuously depend on each other’s 
performance and that they all must operate within a certain 
cultural and socioeconomic environment.  Hence, in order to assess 
the validity of the C&S gradient, it is imperative to juxtapose the 
socioeconomic conditions in the transplant-recipients that may 
bear on the risks and business operations of the clearinghouses 
with the structure, objectives and risks of these transplanted 
entities.  
 
                                                     
substitutes to combining multiple features, without reinventing the wheel.  
43  See, e.g., Armour et al., supra note 41, at 280–83 (observing this trend in 
takeover regimes). 
44  Even if a true “capture” by an interest group did not occur, domestic share 
ownership requirements (discussed below) and heavy reliance on national 
regulators might be indicative of some lobbying on the part of the powerful local 
actors.  See infra Section 5; see also UNICREDIT, MARKET PROFILE JUNE 2014: UKRAINE 
6 (2014) (mentioning that some Ukrainian professional associations have amassed 
a significant lobbying power). 
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3. ASSESSMENT STRATEGY:  TRUST IN TRANSACTIONS 
3.1. Introduction 
 
This Section begins with the analysis of C&S institutions, a 
dangerous and systemically important transplant.  The Section 
then places these institutions within the socioeconomic conditions 
of Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan.  The analysis concludes that 
due to both the nature of the transplant and the fundamental trust 
concerns in the sample jurisdictions, their new C&S facilities pose 
serious market risks.  
 
3.2. What are the Clearing and Settlement Transplants? 
3.2.1. Parties and Functions 
 
C&S institutions are very complex and systemically important 
market entities, which developed in the transplant-origin 
jurisdictions, i.e., the U.S. and some European countries, over the 
course of more than half a century.   They perform post-trade 
operations,45 including two broad categories of services:  clearance 
and settlement.  In simple terms, clearing involves trade 
comparison, matching, confirmation, registration, netting and risk-
management, including collateralization and margining, while 
settlement is merely an exchange of money and securities (or other 
assets) in performance of trade obligations.46 
The functional perspective on modern “clearing” often 
presumes the existence of entities like central counterparties 
(“CCPs”). 47   CCPs, for example, send trade confirmations and 
                                                     
45  See generally Craig Pirrong, The Industrial Organization of Execution, Clearing 
and Settlement in Financial Markets 6–8 (Ctr. for Fin. Stud., Working Paper No. 
2008/43,  2007), available at www.cba.uh.edu/spirrong/Clearing_silos.pdf. 
46  Id.; see also Robert R. Bliss & Robert S. Steigerwald, Derivatives Clearing and 
Settlement: A Comparison of Central Counterparties and Alternative Structures, 30 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 22 (2006) (articulating the importance of clearing and settlement 
systems to the stability of the financial system, especially in the global market); 
Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Beyond Negotiability: A New Model for Transfer and Pledge of 
Interests in Securities Controlled by Intermediaries, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 305, 317 (1990) 
(trading within the major United States securities exchanges and the OTC markets 
are cleared and settled by the combined efforts of the Depository Trust Company 
and the National Securities Clearing Corporation). 
47  TINA P. HASENPUSCH, CLEARING SERVICES FOR GLOBAL MARKETS: A 
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settlement instructions to depositories or other settlement 
institutions and help trading parties complete securities trades 
promptly and efficiently.  In the case of derivatives, C&S, 
obviously, also involves position management.48 
The key services of CCPs comprise of:  (1) novation (when a 
CCP acts as a buyer and seller in each trade, thus substituting itself 
for the original parties to the transaction, 49  undertaking the 
counterparty default risk and providing a guarantee of execution); 
(2) multilateral netting services, 50  which have generally replaced 
bilateral clearing of obligations between direct trade 
counterparties; 51  and (3) risk management through membership 
standards, collateral requirements, capital adequacy requirements, 
members’ guarantee funds52 and margining standards, including 
an “initial margin,” usually required after trade execution, and a 
“variation margin,” assessed according to regular, usually daily, 
reevaluation of members’ open positions, if any. 53   CCPs also 
facilitate “straight-through processing” (“STP”) of transactions 
                                                     
FRAMEWORK FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CLEARING INDUSTRY 17–40 (2009). 
48  See, e.g., John McPartland, Clearing and Settlement Demystified, FED. RES. 
BANK OF CHI., No. 210 (Jan. 2005) (explaining how clearing and settlement systems 
for various financial assets work). 
49  COMM. ON PAYMENT AND SETTLEMENT SYS. & TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT’L 
ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SECURITIES SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS 45 
(2001), http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss46.pdf?noframes=1. 
50  COMM. ON PAYMENT AND SETTLEMENT SYS. & EURO-CURRENCY STANDING 
COMM. OF THE CENT. BANKS OF THE GRP. OF TEN COUNTRIES, OTC DERIVATIVES: 
SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES AND COUNTERPARTY RISK MANAGEMENT 43 (1998) 
[hereinafter CPSS (1998)].  
51  Larry E. Bergmann, Senior Associate Dir., SEC Div. of Mkt. Reg., Speech at 
International Securities Settlement Conference: The US View of the Role of 
Regulation in Market Efficiency (Feb. 10, 2004)  (transcript available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch021004leb.htm); see also Kirsi Ripatti, 
Central Counterparty Clearing: Constructing a Framework for Evaluation of Risks and 
Benefits 5, (Bank of Finland, Discussion Paper No. 1, 2004), available at  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=787606 (emphasizing the 
importance of a competitive clearing environment).  
52  See, e.g., Raymond Knott & Alastair Mills, Modelling Risk in Central 
Counterparty Clearing Houses: A Review, FIN. STABILITY REV. 162 (2002), available at 
http://www.jscc.co.jp/en/ccp12/ materials/docs/0416/2.pdf (mapping out the 
ways in which CPPs “help market participants manage the risk of non-
performance by their counterparties”). 
53  See generally Bernanke, supra note 6, at 137 (explaining margining).  See also 
Bradford Nat’l Clearing Corp. v. S.E.C., 590 F.2d 1085, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1978) 
(discussing generally the creation of a national system for clearance and 
settlement of securities transactions); Pirrong, supra note 45 (explaining the 
operations of the national system for clearance and settlement).  
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based on a series of automated transfers between the original 
parties and a number of intermediaries.54 
Interfacing with CCPs are central securities depositories 
(“CSD”), which generally perform custodial, depository and 
settlement services.  Depositories, for instance, accept deposits of 
certificates from broker-dealers and other financial institutions, 
credit and debit accounts of participants, and effect book-entry 
transfers of securities.55  Typically, a CSD holds securities “in a 
fungible bulk; each participant or pledgee having an interest in 
securities of a given issue credited to its account has a pro rata 
interest in the physical securities of the issue held in custody by the 
securities depository in its nominee name.”56 
Although CCPs and CSDs perform different functions, a single 
statutory definition and similar principles often apply to both.57 
Structurally, all CSDs and CCPs fall into two categories:  some are 
independent entities, often owned by the actual users of their 
services, while others are affiliated with one or several major 
exchanges.58 
 
3.2.2. The Risks and Benefits of Centralized C&S 
 
In any interconnected marketplace, a centralized C&S structure 
becomes a double-edged sword. 59   For instance, since a CCP 
                                                     
54  See, e.g., CPSS (1998), supra note 50, at 44 (defining “straight-through 
processing”).  
55  See, e.g., Depository Trust Company, Rules, By-Laws and Organization 
Certificate of the Depository Trust Company (June 2013) (outlining rules and common 
services of depositories). 
56  Securities Exchange Act Release No. 20,221 (Sept. 23, 1983), 48 Fed. Reg. 
45167-02 (Oct. 3, 1983). 
57  Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(23) (2012) with 7 U.S.C. § 1a(15) (2014); see also 
Thomas L. Hazen & Jerry W. Markham, Broker-Dealer Operations Under Securities 
and Commodities Law, SECBDOP § 13:24 (2010) (explaining clearing house 
regulation in the futures industry).  
58  Both structures have their pros and cons.  See, e.g., Pirrong, supra note 45; 
Jean-Charles Rochet, “The Welfare Effects of Vertical Integration in the Securities 
Clearing and Settlement Industry,” IDEI, Toulouse University (2004), 
www.cepr.org/meets/wkcn/1/1627/papers/rochet.pdf (discussing negative 
effects of silos); Heiko Schmiedel et al., Economies of Scale and Technological 
Development in Securities Depository and Settlement Systems, 30 J. BANKING & FIN. 
1783 (2006); Alistair Milne, The Industrial Organization of Post-Trade Clearing and 
Settlement, 31 J. BANKING & FIN. 2945 (2007). 
59  See, e.g., CPSS, supra note 3, at 18 (explaining the general applicability of 
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“interposes” itself between buyers and sellers and provides a 
guarantee that every trade will be completed according to its 
terms, it mitigates the counterparty risk of the transacting parties. 
At the same time, the guarantee exposes the CCP, and thereby the 
whole clearing system, to the counterparty credit risk.60  Defaults 
by large customers theoretically can cause a “contagion” of 
failures.  In that scenario, clearinghouses would have to perform 
under guarantee arrangements and look to their clearing funds, 
thus effectively spreading the losses among all CCP members such 
as broker-dealers or futures commission merchants. These 
structural issues may aggravate the systemic and moral hazard 
risks.61 
An implication of these risks is that when investors rely on the 
clearinghouses’ guarantees and monitoring and become less 
dependent on the financial stability and reliability of futures 
                                                     
the Principles and the presumption that CSDs and CCPs are systemically 
important). 
60  See, e.g., Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 
676–78 (1987) [hereinafter Ivanhoe Partners] (highlighting the unique position of 
the NSCCs as both buyer and seller, creating a grave risk for the market should a 
company fail to pay the NSCC, which would prevent the NSCC from paying its 
sellers, thereby causing a chain reaction with adverse effects on the entire market); 
U.S. GOV’T ACCT. OFF., PAYMENTS, CLEARANCE, AND SETTLEMENT: A GUIDE TO THE 
SYSTEMS, RISKS, AND ISSUES 47–90, (1997) (reviewing counterparty risk mitigation 
and regulation with respect to all major clearinghouses); RALPH S. JANVEY, 
REGULATION OF THE SECURITIES AND COMMODITIES MARKETS 1-45 (1992); David Bates 
& Roger Craine, Valuing the Futures Market Clearinghouse’s Default Exposure During 
the 1987 Crash, 31 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 248, 264 (1999) (explaining the 
limitations of efforts to decrease risk in a centralized system); Sean J. Griffith, 
Substituted Compliance and Systemic Risk: How to Make a Global Market in Derivatives 
Regulation, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1291, 1300–05 (2014) (highlighting that derivative 
transactions create significant counterparty credit risk). 
61  Id.; see also Bernanke, supra note 6 (emphasizing the potential risks of a 
centralized clearinghouse); REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET 
MECHANISMS 51–55 (Jan. 1988) [hereinafter BRADY COMMISSION REPORT]; U.S. GOV’T 
ACCT. OFF., CLEARANCE AND SETTLEMENT REFORM: THE STOCK, OPTIONS, AND 
FUTURES MARKETS ARE STILL AT RISK (1990) [hereinafter GAO, CLEARANCE AND 
SETTLEMENT REFORM] (advocating for one regulatory body with responsibility for 
rationalizing intermarket issues to better prevent a breakdown of the entire 
financial system).  The moral hazard risk may also affect the market monitoring 
functions making netting and proper operational safeguards more important.  See, 
e.g., Craig Pirrong, The Clearinghouse Cure, 31 REG. 44, 45, 48 (2008–2009); Craig 
Pirrong, The Economics of Clearing in Derivatives Markets: Netting, Asymmetric 
Information, and the Sharing of Default Risks Through a Central Counterparty 39–41 
(Jan. 8, 2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1340660.  See 
also Franklin R. Edwards, The Clearing Association in Futures Markets: Guarantor and 
Regulator, 3 J. FUTURES MARKETS 369, 375–92 (1983).  
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commission merchants and broker-dealers, they may have fewer 
incentives to invest in market monitoring.  If, simultaneously, 
clearinghouses failed to establish adequate risk assessment 
policies, their members-financial intermediaries, having better 
information about their own exposure, might be incentivized to 
take on additional risks either intentionally or through heedless 
transactions.62 
Another cohort of problems is triggered by the systemic risk of 
centralized C&S. 63   Clearing agencies act as financial 
intermediaries, similar to banks and insurance companies.64  They 
must make valid and reasonable assumptions about their risk 
exposure, which is always problematic, particularly in crises,65 and 
set up adequate guarantee funds and pertinent collateral rules 
accordingly.  The concurrency of liquidity crunches and other 
types of financial distress across various asset markets may 
effectively deplete not only the capital but also the risk assessment 
capability of a clearing agency. 66   It may also impact other 
clearinghouses, and their members, within an interconnected 
marketplace.  This strengthened interconnectedness, therefore, 
becomes a downside of a multilateral net settlement system.67 
Some serious failures may spring from even a single 
considerable default.  Should a buyer or seller fail to complete a 
sizeable transaction, a clearinghouse would act as a cushion 
mitigating the settlement risk only up to a certain point, and the 
ultimate “result may well be a massive disruption of the securities 
market that could result in harm to innocent third parties.”68  
                                                     
62  See, e.g., Pirrong (2008-2009), supra note 61, at 48 (explaining the moral 
hazard problem and information advantages that intermediaries may have).  But 
see Bernanke, supra note 6, at 138–42 (discussing incentives and structures for 
better monitoring in centralized clearing). 
63  See Sean J. Griffith, Governing Systemic Risk: Towards a Governance Structure 
for Derivatives Clearinghouses, 61 EMORY L.J. 1153 (2012) (emphasizing the general 
dangers of systemic risk and arguing that “a better approach to derivatives 
regulation would be to adopt a more supple regulatory super-structure that 
encourages a diversity of approaches to achieve the objective of minimizing 
system risk”); see generally CPSS, supra note 3. 
64  See generally Bernanke, supra note 6.  
65  Id. at 143. 
66  Id. at 144. 
67  CPSS, supra note 3.  
68  Ivanhoe Partners, supra note 60, at 677; see also Darrell Duffie et al., Policy 
Perspectives on OTC Derivatives Market Infrastructure 24 (Milton Friedman Inst. for 
Res. in Econ., Working Paper No. 2010-002, 2010), available at  
http://bfi.uchicago.edu/RePEc/bfi/wpaper/BFI_2010-002.pdf (describing 
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All these risks, including, in the industry vernacular, credit, 
liquidity, replacement cost, operational, legal and other pre-, post- 
and settlement risks, are tackled through a complex combination of 
legal and operational improvements.69  Moreover, C&S should rest 
on the policies ensuring adequate financial monitoring, effective 
margining, risk management, participant eligibility policies, 
adequate credit risk assessment standards, and net capital 
requirements.70  It is through those mechanisms and operational 
services, such as netting, that C&S agencies may generate 
efficiency gains, minimize their own exposure, and, by extension, 
limit the exposure of market participants.71  
                                                     
“waterfall” structures). 
69  See, e.g., CPSS, supra note 3; CPSS (2001), supra note 49, at 17, 39, 48; SEC 
(2004), supra note 7; COMM. ON PAYMENT AND SETTLEMENT SYS. OF THE CENT. BANKS 
OF THE GRP. OF TEN COUNTRIES, CROSS-BORDER SEC. SETTLEMENTS 53–54 (1995). All 
these risks are mitigated through either improving operations of clearinghouses or 
pertinent law, enforceability provisions, prudential rules, harmonization of the 
settlement cycle, etc.  See, e.g., COMM. ON PAYMENT AND SETTLEMENT SYS. OF THE 
CENT. BANKS OF THE GRP. OF TEN COUNTRIES, DELIVERY VERSUS PAYMENT IN 
SECURITIES SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS 4, 34 (Sept. 1992); COMM. ON PAYMENT AND 
SETTLEMENT SYS. OF THE CENT. BANKS OF THE GRP. OF TEN COUNTRIES ET AL., 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CENTRAL COUNTERPARTIES (Mar. 2004),  
www.bis.org/publ/cpss61.pdf; BACHMANN TASK FORCE, REPORT OF THE 
BACHMANN TASK FORCE ON CLEARANCE AND SETTLEMENT REFORM IN U.S. SECURITIES 
MARKETS 31–32 (1992); Egon Guttman, Transfer of Securities: State and Federal 
Interaction, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 437 (1990); James S. Rogers, Policy Perspectives on 
Revised U.C.C. Article 8, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1431, 1439–41, 1461–70 (1996).  Some 
risks are addressed via a combination of regulatory and operational 
improvements.  Examples include straight-through processing (STP), matching 
services, receive-versus-payment (RVP) and delivery-versus-payment (DVP) 
mechanisms, allowing for a contemporaneous exchange of assets for payments 
and others.  See generally SEC Release No. 8,398, supra note 6; Securities Exchange 
Act Release No. 44,188, 66 Fed. Reg. 20494 (Apr. 23, 2001) (discussing an example 
of an STP provider). 
70  See, e.g., Clearing Agency Standards for Operation and Governance, 
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 64,017, 76 Fed. Reg. 14472 (Mar. 16, 2011) 
(detailing the SEC’s proposed rules for the operation and governance of clearing 
agencies to address gaps identified from the crash); THE OCTOBER 1987 MARKET 
BREAK, SEC STAFF REPORT, ch. X (Feb. 1988); GAO, CLEARANCE AND SETTLEMENT 
REFORM, supra note 61, at xxiii-xxv, xxix-xxx (identifying the problems 
encountered during the crash of 1987 due to the volatility in the market and 
presenting recommendations on how to uniformly prevent those issues in the 
future); Bernanke, supra note 6 (pointing to the major issues within centralized 
clearing and settlement systems); Duffie, supra note 68, at 7 (narrating how to 
calculate the daily risks posed to a CPP). 
71  Self-evidently, these benefits become less obvious or even questionable in 
centralized clearing of certain products like OTC derivatives or in interconnected 
markets.  See, e.g., Bernanke, supra note 6; John P. Jackson & Mark J. Manning, 
Comparing the Pre-Settlement Risk Implications of Alternative Clearing Arrangements 
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The U.S. and European systems, with various degrees of 
success, are built around these cost-efficiency and risk 
considerations.72  At the same time, the risks continue to be real 
and pervasive.  In summary, C&S agencies are a complicated, 
highly technical and systemically important conduit structure that 
facilitates transactional exchange, interacts with the whole market 
and, therefore, must assess the risks and performance prospects of 
as many market participants, i.e. clearing members, as possible.  
This is the animal that the sample economies have recently 
imported.  
 
3.3. Assessment Strategy:  Market Actors 
 
This dangerous foreign animal has been introduced into the 
hostile forest of the local markets of Russia, Ukraine and 
Kazakhstan. The new C&S facilities are now in the middle of a 
transactional structure where local parties buy and sell financial 
products.  This Subsection will demonstrate that the typical 
transactional metrics in the sample economies may undermine the 
ability of a C&S institution to properly assess its exposure and 
monitor its members.  The principal reasons are behavioral 
                                                     
(Bank of England, Working Paper No. 321, Apr. 2007), available at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/Documents/workingpapers/2007/
WP321.pdf (underscoring that inter-agency consolidation may be needed); 
Griffith, supra note 63 (emphasizing structural clearinghouse concerns); Pirrong 
(2009), supra note 61 (highlighting the downsides of centralized C&S); Manmohan 
Singh, Collateral, Netting and Systemic Risk in the OTC Derivatives Market 5–9 (IMF 
Working Paper No. 10/99), available at  
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2010/wp1099.pdf (describing in 
general the positive effects of centralized C&S through netting, collateralization, 
reduction in counterparty risk but also raising individual risk concerns). 
72  See, e.g., CLEARANCE AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD’S SECURITIES 
MARKETS, GRP. OF THIRTY 7 (1989) (concluding organizations that compromise the 
global clearing and settlement industry need to decide on a long-term approach); 
The Direct Costs of Clearing and Settlement: An EU-US Comparison, NERA ECON. 
CONSULTING, City Res. Series, No. 1 (Jun. 2004), 
http://www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/Corporation/LGNL_Services/Business/ 
Business_support_and_advice/Economic_information_and_analysis/Research_p
ublications/Archived+reports+2000-2006.htm (investigating and comparing the 
direct costs of clearing and settling an equity transaction in Europe and in the 
U.S.); The Future of Clearing and Settlement in Europe, BOURSE CONSULT, City Res. 
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distortions, the low level of trust, and the opacity of the local 
economies, which, cumulatively, may lead to systemic risk 
accumulation and exacerbate moral hazard. 
The analysis begins with the fundamental proposition that in 
any country, “[c]onjoint action is possible just in proportion as 
human beings can rely on each other.” 73   This is an almost 
axiomatic presumption in economics and transactions:  all 
transactions presume a certain level of trust among participating 
parties. 74  Importantly, such degree of trust may differ from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction75 and, as demonstrated further in this 
Section, the level of trust in the sample is low. 
What is “trust”?  For the purposes of the analysis, the Article 
relies on the definition by Professors Gilson, Scott and Sabel who 
define the concept of trust as follows: 
 
first, to refer to the complementary combination of informal 
mechanisms—reputation, continuing relations, and 
reciprocity—that evolve through the actions of the parties 
in implementing their substantive goals under the 
agreement; and second, in the increasing confidence of each 
party in the ability of the other to actually perform as the 
agreement requires.76 
 
 In conjunction with the “ability” of the other party to perform 
an agreement, I would like to consider the “willingness” of the 
other party to comply with her contractual obligations and the 
                                                     
73  JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY VOL. I, 109 (1848), 
reprinted in JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY WITH SOME OF 
THEIR APPLICATIONS TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY VOL. II (John M. Robson ed., online ed. 
2006) (arguing that there is a clear and distinct link between societal functions and 
the economy).  
74  Id.  For a review of the research on trust, socioeconomic interactions, and 
reciprocity, see, e.g., LANDA, supra note 4, at 10–15 (describing political and 
sociological theory, relating to socioeconomic interactions). 
75  Resorting to Mill again, in some countries “of first-rate industrial 
capabilities, . . . the most serious impediment to conducting business concerns on 
a large scale, [was] the rarity of persons who [were] supposed fit to be trusted 
with the receipt and expenditure of large sums of money.”  Mill, supra note 73, at 
109–10; see also Oliver E. Williamson, Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic 
Organization, 36 J.L. & ECON. 453, 476–79 (1993) (discussing institutional trust in 
various environments). 
76  Gilson et al., supra note 12, at 1383 n.11. 
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mutual awareness of both parties of a reasonable probability of 
both:  the willingness and the ability. 
Based on the discussed above C&S structure and functions, it is 
self-explanatory that the willingness and ability factors must be 
assessed with respect to several players.  The first group includes 
the transacting parties, i.e., the ultimate users of C&S services like 
brokers, investors, issuers, and others, evaluating the 
“trustworthiness” of each other.  The second inter-linkage is the 
mutual assessment of one another by the private actors and by the 
centralized C&S facilities.  The third inter-linkage is the trust of the 
market actors in the state as an efficient standard setting and 

















If systemic breakages occur in all three inter-linkages, a 
financial model or facility is likely to perform poorly. 
 
3.4. Private v. Private:  Trust Thy Neighbor 
3.4.1. The Bases of Transactional Trust 
 
Within the first two linkages, private market participants and 
C&S facilities must reasonably trust each other in order to transact 
efficiently, i.e., without overcharging the counterparties excessive 
                                                     
77  Section 4 will discuss the role of the state in its dual capacity as the 














GUSEVA (DO NOT DELETE) 4/20/2015  12:13 PM 
2014] KGB’S LEGACY 557 
risk premiums or resorting to costly contractual mechanisms.  This 
is a self-explanatory proposition since all market actors prefer to 
transact for predictable outcomes and be adequately compensated 
for the undertaken risks based on the ex ante risk pricing and ex 
post outcome assessment and enforcement strategies.78   
We can simplify the concept of the expected value of a contract 
through the elements of “trust” as follows:  suppose the value of a 
contract to a transacting party equals V.  Prior to signing the 
contract, based on the information available at time 0 (zero), the 
party may reasonably assign a probability P(t0) that the transaction 
will be completed. The party expects that at time 1, i.e., during 
contractual performance, new adverse information may become 
available. Therefore, the party assigns a probability P(t1) that the 
contract will not be performed exactly as promised.  The party also 
knows that at this junction, her alternative decision may be to go to 
court.  The value of the court award equals E and the probability of 







                                                     
78  Contractual techniques and pricing are often related to trust, or fairness, 
enforcement and information asymmetry related to type identification.  Elena 
D’Agostino & Maurizio Lisciandra, Enforceable vs. Non-enforceable Contracts: A 
Theoretical Appraisal with Fair Players 4–5, 22, (Munich Personal RePEc Archive, 
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Based on this simplistic analysis, the expected value of the 
contact is, obviously, the following: 
 
In the trust context, P is merely a function of the counterparty’s 
performance ability and willingness. 
 
The probability changes between time 0 and time 1 reflect the 
underlying changes in the ability and willingness: 
 
 
To summarize, an individual transacting party, including, in the 
context of the transplants, clearinghouses and trading parties, may 
see the expected value as a function of (a) the probability expressed 
through the “ability” and “willingness” assessed at the point of 
contracting and the future changes in both during performance by 
the counterparty, 79  and (b) the return on enforcement efforts, 
relevant when the original probability of performance by the 
counterparty is reduced. 
Factors A and W must be assessed and observed by all 
transacting parties.  So should the expected intra-performance 
changes, ΔP.  Parties will spend resources on identifying these 
variables.  There, of course, may be differences in the parties’ 
investments:  one party may be ab initio more trustworthy and 
reputable than the other counterparty.  For example, a well-
managed CCP may be more trustworthy compared to a small 
transacting party.  This means that the latter does not need to 
spend the same amount of resources on confirming the obvious 
quality of the CCP and vice versa.  The identification assessment 
                                                     
79  Here, the Article de facto presumes the existence of some form of 
calculative trust, and the discussion is inspired by Williamson’s analysis.  See, e.g., 
Williamson, supra note 75, at 463–69, 481–83 (discussing risk, trust, and calculative 
versus noncalculative risk).  The A and W factors may, of course, affect both 
calculative and personal trust paradigms.   
 Expected Value = P(t0) x [P(t1) x V + [1 – P(t1)] x P(a) x E] 
   P=f(A;W) 
 
   ΔP=f(ΔA;ΔW) 
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efforts are, thus, asymmetric.   
In general, the identification of A, W and P should reduce 
information asymmetry and allow a party to charge optimal prices, 
which can be in the form of margin payments, guarantee funds or 
otherwise, and to select optimal contractual arrangements.  The 
rules of a typical clearinghouse, incorporated by reference into all 
contracts between its members and the clearinghouse, illustrate 
this approach.  
By way of example, the Rules of the National Securities 
Clearing Corporation (NSCC) structure the clearing fund 
contributions around the objective sets of factors.  Those are the 
volatility of net pending positions and liquidity and volatility of 
securities, which are established “based on such factors as the 
Corporation determines to be appropriate from time to time.”80 
This objective pricing prong, based on easily obtainable public 
information, is only one aspect of the contractual arrangement. 
Another crucial prong is compliance with the exhaustive initial 
membership standards, which is more subjective.  Note that NSCC 
has significant discretion in member assessment.  If, for example, 
the applicants’ conduct is not “against the interests” of NSCC or its 
members, NSCC may still decide to accept the applicants who fail 
to meet the initial membership requirements.81  This requirement 
demonstrates an asymmetric A and W assessment scenario where a 
well-established institution whose trustworthiness need not be 
separately evaluated engages in a unilateral assessment. 
After the initial evaluation of the member’s quality, ongoing 
reporting and operational testing become crucial, allowing NSCC 
to continuously make sure that ΔP of contracting parties is 
acceptable. NSCC, again, enjoys significant leeway in determining 
the scope and manner of such testing and reporting.82  
It is possible that the depth of such ongoing monitoring and, 
hence, its costs are premised on the initial assessment of 
compliance and aforesaid waivers.  From a contractual perspective, 
if a party determines that the counterparty’s A and W are 
substantial, well-identified fairness has the capacity to breed more 
                                                     
80  NAT’L SEC. CLEARING CORP., RULES & PROCEDURES 266–68 (2014),  
http://www.dtcc.com/~/media/Files/Downloads/legal/rules/nscc_rules.pdf 
(delineating Procedure XV).  
81  Id. at 21, 30 (Rules 2A & 2B). 
82  Id. 
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“reciprocal” fairness.83  There is a high probability that the “fair” 
type, including high A and W parties, will remain fair regardless of 
increasing returns conducive to breach or suboptimal contract 
choices.84   
While identification of A and W is paramount to all transacting 
parties, in the case of C&S institutions, it is truly indispensable.  In 
order to operate safely, centralized clearing agencies must evaluate 
the A and W of as many market participants as possible.  
The next issue, therefore, is whether a transacting party in the 
sample economies can efficiently identify and monitor the ability 
and willingness of the counterparties to perform and the value of a 
contract. What general market and socioeconomic factors bear on 
the feasibility and cost efficiency of such assessments? 
 
3.4.1.1. Public Information and Market Transparency 
 
Under normal market circumstances, pricing, type 
identification and monitoring efforts are facilitated by several 
public mechanisms. The first one is securities markets with their 
disclosure rules and a network of intermediaries and gatekeepers 
such as institutional investors, brokerages, exchanges, market 
analysts, and others.  Unfortunately, in the sample, the ability of a 
party to determine the nature of a transacting candidate through 
capital markets is questionable. 
First, self-evidently, a smaller market, with thin trading and 
low gatekeeper coverage, may be less efficient and the prices 
                                                     
83  See, e.g., Garry Charness & Matthew Rabin, Understanding Social Preferences 
with Simple Tests, 117 Q.J. ECON. 817 (2002) (demonstrating that people are 
concerned with increasing total social welfare and motivated by reciprocity); 
Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation, 
114 Q.J. ECON. 817 (1999) (displaying evidence that suggests selfish or fair people 
can dominate free rider situations depending on the economic environment); 
Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics, 83 AM. 
ECON. REV. 1281 (1993) (arguing that people will maximize payoffs for those who 
aid them and minimize payoffs for those who harm them); Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. 
Schmidt, Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity (Munich Discussion Paper No. 2001–2, 
2000), http://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14/1/0102_fehr.pdf (presenting new 
research against the self-interest hypothesis and supporting the idea that people 
are motivated by fairness and reciprocity). 
84  See, e.g., D’Agostino & Lisciandra, supra note 78, at 9, 13 (proving the 
theory that once a party’s A and W are substantial, there is a high probability that 
despite increasing returns on a unilateral breach, a fair transaction will remain 
fair). 
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would not reflect the full information and the value of companies.85  
This may be precisely the case of the sample economies.86  Low 
liquidity is another important issue.  For instance, even in Russia, 
which has the largest market in the region, 87  trading liquidity 
remains inadequate.  According to some estimates, there are about 
300 public corporations and shares of only about 90 of them are 
relatively liquid.88   
At the international level, the “gatekeepers” such as 
international investment market analysts, institutional investors 
and other global market actors typically follow more “visible” 
companies. 89   Such international visibility is often achieved 
                                                     
85  For an analysis of the implications of the capital market efficiency or lack 
thereof, see, e.g., Merritt B. Fox, Securities Class Actions Against Foreign Issuers, 64 
STAN. L. REV. 1173, 1186–97, 1247–50 (2012) (describing relative informational 
inefficiency of certain markets, like OTC trading, and juxtaposing it with the 
“Fraud-on-the-Market” theory); Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities 
Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 
1369–416 (1999) (discussing disclosure policies and market efficiency). 
86  See, e.g., 2013 Investment Climate Statement—Kazakhstan 8-9, U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE (2013) (mentioning thin trading in this jurisdiction); Robert B. Ahdieh, 
Making Markets: Network Effects and the Role of Law in the Creation of Strong Securities 
Markets, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 279–349 (2003) (highlighting inefficiencies that 
weaken security markets in transitional states). 
 The Russian exchange statistics also show that only 711 issuers trade shares of 
stock and various bonds on the Moscow Exchange, the largest exchange in the 
country.  This number includes not only corporations but also municipal and 
other public authorities.  See, e.g., Obshchee Kolichestvo Torguemyh Tsennyh Bumag v 
ZAO “FB MMVB” [Total Quantity of Securities on the “Moscow Interbank Currency 
Exchange”], MOSCKOVSKAIA BIRZHA [MOSCOW EXCHANGE], http://moex.com/s18 
(last visited June 9, 2014) (displaying the number of companies that list their stock 
on the market); Spisok Tsennyh Bumag, Dopushchennyh k Torgam v ZAO “FB 
MMVB” [List of Securities Authorized to Trade on the “Moscow Interbank Currency 
Exchange”], MOSCOW EXCHANGE, http://moex.com/ru/listing/securities-list.aspx 
(last visited June 9, 2014) (recording those securities authorized to list on the 
market). 
87  Public Relations Department, Moscow Exchange’s Turnover Was RUB 36.4 
Trln in May 2014, MOSCOW EXCHANGE (June 2, 2014, 4:54 PM), 
http://moex.com/n5585. 
88  Oleg Shvyrkov, Infrastruktura Korporativnogo Upravleniia v Rossii [The 
Infrastructure of Corporate Management in Russia], in INVESTITSII V STRANAH BRIC 
[INVESTMENTS IN THE BRIC COUNTRIES] 41–42 (Svetlana Borodina & Oleg Shvyrkov 
eds., 2010). 
89  See, e.g., Reena Aggarwal et al., Portfolio Preferences of Foreign Institutional 
Investors, 29 J. BANKING & FIN. 2919 (2005) (finding that US funds are more likely to 
invest in institutions with greater transparency and institutions better covered by 
market analysts); Guseva, supra note 34 (explaining that due to their ability to 
increase exposure through cross-listing, investors preferred ADRs to foreign 
shares when investing overseas); Mark H. Lang et al., ADRs, Analysts, and 
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through global CDS markets or cross-listings on major exchanges. 
Both of these signaling and information-revealing mechanisms are 
rare in the sample economies.90  Moreover, major financial advisers 
and brokers, preserving their status as solid reputational 
intermediaries, sometimes distance themselves from even large 
and profitable corruption-tainted clients.91  
The mirror image of this problem is the less observable 
character and nature of businesses within the domestic markets.   
This may be due to several reasons, including not only the general 
shortage of reliable reputational intermediaries, local investment 
banks or independent press,92 but also the persistent inadequacy of 
disclosure and large numbers of administrative offenses in this 
area.93 
                                                     
Accuracy: Does Cross Listing in the United States Improve a Firm’s Information 
Environment and Increase Market Value?, 41 J. ACCT. RES. 317 (2003) (positing that 
firms that cross list on U.S. exchanges maintain higher analyst coverage and 
accuracy than firms that are not cross listed). 
90  Id.; see also Mezentsev, infra note 163 (identifying that few Russian 
companies have CDS contracts and that only three to five Russian companies have 
CDS contracts characterized by considerable liquidity). 
91  Mark Leftly, Scandal-Hit Miner ENRC Shunned by Leading City Brokers, THE 
INDEPENDENT (May 10, 2013), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/scandalhit-miner-enrc-
shunned-by-leading-city-brokers-8610218.htm; see also Gilson & Kraakman, infra 
note 176 (discussing the central role of intermediaries). 
92  See, e.g., Ahdieh, supra note 86; Black, supra note 2, at 798. 
93  In Russia, e.g., the number of administrative offenses in the area of 
disclosure seemed to be on the rise. Otshchet o deiatel’nosti Regional’nogo 
otdeleniia Federal’noj sluzhby po finansovym rynkam v Sibirskom federal’nom 
okruge za 2012 God [Report of Activities for the Year 2012], REGIONAL’NOGO 
OTDELENIIA FEDERAL’NOJ SLUZHBY PO FINANSOVYM RYNKAM V  SIBIRSKOM 
FEDERAL’NOM OKRUGE [REGIONAL DEPARTMENT OF THE FEDERAL FINANCIAL MARKET 
SERVICE IN THE SIBERIA FEDERAL DISTRICT] (2013) (mentioning that the number of 
administrative reports doubled between 2011 and 2012).  In January 2014 alone, 
the centralized financial markets division of the Central Bank of Russia reviewed 
ten major cases involving reporting violations and ten other violations of 
securities market regulations.  Informatsiia ob administrativnyh vzyskaniiakh, 
nalozhennykh Bankom Rossii v sfere finansovykh rynkov [Information About 
Administrative Fines Issued by the Bank of Russia in the Sphere of Financial Markets], 
TSENTRAL’NII BANK ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [CENTRAL BANK OF RUSSIA], 
http://www.cbr.ru/sbrfr/?PrtId=sanctions (last visited Nov. 20, 2014).  Regional 
enforcement divisions conduct thousands of investigations. See, e.g., Godovye 
otchety 2009 [FSFR Annual Report 2009], FEDERAL’NAYA SLUZHBA PO FINANSOVIM 
RINKAM [FEDERAL FINANCIAL MARKETS SERVICE] (2010),  
http://www.cbr.ru/sbrfr/archive/fsfr/archive_ffms/common/upload/FSFR_ot
chet.pdf (providing annual reports of the Federal Financial Markets Service). 
 In Kazakhstan, despite the improvements in financial reporting, disclosure 
remains inadequate, particularly, as concerns affiliated persons, remuneration of 
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Shareholder litigation, particularly in the form of class actions, 
cumulatively serving as signaling and corporate governance 
mechanisms,94 is still in its infancy.95  The public enforcement of 
                                                     
executives and other issues.  See, e.g., Elena Pastuhova et al., Issledovanie 
informatsionnoi prozrachnosti kazahstanskikh kompanii v 2009 g.: Nizkii start — vysokii 
potentsial [Study of Transparency Among Kazakh Companies in Year 2009:  Low Start – 
High Potential], STANDARD & POOR’S (2009), 
http://www.kase.kz/files/mix/research.pdf (describing improvements in 
transparency among Kazakh companies, but noting, for example, that in 2009 only 
eighteen percent of large public Kazakh companies disclosed information on the 
compensation of directors and only nine percent disclosed information on the 
compensation of their management). 
 The public electronic disclosure system in Ukraine is still being developed.  It 
was clearly inadequate until 2003.  See, e.g., Shapran Vitalii, Sistemy raskrytiia 
informatsii v Rossii i Ukraine [Disclosure System in Russia and Ukraine], 23 ZHURNAL 
“RYNOK TSENNIKH BUMAG” [J. “SEC. MARKET”] (2003), 
http://www.old.rcb.ru/archive/articles.asp?id=3791 (explaining that the 
Ukrainian disclosure system, as of 2003, is in the stages of introduction and 
development).  Only recently did the national regulator request that all reports be 
presented in electronic format and unify some reporting obligations.  See, e.g., 
LIGABiznesInform, NKCBFR uzhestochila trebovaniia k raskrytiiu informatsii ob 
emitentahk [The National Commission of Stock and Financial Markets Hardened 
Disclosure Demands of Issuers], LIGAFINANSY (Jan. 10, 2014, 11:45 AM), 
http://finance.liga.net/stock/2014/1/10/news/36959.htm (describing the 
institution of new requirements for electronic disclosures, requiring less 
information of companies but uniform and more frequent disclosures); ORG. FOR 
ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., A CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ASSESSMENT OF 
UKRAINE’S STATE-OWNED AVIATION SECTOR: THE CASE OF ANTONOV 57 (2012), 
http://www.oecd.org/investmentcompact/AntonovEN.pdf (noting that many 
public state-owned enterprises in Ukraine rigorously report to regulatory bodies 
within the government, but “public disclosures are far more selective”). 
94  See, e.g., U.S. Department of State, Kazakhstan, supra note 86, at 8–9 
(remarking on government involvement in the economy); Black, supra note 2, at 
783–90, 798 (“[W]ithout any liability risk, accounting firm partners will sometimes 
accept the ever-present temptation to squander the firm’s reputation to gain or 
keep a client”); Black et al. (2000), supra note 38 (discussing the effect of litigation 
on corporate governance in Russia); Merritt B. Fox, Comment on Russian Corporate 
Governance Today 4–12, 1 CORP. GOVERNANCE IN RUSSIA & TRANSITIONAL ECON. 
(2006) (manuscript at 4–12),  http://www.law.columbia.edu/faculty/full-
time?&main.ctrl=contactmgr.detail&top.robots=all&main.view=profiles.inline_de
tail&global.id=8514&global.elem_id=0&main.id=8514. 
95  See, e.g., APK RF, supra note 16, art. 53 (Russ.), arts. 225.1, 225.11 (setting 
regulations in the area of cumulative action); Dmitry Magonya, Class Actions in 
Russia, 1 RUSS. L.J. 57, 57–65 (2013) (analyzing the necessity and a method of 
introduction of class action suits into the Russian legal system); Dmitrii M. 
Zabrodin, Gruppovye iski v grazhdanskom protsessual’nom prave Rossii: problema 
poriadka prisoedinenia k gruppe [Group Suits in Civil Procedure Law of Russia: the 
Problem of Joining the Class], 9 ZAKONY ROSSII: OPIT, ANALYZ, PRAKTIKA [LAWS OF 
RUSSIA: EXPERIENCE, ANALYSIS, PRACTICE] 65, 65–69 (2012) (describing problems in 
the Russian legal system with adding new plaintiffs to class suits); ASTERS, DOING 
BUSINESS IN UKRAINE 40 (2012), 
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securities law also raises serious concerns.  It may be procedurally 
easy 96  yet inefficient as a deterrent against securities law 
transgressions.  The reputational value of the administrative 
proceedings is questionable, while the maximum civil penalties for 
misleading or incomplete disclosures are exceptionally low.97   
Consider the following example.  A fine in the amount of about 
$30,000 was imposed on a large and profitable aluminum 
producer. 98   In its annual report, the aluminum giant omitted 
material information about the compensation of its management 
company and the “substantive terms” of the management 
agreement and appendices thereto.  The management company 
was, in fact, a part of the same holding structure.  It was an 
offshore entity registered in the Netherlands.  Incidentally, the 
                                                     
http://www.asterslaw.com/upload/iblock/db2/Doing%20Business%20in%20U
kraine.pdf (explaining that “Ukrainian procedural law does not provide for class 
actions”); N. S. Kuznetsova, Corporate Governance in Ukraine 2, OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/1930958.pdf 
(exploring the impact of Ukraine’s failure to develop collective action suits and 
legal procedures requiring insiders to disclose information on share holdings). 
96  See, e.g., Kontrol’no-revіzіina dіial’nіst’ [Control and Audit Activities], 
NATSІONAL’NA KOMІSІIA Z TSІNNIH PAPERІV TA FONDOVOGO RYNKU [NATIONAL 
COMMISSION ON SECURITIES AND SECURITIES MARKET OF UKRAINE] (Jun. 2014), 
http://www.nssmc.gov.ua/activities/controlaudit (outlining the supervisory 
authority of the Ukrainian securities commission); O SOSTOYANII RINKA TSENNIH 
BUMAG V GOSUDARSTVAH-UCHASTNIKAH SNG, ISPOLNITELNIY KOMITET SNG 31–32 
(2012) (summarizing the regulatory actions and new statutory amendments in 
2011); FSFR Annual Report 2009, supra note 93 (presenting the impact of the 
Federal Service of Financial Regulation); FZ RF on Securities, supra note 16, at ch. 
5 (Russ.) (on the authority of the federal securities regulators); Information About 
Administrative Fines Issued by the Bank of Russia in the Sphere of Financial Markets, 
supra note 93 (providing concise information about the method by which fines are 
imposed); Postanovlenie FAS Moskovskogo okruga ot 26 noiabria, 2013 goda 
[Decision of the Federal Arbitration Court of the Moscow Circuit of Nov. 26, 
2013], case No. A40-30770/13-72-263 (mentioning that if a corporation can publish 
the report but does not undertake bona fine efforts to do so, the liability under the 
Administrative Code follows naturally). 
97  In Russia, the civil penalties are roughly between $11,000 and $20,000. 
KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII OB ADMINISTRATIVNYKH PRAVONARUSHENIIAKH 
[KOAP RF] [CODE OF ADMINISTRATIVE VIOLATIONS] art. 15.19 (Russ.) (civil penalties 
for failures to disclose constitute 500,000 to 700,000 rubles in fines and potential 
disqualification from listing on the market for one year); US Dollar-Russian Ruble 
Exchange Rate, BLOOMBERG, http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/USDRUB:CUR 
(last visited Nov. 21, 2014)  (showing an exchange rate of 45.83 rubles to 1 U.S. 
dollar). 
98  See Financial Statements, RUSAL, 
http://rusal.ru/en/investors/financial_stat.aspx (last visited Nov. 21, 2014) 
(providing the financial statements of Rusal, an aluminum company fined for 
disclosure failure). 
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single shareholder of many subsidiaries of the holding appointed 
that management company as the sole executive authority for the 
subsidiaries.  On appeal, the Circuit Court upheld the regulatory 
decision.99  Yet that did not alter the fact that the actual amount of 
the penalty was disproportionately small compared to the profits 
of the aluminum giant and remuneration of its management. 
What are the consequences of undeterred misleading 
disclosure?  Self-evidently, absent robust disclosure, insiders may 
be more inclined to act opportunistically.100  If one adds the super-
concentrated ownership systems existing in all three sample 
economies to this problem, 101  such inclinations logically must 
                                                     
99  See, e.g., Postanovlenie FAS Vostochno-Sibirskogo okruga ot 9 oktiabria 
2013 g. [Decision of the Circuit Court of the East-Siberia District of Oct. 9, 2013], 
case No. A74-6004/2012 (denying the plaintiff's motion to have the fine waived). 
100  Selective disclosure and enforcement do not help in this regard.  Black, 
supra note 2, at 784, 804–05; Simon Johnson et al., Corporate Governance in the Asian 
Financial Crisis, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 141, 144 (2000); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. 
Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737 (1997). 
101  Similar trends affect all three jurisdictions. See, e.g., KORPORATIVNOE 
UPRAVLENIE: KAZAHSTANSKII KONTEKST [CORPORATE MANAGEMENT: THE 
KAZAKHSTAN CONTEXT] 47 (C.A. Filin ed., 2009), 
http://www.kazid.kz/books/1/Page47-print=yes.htm (observing how 
ownership accumulates under control of a small group of shareholders); Anna S. 
Buzelo, Model’ korporativnogo upravleniia v Respublike Kazakhstan [Model of Corporate 
Management in the Republic of Kazakhstan], G GLOBAL (2013), http://old.group-
global.org/ru/lecture/view/6022 (discussing various models of corporate 
ownership and governance in Kazakhstan and ownership concentration patterns); 
Study of Transparency Among Kazakh Companies in Year 2009:  Low Start – High 
Potential, supra note 93 (describing also the general lack of transparency among 
Kazakh companies despite improvements in corporate governance); Mekhanizm 
Zashchity Prav Aktsionerov [Shareholder Protection Mechanism], GRATA (Feb. 2004) 
(underscoring collusion between large shareholders and management), 
http://www.gratanet.com/ru/news/recent_publications/2004/february/1805/; 
Trendy razvitiia kazahstanskoi ekonomiki [Trends in the Development of the Kazakh 
Economy], ZAKON.KZ (Oct. 12, 2011, 1:39 PM), http://www.zakon.kz/4452982-
trendy-razvitija-kazakhstanskojj.html (commenting on a different type of 
concentration – the increasing presence of the state in the economy); A.N. Kostiuk 
& Y.V. Kostiuk, Evoliutsia Struktury Korporativnoi Sobstvennosti v Ukraine [Evolution 
of the Structure of Corporate Ownership in Ukraine], 2 VІSNIK UKRAINS’KOI AKADEMІI 
BANKІVS’KOI SPRAVI [JOURNAL OF THE UKRAINIAN ACADEMY OF BANKING AFFAIRS], no. 
17, 2008, at 4, available at 
http://dspace.uabs.edu.ua/jspui/bitstream/123456789/2365/1/2004_2(17).pdf 
(describing the problematic relationship between the structure of corporate 
ownership in Ukraine and both the productivity and financial efficiency of 
Ukrainian companies); B. Stetsenko,  Stanovlenie otechestvennoi modeli 
korporativnogo upravleniia v kontekste mirovogo opyta [Formation of a Domestic Model 
of Corporate Management in the Context of Global Knowledge], 35 TSENNYE BUMAGI 
UKRAINY 1, 10-12 (2005) (comparing Ukrainian and foreign models of corporate 
ownership); L.S. Ruzhanskaia, Koncentratsiia sobstvennosti i formirovanie osnovnekh 
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increase dramatically. 
Another issue is that the smaller and more opaque sample 
markets with lesser visibility of national companies in the 
international markets create fewer opportunities to identify the 
nature and probability of performance based on the past and 
present reporting by the local parties.  Parties trading in the 
securities of such “locals” will be unable to properly assess them 
                                                     
tipov kontrolia v rossijskikh kompaniiakh [The Concentration of Ownership and 
Formation of Basic Methods of Control in Russian Companies], 1 ZHURNAL 
“KORPORATIVNYE FINANSY” [J. “CORP. FIN.”], no. 5, 2008, at 5–11, available at 
http://ecsocman.hse.ru/data/933/769/1223/5_rujanskaya_5_11.pdf 
(contemplating the shift in both central and regional Russian companies from 
insider-concentrated to outsider-concentrated control, and noting the large role 
being played by regional government in the development of otherwise 
independent firms); A.E. Molotnikov, Kontroliruiushchie, krupnye i minoritarnye 
aktsionery: problemy vzaimodeistviia i pravovogo regulirovaniia [Controlling Majority 
and Minority Shareholders: Problems of Interaction in Legal Regulation], 11 
AKTSIONERNOE OBSHCHESTVO: VOPROSY KORPORATIVNOGO UPRAVLENIIA [JOINT-STOCK 
COMP: QUESTIONS OF CORP. MGMT.], no. 54, 2008, available at http://cg-
aspect.ru/library/59/498#16 (noting the radical centralization of control into the 
hands of a few Russian shareholders and the Russian government); P.V. 
Kuznetsov & A.A. Murav’ev, Struktura aktsionernogo kapitala i resultaty 
deiatel’nosti firm v Rossii [Structure of Shareholder Capital and the Results of 
Firm Activity in Russia] (unpublished doctorate thesis, Konsortium 
ekonomicheskih issledovaniy i obrazovania [Consortium of Economic Research 
and Education]) (on file with the consortium) (describing a trend in the Russian 
stock markets, where a few powerful shareholders take control of blue chip 
companies, withdraw the private value of their control, and in the aggregate drive 
down the value of these companies); V.A. Korolev & A.S. Semenov, Preimushestva 
i riski prisutstviia v kompanii kontroliruiushchego aktsionera [The Value and Risk of 
Controlling Shareholders in Companies], 2012 JOINT-STOCK COMP: QUESTIONS OF CORP. 
MGMT., no. 2, available at 
http://www.cfin.ru/investor/ao/controlling_stake.shtml (listing and analyzing 
the benefits and risks of the prevalence of Russian companies that are owned by 
controlling shareholders); T.G. Dolgopiatova, Koncentracija sobstvennosti v rossijskoj 
promyshlennosti: evoliutsionnye izmeneniia na mikrourovne [Concentration of 
Ownership in Russian Industry: Firm-Level Evolution], 8 ZHURNAL NOVOI 
EKONOMICHESKOI ASSOTSIATSII [J. NEW ECON. ASS’N] (2010), at 80–99, 
http://www.econorus.org/repec/journl/2010-8-80-99r.pdf (examining 100 large 
and medium-size companies that, during a period of de-concentration in 
shareholder ownership between 2005 and 2009, experienced increased entry into 
securities market and also increased ownership by foreign investors); Oleg 
Shvyrkov: “V sovetahk direktorov kompanii usilivaetsja nezavisimaia sostavliaiushchaia” 
[Oleg Shvyrkov: “Independence is Strengthening in Companies’ Councils of Directors], 
PROMISHLENNIK ROSSII [INDUS. OF RUSSIA] (Nov. 2012), 
http://promros.ru/magazine/2012/nov/oleg-shvyrkov-v-sovetah-direktorov-
kompanij-usilivaetsya-nezavisimaya-sostavlyayuschaya.phtml (noting progress in 
the independence of Russian companies’ boards, but emphasizing the need for 
amendments to and improvements in the civil code that bolster democratic 
corporate governance). 
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based on publicly available information.  This may distort trading 
strategies and affect liquidity and volatility of securities.  Similarly, 
the trading participants will be less likely to make valid 
assessments of each other’s exposure and future performance.  
Without ex ante robust disclosure and market transparency, the 
pre-contractual pricing and performance assessment become 
weaker and costly.  In turn, the probability of future performance 
(P(t1)) is more uncertain.   
The second typical public monitoring mechanism is financial 
institutions like lenders, operating as a substitute for or 
supplement to the capital market monitoring.  For instance, various 
capital providers are often involved in monitoring their customers’ 
businesses.  Such monitoring entails significant benefits for 
borrowers, their contracting parties and creditors, who may now 
rely on the lender’s type-identification research and monitoring 
efforts. 102   Yet, in the developing world, the accuracy of such 
monitoring and ensuing signaling may be undermined by personal 
“connections” between lenders and debtors, corruption, agency 
costs, and otherwise underdeveloped financial practices.103 
                                                     
102  See generally James R. Booth, Contract Costs, Bank Loans, and the Cross-
Monitoring Hypothesis, 31 J. FIN. ECON. 25 (1992); Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory 
of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 912–25 (1986). 
103  This may also be a typical externality of bank-based monitoring.  See, e.g., 
Christian Leuz & Felix Oberholzer-Gee, Political Relationships, Global Financing, and 
Corporate Transparency: Evidence from Indonesia, 81 J. FIN. ECON. 411, 436–37 (2006); 
Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Which Capitalism?  Lessons from the East 
Asian Crisis, 11 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 40 (1999) (explaining the disadvantages of a 
relationship-based system). 
 On the financial system in the sample economies, see, e.g., Black, supra note 2; 
Koen Schoors & Ksenia Yudaeva, Russian Banking as an Active Volcano, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY 570 (Michael Alexeev & Shlomo 
Weber eds., 2013); Brian Sawers, Reevaluating the Evidence for Anticommons in 
Transition Russia, 16 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 233, 245–49 (2010); Ukraine: Request for Stand-
By Arrangement-Staff Report; Staff Supplement; and Press Release on the Executive 
Board Discussion, INT’L MONETARY FUND (May 2004), 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2004/cr04129.pdf; INT’L MONETARY 
FUND, UKRAINE: FINANCIAL SYSTEM STABILITY ASSESSMENT, INCLUDING REPORTS ON 
THE OBSERVANCE OF STANDARDS AND CODES ON THE FOLLOWING TOPICS: MONETARY 
AND FINANCIAL POLICY TRANSPARENCY, BANKING SUPERVISION, AND PAYMENT 
SYSTEMS (Nov. 2003) [hereinafter IMF, 2003], 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2003/cr03340.pdf; Ukraine Country 
Profile 2008, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION ENTERPRISE SURVEYS, WORLD 
BANK (2008), at 11, available at 
http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/~/media/FPDKM/EnterpriseSurveys/Docu
ments/Profiles/English/ukraine-2008.pdf (providing indicators and a description 
of the development of financial markets in Ukraine); Kazakhstan Country Profile 
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An important and somewhat idiosyncratic feature of the 
sample is that their national capital providers may rationally 
believe that they operate under unstable, “endgame” conditions. 
Their unfortunate “experiences” are numerous:  from the 
government-related financial crisis of 1998 to the recent failures 
and de-privatization of financial institutions.104  This “last period” 
problem may effectively discourage local financiers from investing 
in ex ante identification or long-term monitoring efforts.  A good 
example is the typical domestic practice of curtailing credit and 
charging high interest rates.105 
The resulting signals from traditional lenders thus become 
inaccurate:  all companies, regardless of their individual 
willingness and ability to perform, are charged higher rates and, in 
turn, subject to less monitoring, even though the well-connected 
clients may be continuously undercharged.106  
                                                     
2009, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION ENTERPRISE SURVEYS, WORLD BANK 
(2009), at 11, available at 
http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/~/media/FPDKM/EnterpriseSurveys/Docu
ments/Profiles/English/kazakhstan-2009.pdf (providing indicators and a 
description of the development of financial markets in Kazakhstan); INT’L 
MONETARY FUND, REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN—FINANCIAL SECTOR ASSESSMENT 
PROGRAM UPDATE—DETAILED ASSESSMENTS AND UPDATES OF FINANCIAL SECTOR 
STANDARDS AND CODES 19 (Oct. 2004) [hereinafter IMF Report No. 04/338], 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2004/cr04338.pdf. 
104  See, e.g. Padma Desai, Why Did the Ruble Collapse in August 1998?, 90 AM. 
ECON. REV. 48 (2000); Andrea Zazzarelli, Sovereign Default and Recovery Rates, 1983-
2006, MOODY’S INVESTORS SERV. (2007), 
http://ksuweb.kennesaw.edu/~dtang/CRM/Moodys_SovereignDefault.pdf 
(arguing that the collapse of the ruble was at least partially a result of the 
unanticipated Asian financial crisis); Ukraine Defaults on Domestic Debt, KYIVPOST 
(Sept. 15, 1998, 1:00 AM), https://www.kyivpost.com/content/business/ukraine-
defaults-on-domestic-debt-675.html?flavour=mobile (describing the Ukrainian 
default of 1998 and that “[t]he Ukrainian government will always have the default 
stamp on its forehead”); Oksana Kobzeva and Daria Korsunskaya, TB RF obrek 
banki na ukrupnenie [The Central Bank of Russia Condemned Banks to Consolidation], 
BANKI.RU (Dec. 31, 2013, 0:03 AM), 
http://www.banki.ru/news/bankpress/?id=6042669 (describing Russia’s 
decision to consolidate domestic banks and that, for the first time since the 2008–
2009 financial crisis, a lack of confidence in the banking system has returned).  
105  See, e.g., Sawers, supra note 103, at 246; Ruta Aidis & Yuko Adachi, Russia: 
Firm Entry and Survival Barriers, 31 ECON. SYS. 391, 407 (2007); IMF, 2003, supra 
note 103; Genrikh Salata, Barriers to Bilateral Business Relations: The Case of Australia 
and Ukraine, 6, 9, 20 (2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1832044 (documenting key 
complaints of Australian companies doing business in Ukraine).  
106  Market actors are also generally aware that shirkers attempt to mimic the 
behavior of the “fair” type and may mistrust all. See, e.g., D’Agostino & 
Lisciandra, supra note 78, at 9 (outlining a framework of contacting types and 
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Thus, neither capital markets nor other capital providers 
logically operate as efficient producers of information regarding 
the “trustworthiness” of private parties and the value of their 
securities and other financial instruments.  To summarize, the 
following two consequences are important.  On the one hand, 
trading participants will be unable to assess the quality and value 
of the products in which they are transacting. On the other hand, 
by extrapolation, reporting and signaling problems may 
undermine the transparency and predictability of performance by 
trading participants, which operate within the same opaque 
environment.  Overall, the resultant information losses should 
become costly to the whole economy and affect not only capital 
markets and trading per se but also their C&S segment.107   
 
3.4.1.2. Private Contracting as a Type-Revealing Technique 
3.4.1.2.1. Costly Probabilistic Assessments Under 
Uncertainty 
 
In theory, this may leave inter se contracting techniques as a 
second-best strategy for assessing the ability and willingness to 
perform.  Based on privately generated information, parties may be 
in a better position to choose appropriate contractual formats, 
enforcement and performance incentives.108   
Yet there are four important caveats.  First, this method requires 
significant upfront investments into the exploration of every single 
candidate or product and, potentially, individualized contract 
drafting.109  This makes it less cost-efficient than a combination of 
privately and publicly generated information. 110   Moreover, 
clearing agencies are expected to benefit from the economies of 
scale generated by public reporting, market transparency and 
                                                     
clarifying the incentive to appear “fair”). 
107  See generally Simeon Djankov et al., Private Credit in 129 Countries, 84 J. 
FIN. ECON. 299 (2007); Thorsten Beck et al., Financial Intermediation and Growth: 
Causality and Causes 18 (Central Bank of Chile Working Paper No. 56, 1999), 
available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/chb/bcchwp/56.html.  
108  Gilson et al., supra note 12, at 1381. 
109  Such investments are justified mainly in transactions where the payoffs 
outweigh the original type identification efforts. 
110  See, e.g., Fox (1999), supra 85, at 1362–70 (underscoring the “public good” 
aspects of valid issuer disclosure). 
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capital market monitoring.111  Individual type identification is also 
inefficient in the case of smaller deals or transactions that are 
supposed to be standardized, such as sales of securities and their 
clearing and settlement.  Consequently, it may be cheaper for the 
parties to demand and pay additional, potentially indiscriminate 
risk premiums for uncertain A and W. 
 
3.4.1.2.2. Trust and Culture 
 
The second caveat is the cultural ambience, undermining the 
expected value of private contracting in the sample.  Specifically, in 
a typical market, parties are supposed to transact bearing in mind 
an estimated average level of “trust” among market actors and in a 
society in general.112   
Obviously, even in the “fairest” and relatively stable market, 
parties may move outside a self-enforcing range of performance 
and disregard originally “trustworthy” commitments if the ex post 
profitability of defecting substantially increases compared to the 
bargained-for payoff or the value of reputation.113  All contracts are 
thus drafted bearing in mind that ex post performance may 
deteriorate with time regardless of the parties’ original type and 
bona fide nature.  The A and W factors may change over time. 
There is, however, a cultural assumption allowing local parties 
to reduce the exploratory investments in type identification and 
performance monitoring.  This is the public trust presumption that 
is implicitly incorporated in the probability of performance and of 
the frequency of “fair” type parties.114   
                                                     
111  For example, the NSCC rules and procedures rely on such mass-scale 
public reporting obligations.  NSCC, supra note 80, at Rule 2B. 
112  See MILL, supra note 73 (opining that joint action among parties is directly 
correlated with the degree of trust among the parties); Williamson, supra note 75 
(explicating the notions of trust among social actors). 
113  Almost obligatory references are, of course, Ronald Coase, The Conduct of 
Economics: The Example of Fisher Body and General Motors, 15 J. ECON. & MGMT. 
STRATEGY 255, 260 (2006); Benjamin Klein, Fisher—General Motors and the Nature of 
the Firm, 43 J.L. & ECON. 105, 129 (2000) (discussing the correlation between the 
self-enforcing relationship and changes in market conditions). 
114  See, e.g., MILL, supra note 73; LANDA, supra note 4, at 15; Kenneth J. Arrow, 
Gifts and Exchanges, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 343, 357 (1972) (observing that “[v]irtually 
every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust”); Stephen 
Knack, Trust, Associational Life, and Economic Performance 2 (Munich Personal 
RePEc Archive, Paper No. 27247, 2010) (“Where social and legal mechanisms for 
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In this sense, the sample countries do not fare well in terms of 
both social and market interactions.  For instance, an abysmal 1% 
of Muscovites reportedly trust people in general, including the 
sentiments towards long-term acquaintances or even their 
families,115 while Ukrainians trust church above all and the level of 
social and interpersonal trust has been low in the past years.116  In 
fact, many contracting parties seem to expect that defection is 
highly probable.117 
                                                     
the efficient resolution of prisoners’ dilemma and principal-agent games are weak 
or absent – i.e., where most potential pairs of economic transactors cannot trust 
each other – the private returns to predation increase while the private returns to 
production fall.”).  Trust, obviously, is part of “[c]ultural values represent[ing] the 
implicitly or explicitly shared, abstract ideas about what is good, right, and 
desirable in a society.”  Amir N. Licht et al., Culture, Law, and Finance: Cultural 
Dimensions of Corporate Governance Laws 6 (Soc. Sci. Res. Network, Working Paper, 
2001), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=267190; René M. 
Stulz & Rohan Williamson, Culture, Openness, and Finance, 70 J. FIN. ECON. 313 
(2003). 
115  See, e.g., The Matter of Trust in Russia, RUSS. MEDIA (May 14, 2013), 
http://russmedia.wordpress.com/2013/05/14/the-matter-of-trust-in-russia/ 
(citing the findings of the Eurobarometer in Russia and the research by the 
Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration); 
Pavel Stepantsev, Vse na lichnihk sviaziahk [Everything on Personal Connections], 
VEDOMOSTI, May 13, 2013, 
http://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/news/11931461/svoi_lyudi#ixzz2TFWzeyo
Z (arguing that in Russia people are less likely to trust each other than  in the 
majority of economically developed countries – with the exclusion of France and 
Spain – and citing that less than one percent of Moscovites think that in general 
people can be trusted, independent of whether those people are acquaintances or 
not).  See also Gerry Mackie, Patterns of Social Trust in Western Europe and Their 
Genesis, in TRUST IN SOCIETY 245, 255 (Karen S. Cook ed., 2001) (discussing social 
trust data of modern European societies); Jo Crotty & Andrew Crane, Transitions 
in Environmental Risk in a Transitional Economy: Management Capability and 
Community Trust in Russia, 7 J. RISK RES. 413 (2004) (analyzing Russia’s 
environmental changes as a result of dramatic economic changes).  
116  Ukrainians Trust Church Most, UKRAINE BUS. ONLINE (Dec. 28, 2011, 10:17 
AM), http://www.ukrainebusiness.com.ua/news/4167.html; John M. Johnson & 
Andrew Melnikov, The Wisdom of Distrust: Reflections on Ukrainian Society and 
Sociology, in STUDIES IN SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 11 (Norman K. Denzin ed., vol. 33 
2009) (contemplating the high level of distrust of government institutions in 
Ukrainian society and the challenges this introduces when attempting to poll 
Ukrainians to better understand their relationship with government).  Cf. 
NATALYA PANINA, UKRAINIAN SOCIETY 1994–2005: SOCIOLOGICAL MONITORING 
(2005), http://dif.org.ua/modules/pages/files/1337234258_1666.pdf (observing 
that although after the Orange Revolution, societal trust somewhat increased, 
interpersonal conflicts, including conflicts among family members, increased as 
well).  Id. at 130.  See also id. at 37–39, 41, 45–46 (comparing the trust level among 
different constituencies).  
117  See, e.g., Kathryn Hendley, Coping With Uncertainty: The Role of Contracts in 
Russian Industry During the Transition to the Market, 30 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 417, 
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Examples of trust-related problems in the sample economies 
are legion.  Corporate governance rules may be routinely violated 
by even respected managers,118 defaults in payment are common 
even among repeat players, 119  and significant hold-up risks 
manifest themselves in long-term agreements even among the 
largest and “best” domestic companies.  Those “best” contracting 
parties readily hold counterparties who have made an asset-
specific investment hostage in order to renegotiate performance 
schedules or extort price concessions.120  To top it off, widespread 
corruption and bribery seem to be indispensable variables in 
private contracting.121   
 
                                                     
455–59 (2010) (discussing how many firms “had no sustained expectation of 
repeated interactions[, as] . . . [t]hey were always waiting for the proverbial shoe 
to drop.”). 
118  Bernard S. Black, Does Corporate Governance Matter?  A Crude Test Using 
Russian Data, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2131 (2001) (describing how Russia’s laws are 
often weak at constraining behavior); Bernard S. Black, The Corporate Governance 
Behavior and Market Value of Russian Firms, 2 EMERGING MKTS. REV. 89 
(2001) (suggesting cultural constraints are weak and “Russia has weak laws 
governing behavior by firms and insiders[,] . . . weak norms for insider conduct, 
and weak reputational constraints on insider conduct”) (citation omitted). 
119  Kathryn Hendley, The Puzzling Non-Consequences of Societal Distrust of 
Courts: Explaining the Use of Russian Courts, 45 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 517, 537 (2012) 
(commenting that the firms that did not receive payments often also failed to 
make payments).  
120  See, e.g., Andrei Yakovlev et al., Empirical Analysis of Suppliers’ Non-
Performance Risks in Execution of Public Procurement Contracts in Russia, in 
CHARTING A COURSE IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT INNOVATION AND KNOWLEDGE 
SHARING 253–87 (G. L. Albano, K. F. Snider & K. V. Thai eds., 2013), available at 
http://ippa.org/jopp/download/vol12/Book/Chapter%2010_Yakovlev-
Demidova-Balaeva.pdf (analyzing empirical data on state contracts for 
procurement of goods, observing a reduction in prices at auctions when state 
actors bid, and indicating contract performance problems). 
121  See generally Paul B. Stephan, Rationality and Corruption in the Post-Socialist 
World, 14 CONN. J. INT’L L. 533 (1999); Ukraine Country Profile 2008, supra note 103 
(“Inefficient regulations constrain firm efficiency as they present opportunities for 
soliciting bribes where firms are required to make ‘unofficial’ payments to public 
officials to get things done”); TRENDS IN CORRUPTION AND REGULATORY BURDEN IN 
EASTERN EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA, WORLD BANK (2011).  The press continuously 
expresses similar concerns.  See, e.g., European Business Association: Trust of 
Investors in Ukraine Before Election Plunges to Record Low Indicator, KYIV POST (Oct. 5, 
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3.4.1.2.3. Transactional Implications 
 
Cumulatively, these maladies should make appropriate inter se 
identification efforts costlier or unfeasible.  Private parties should 
respond to these problems by resorting to the mechanisms that 
eliminate the need for a precise type identification.  For instance, 
one may view corporate ownership concentration in the sample as 
a way of protecting property and controlling untrustworthy 
outside shareholders, albeit at the expense of company value, 
inversely correlated with such concentration.122 In contracting, a 
defensive strategy would be using easily enforceable contracts 
with hard terms.123  This is indeed a popular method in the sample 
jurisdictions. 
Contracts are often based on specific terms, such as penalty 
clauses, cash on delivery or before delivery, or the right to 
unilaterally change the price, which eliminates the delivery and 
payment risks in case of either inadvertent or opportunistic 
breach. 124   Contracting parties do that routinely and often 
regardless of whether they are dealing with a one-time or a long-
term customer.125  Thus, the initially low-trust environment moves 
                                                     
122  P.V. Kuznetsov & A.A. Murav’ev, supra note 101, at 38 (registering lower 
Tobin’s Q ratio of Russian companies with concentrated ownership). 
123  See generally D’Agostino & Lisciandra, supra note 78, at 17–21 
(expounding on the costs of complete, hard-terms contracting); Gilson et al., supra 
note 12, at 1400, 1381 n. 6 (discussing the preference for more contingent 
arraignments, undesirability of “price tags” for defaults and reviewing literature 
showing that voluntary cooperation may be ousted by formal mechanisms). 
124  Yuliya Guseva & Oleksiy Kononov, Enforcement of Contracts in Russia: 
Positive Developments and Persisting Dilemmas, in THE CASE LAW OF CENTRAL & 
EASTERN EUROPE: ENFORCEMENT OF CONTRACTS 818–27 (Stefan Messmann & Tibor 
Tajti eds., 2009) (discussing the heavy use of payment penalties in modern 
Russia); Leonila Guglya & Oleksiy Kononov, Enforcement of Contracts in Ukraine, in 
THE CASE LAW OF CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROPE: ENFORCEMENT OF CONTRACTS 1034–
41 (Stefan Messmann & Tibor Tajti eds., 2009); Sh. B. Malikova et al.,  Ugolovno-
pravovye aspekty bor’by s prestupleniiami  v sfere oborota tsennykh bumag [Criminal-
Legal Aspects of Fighting Securities Crime], in “VOPROSY PRAVA V SOVREMENNOM 
MIRE”: MATERIALY MEZHDUNARODNOI ZAOCHNOI NAUCHNO-PRAKTICHESKOI 
KONFERENTSII [QUESTIONS OF LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD: MATERIALS OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL REMOTE SCIENTIFIC AND APPLIED RESEARCH CONFERENCE] (SibAk 
2013), available at http://sibac.info/index.php/2009-07-01-10-21-16/7810-2013-05-
16-15-18-55. 
125  Compare Hendley (2010), supra note 117, at 435–44 (commenting on how 
ineffectual contracts were and how they provided only artificial guarantees), with 
Kathryn Hendley et al., Law, Relationships, and Private Enforcement: Transactional 
Strategies of Russian Enterprises 4, 17 (The William Davidson Inst., Univ. of Mich. 
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private actors away from Pareto-superior contractual formats, 
incomplete agreements, cheaper informal agreements based on 
relationships, or better corporate governance practices.126 
The fact that private parties in the sample have started to use 
courts more often and that recently established firms initiate 
litigation more frequently than older enterprises may be also 
indicative of the new growing trend resulting from the ex ante low 
level of trust.127  Recall that when the anticipated probability of the 
adverse changes in the Willingness or Ability is high, Enforcement, 
based on payoff expectations, looks like a more attractive 
alternative.  First, parties use specific terms and penalties whose 
proof, verification and enforcement in court are much easier.  
Afterwards, they go to court to enforce them regardless of whether 
they trust the judiciary in the first place.  They just have to trust 
courts more at time 1 if the expected value of enforcement (E) 
exceeds the expected value of performance.  
Unfortunately, these risk-reduction strategies may not only 
distort future contractual practices128 but also are unsuitable for all 
industries.  Thus, the third caveat is that such strategies do not fit 
within a centralized C&S structure.129 
Recognizing this problem, the sample economies attempted to 
change them whenever possible.  For instance, in Ukraine, it was 
indeed common to complete securities trades on the prepayment 
or pre-delivery terms. 130   Today, in compliance with the 
                                                     
Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 72, 1998), 
http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/39462/wp72.pdf?seq
uence=3 (analyzing firms’ different reasons for engaging in self-enforcement 
techniques). 
126  See, e.g., D’Agostino & Lisciandra, supra note 78, at 2 (concluding that the 
value of the contract is far less influential on behavior than the overall framework 
for fairness in the contractual environment); Robert Gibbons, Trust in Social 
Structures: Hobbes and Coase Meet Repeated Games, in TRUST IN SOCIETY 339, supra 
note 115 (observing that “[e]ven ostensibly formal processes such as 
compensation, transfer pricing, internal auditing . . . often cannot be understood 
without consideration of their associated informal agreements”); Knack, supra 
note 114, at 10 (mentioning that “[t]rust can . . . reduce transactions costs”). 
127  See, e.g., Hendley (2012), supra note 119, at 523, 544–45 (explaining the 
reasons for Russian firms to use courts to resolve problems).  
128  The lack of “normal” relational contracting and breach may become self-
propagating. David Campbell, Breach and Penalty as Contractual Norm and 
Contractual Anomie, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 681, 691 (2001).  
129  See supra Section 3.2. 
130  UNICREDIT, supra note 44, at 10, 14 (noting that “[m]ost of the deals in 
Ukraine involving foreign investors are settled OTC” and settled on pre-payment 
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international practices, the transplants reinforce other C&S 
methods, like DVP or RVP, and call for stronger risk management 
of clearing agencies.131   
Finally, a counterparty or clearinghouse cannot add a large and 
indiscriminate default price tag to every deal, post-trading 
operation or membership standard lest that prohibitively increases 
the cost of capital.  This is precisely the opposite of what the C&S 
reformers intend to achieve. 
 
3.4.1.2.4. Market Perceptions:  Game Over 
 
The fourth caveat undermining the efficiency of the inter se type 
identification touches upon deeper, fundamental issues.  In a 
normalcy scenario, a rational party should view breach and 
opportunism as possible but extraordinary and undesirable events. 
Justifying causes are usually limited to impracticability of 
performance due to unforeseeable supervening events or 
frustration of purpose, which are both in part premised on the 
severity of the events whose risks cannot not be deemed assumed 
by a contracting party. 132   If a party does breach absent 
extraordinary market circumstances causing the breach, the market 
becomes aware of the breach and incorporates this information 
into the future dealings with the breaching party.  The 
consequences are possibly fewer deals or more price discounts.133 
Honest performers become well-known players whose past 
contractual experiences should multiply future fair and reciprocal 
deals.134   People also seem to reciprocate in response to either 
                                                     
and pre-delivery bases, but that stock exchange clearing differed and was done 
through a depository). 
131  On DVP/RVP and STP, see generally SEC Release No. 8,398, supra note 6; 
SEC Release No. 44,188, supra note 69.  
132  See, e.g., Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 59 
(1980) (discussing the doctrine of frustration, other contractual doctrines, and the 
correlation between Essex’s advantage and high profits with the losses ALCOA 
suffered).  
133  See generally Black, supra note 2, at 820 (discussing an example of Russian 
companies whose cross-listed securities were discounted); Coase, supra note 113; 
Hendley et al. (1999), supra note 125, at 7. 
134  See, e.g., Coase, supra note 113, at 260 (observing “that the incentive for 
opportunistic behavior is usually checked by the need to take account of the effect 
on future business”); Gilson et al., supra note 12, at 1396 n.49, 1411 (“’[W]hile 
benefits of enhanced pro-social behavior can be substantial in the static case, the 
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positive or negative actions by awarding the fair and punishing the 
unfair. 135   These objective factors and subjective propensities 
increase the mutual confidence in performance and minimize 
contractual losses.136   
A challenge faced by the sample economies, however, is that 
there may be no culprit to reciprocate against and no performer to 
award.  Neither is there a sufficient number of repeated “games.” 
Absent repeated interactions and other trust-building or 
information-revealing mechanisms, short-term inter se cooperation 
cannot significantly improve trust through identifying the A and W 
of the parties.137 
There is an obvious lack of long-term players, which is partly 
due to the profound changes in the composition of local elites and 
businesses between the 1990s and in the second decade of the 21st 
century.138  The reasons vary from political risks and instability to 
the proliferation of corporate raiding, multiple arrests of 
entrepreneurs and the slow breakdown of formerly gigantic Soviet 
enterprises.139 
The history of the three sample jurisdictions is also replete with 
cases where:  (a) it was profitable for a party to exhibit some 
alacrity exiting the domestic markets when their private assets 
suddenly came to the attention of persons connected with 
authorities and (b) certain assets were de facto or de jure de-
privatized by the state on a whim.140  
                                                     
potential impact . . . is greater in a dynamic context, particularly in economic 
environments featuring repeated personal interaction.’”). 
135  Ernst Fehr et al., Reciprocity as Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental 
Evidence, 65 ECONOMETRICA 833, 839 (1997); Fehr & Schmidt, supra note 83, at 32–
37; Gilson et al., supra note 12, at 1384 n.14. 
136 Russell Hardin, Conceptions and Explanations of Trust, in TRUST IN SOCIETY 3, 
3–4, supra note 115 (reviewing these reputational and self-interest aspects of trust); 
Arrow, supra note 114; Campbell, supra note 128, at 688–90; Ernst Fehr et al., 
Fairness and Contract Design, 75 ECONOMETRICA 121, 151 (2007) (confirming in their 
experiments that “the principals understand that fairness matters and 
predominantly choose the superior bonus contract that relies on fairness as an 
enforcement device,” although the combination of a percentage of fair players and 
specific strategic situations also matters). 
137  Individual “trust” expectations are partially based on past transactional 
experiences and require a significant number of interactions.  D’Agostino & 
Lisciandra, supra note 78, at 3, 20–21. 
138  Kazakhstan in this sense may be viewed as a politically stable exception. 
139  See, e.g., infra notes 140, 152–57 (chronicling the unstable and state-
controlled business environments in the former Soviet states).  
140  See, e.g., Thomas Firestone, Criminal Corporate Raiding in Russia, 42 INT’L L. 
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In this sense, it does not matter what Probability of performance 
a contracting party assigns to its counterparty – the latter may 
convert into a defector due to sudden exogenous events regardless. 
The discussed above opacity of the market and the unexpected 
nature of the events may make the actual moment of the 
transformation from an honest collaborator into a defector 
unobservable to outsiders.  In a way, the conversion becomes a 
local species of “force majeure” or “exit by necessity.” 
Recall that in a normalcy scenario, the gains from defection are 
less than the gains from preserving reputation.141  Domestic market 
boundaries should be also tight and exit limited 142  so that the 
market can ostracize the defectors.  These conditions do not hold in 
the sample.  In fact, the ubiquitous flight of capital from the sample 
countries to offshore jurisdictions may be viewed as both safe and 
                                                     
1207 (2008) (describing the illegal corporate raiding that has become common in 
Russia); Hendley (2010), supra note 117, at 455–59 (stating that the development of 
new transactional norms was hindered because post-Soviet managers carried the 
cultural norms from the Soviet era into the nineties); Andrei Yakovlev et al., 
Means of Production Versus Means of Coercion: Can Russian Business Limit the 
Violence of a Predatory State?, 30 POST-SOVIET AFF. 171 (2014) (describing the 
transition of developing societies to societies with sustained economic growth); 
Aaron Beitman, The Challenge of Corporate Raiding in Russia, TERRORISM, 
TRANSNAT’L CRIME & CORRUPTION CTR. (Jan. 3, 2013), 
http://traccc.gmu.edu/2013/01/03/the-challenge-of-corporate-raiding-in-
russia/ (“[H]igh uncertainty around property rights, extensive corruption and 
poor corporate governance have facilitated the rise of the phenomenon known as 
corporate raiding in Russia.”); Carl Schreck, The Danger of Doing Business in Russia, 
TIME (Dec. 19, 2009) (discussing examples of corporate actors who suffered due 
to raiding tactics); Maria Danilova, Ukraine Corporate Raids Stifle Foreign 
Investment, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 27, 2012, 6:20 AM), 
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/05/27/ukraine-corporate-raids-stifle-
foreign-investment/(commenting on the negative impact of corporate raids in 
Ukraine); Kazakhstan Aims to Nationalise Top Three Private Pension Funds, REUTERS 
(Mar. 5, 2013, 5:56 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/05/kazakhstan-funds-
idUSL6N0BX4RJ20130305 (describing Kazakhstan’s plans to nationalize the 
nation’s largest pension funds); Alexei Goriaev & Konstantin Sonin, Is Political 
Risk Company-Specific?  The Market Side of the Yukos Affair (Soc. Sci. Research 
Network, Working Paper No. 772, 2005), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/Sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=676875 (looking into the 
“nature of company-specific political risks in emerging markets”). 
141  See, e.g., Coase, supra note 113; Klein, supra note 113.  
142  See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of 
Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 557 (2003) (arguing that reputational effects of 
contracts work only in relatively small and homogenous markets where actors 
will quickly know why bad actors continually fail to honor their contracts); 
Williamson, supra note 75, at 473 (discussing the evolution of commercial trust 
with the advent of new communication technologies). 
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profitable exit ordinarily resorted to by domestic players.143 
It is also not necessary for the endgame pressures and resultant 
personal “unreliability” to be proven.  Even ostensibly most 
reputable public players tend to “misbehave” in the last-period 
game. 144   Furthermore, a generalized opinion may suffice and 
weigh heavily on individual property relations.145  One may argue 
that this has already happened in the sample nations where the 
private sector is dwindling, in unison with investments and the 
state has to step in in its stead.146   
 
                                                     
143  It was reported in the media that Prime Minister Medvedev referred to 
the 2013 Cyprus banking crisis as “stealing the [burglars’] loot.”  Medvedev: na 
Kipre prodoljayut grabit nagrablennoe [Medvedev:  On Cyprus, They Continue to Steal 
the Loot], BFM.ru (Mar. 25, 2013, 2:43 PM), 
http://www.bfm.ru/news/211721?doctype=news; Maksim Kvasha, Kak Kremliu 
Kipr prigoditsia [How Cyprus Serves the Kremlin], KOMMERSANT.RU (Apr. 1, 2013, 0:00 
AM), http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2144346.  See also Peeter Vahtra, 
Expansion or Exodus? Trends and Developments in Foreign Investments of Russia’s 
Largest Industrial Enterprises 8 (Pan-Eur. Inst., Paper No. 1/2006, 2006), 
http://www.utu.fi/fi/yksikot/tse/yksikot/PEI/raportit-ja-
tietopaketit/Documents/Vahtra_12006.pdf; $30bn in Russian Money Sent to Cyprus 
in 2 Decades, RUSS. TODAY (June 18, 2013, 12:46 PM), 
http://rt.com/business/russia-cyprus-money-transfer-877/ (citing a study by the 
Russian State Statistical Agency, ROSSTAT). 
144  See, e.g., Mitu Gulati, When Corporate Managers Fear a Good Thing Is Coming 
to an End: The Case of Interim Nondisclosure, 46 UCLA L. REV. 675, 694–702 (1999) 
(discussing the final-period problem and urging for more stringent regulation of 
the interim nondisclosure problem among the largest, most well-established 
companies). 
145  Arguably, personal and property security “in modern nations is the effect 
of manners and opinion,” including a complex system of trust and fear of 
exposure.  MILL, supra note 73, at 135–136, 444.  For example, a recent opinion poll 
found that foreign managers “general[ly] mistrust . . . regional outsourcing 
partners” in Russia.  RICHARD GERMAIN & ARMIN GÜNTER, CONTRACT LOGISTICS 
AND OUTSOURCING IN RUSSIA: A REPORT BY THE DEUTSCHE BAHN AND RUSSIAN 
RAILWAYS CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL LOGISTICS AND SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT 
11 (2012), http://www.dbschenker.com/ho-
en/news_media/studies/2847098/ContractLogistics_Outsourcing.html.  See also 
Salata, supra note 105. 
146  See, e.g., Aidis & Adachi, supra note 105, at 394 (noting that often, new 
companies are merely an extension of old enterprises, which means the growth 
numbers are misleading); Putin’s Russia: Sochi or Bust, ECONOMIST, Feb. 1, 2014, at 
17 (detailing the enormous expenditures by the Russian Government for the 2014 
Sochi Olympics); Sputtering: Slow Growth Reflects Structural Failings that the Kremlin 
Is Not Tackling, ECONOMIST, Jun. 22, 2013, at 58 (discussing the need for 
government intervention in Russia’s slowing economy).  In Kazakhstan, the 
influence of the state grows.  See, e.g., KORPORATIVNOE UPRAVLENIE: KAZAHSTANSKII 
KONTEKST, supra note 101; Trendy razvitiia kazahstanskoi ekonomiki, supra note 101. 
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3.4.1.2.5. Presumptive Negative Reciprocity 
 
If an average contracting party suspects that the others may 
exit and defect at virtually any moment and if that party has little 
control over the defectors through reputational repercussions or 
otherwise, two corollaries seem possible.  First, the parties’ ex ante 
state of mind is that they are potentially mistreated.147  Inasmuch as 
parties’ actions are influenced “by the perceived fairness” of a 
relationship,148 the perception of ex ante unfairness might trigger a 
reciprocal desire to act opportunistically and breach contracts. 
It is one thing when defaults increase in crisis.  In fact, it 
happens everywhere.149  Yet it is a completely different ballgame 
when the shirking party exonerates herself by viewing defection as 
a justified prospective punishment of the future untrustworthy 
behavior of other actors and when the others are a priori labelled as 
opportunists.  The same may be equally applicable to the 
prospective punishment of bullying regulators-owners of certain 
industry facilities, including clearing agencies.  Thus, the very 
human propensity towards reciprocity and the sense of fairness 
may distort a stereotypical cost-benefit analysis of performance 
versus non-performance.  In practice, market actors may default 
more easily.150 
                                                     
147  See, e.g., David K. Levine, Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in 
Experiments, 1 REV. ECON. DYNAMICS 593, 595 (1998) (“[S]uggest[ing] that players 
care not only about other players’ utility, but also that their attitudes toward other 
players depend on how they feel they are being treated.”); Knack, supra note 114, 
at 5 (citing studies confirming that “[i]f government leaders, judges and 
bureaucrats are corrupt, market participants can more easily justify and 
rationalize their own dishonest behavior”) (quoting John N. Drobak, Law Matters, 
76 WASH. U. L. REV. 97, 103 (1998)). 
148  Fehr & Schmidt, supra note 83, at 3–4 (providing examples in which 
fairness considerations “shape the behavior of people in particular economic 
domains,” including compliance with contractual obligations). 
149  There are typically more defaults, expropriation and defection in crises. 
See, e.g., WORLD BANK, RUSSIAN ECONOMIC REPORT 27: MODERATING RISKS, 
BOLSTERING GROWTH 21–22 (2012), 
http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/rer-27-
march2012-eng.pdf (commenting on the large share of non-performing loans after 
the crisis); Gilson et al., supra note 9, at 204–05 n. 92 (exploring an example where 
a surge in contractual breaches was prompted by the extraordinary price 
volatility); Johnson et al., supra note 100, at 143 (referring to defaults and 
expropriations in relation to the Asian financial crisis). 
150  This may be viewed as an extension of the scenario combining ex ante 
low trust and ex post penalties for observed behavior.  See e.g., Gilson et al., supra 
note 12, at 1393 n.43 (citing studies which found that many subjects punished 
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Obviously, this is merely a logical extension of the current 
theories and more research is needed with respect to the ex ante 
negative reciprocity in the developing economies.  However, if one 
juxtaposes the discussed above problems, the suggestion seems 
plausible.  Since commonly “[b]usiness contracts must be 
construed with business sense, as they naturally would be 
understood by intelligent men of affairs,”151 sophisticated men of 
affairs may perceive certain forms of breach and opportunism as a 
norm rather than an unwise aberration.  The uncertainties 
surrounding the shrinking private sector in the sample may bear 
witness to it.152 
 
3.4.2. The Role of Enforcement 
 
The crucial repercussion of opacity and the lack of trust and 
reputational sanctions is the need for efficient formal enforcement 
(i.e., E).153  Recall that parties should expect that at time 1 they will 
have to make a choice between continuing performance with 
                                                     
shirkers). 
151  North German Lloyd v. Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y., 244 U.S. 12, 24 (1917). 
152  See generally supra note 146 and accompanying text.  For an illustration of 
the uncertainties and the dangers of nationalization and reprivatization in 
Ukrainian, compare, e.g., Reprivatizatsii na Ukraine ne budet [There Will Not Be 
Reprivitization in Ukraine], SEGODNIA (March 3, 2014, 5:26 PM), 
http://www.segodnya.ua/economics/business/reprivatizacii-v-ukraine-ne-
budet-yacenyuk-500217.html (exemplifying that there is a need for the new 
leaders in Ukraine to assuage the business communities concerns over the sanctity 
of property rights after years of reprivatization and government seizures in the 
region); Irshanskii GOK i Vol’nogorskii GMK vernut gosudarstvu [GOK of Irshanskii 
and GMK of Vol’nogorskii Return to the Government], UNIAN (July 10, 2014, 2:44 PM), 
http://economics.unian.net/industry/938174-irshanskiy-gok-i-volnogorskiy-
gmk-vernut-gosudarstvu.html (describing how two large resource companies 
were taken control of by the Ukrainian government); Ukrainskaia reprivatizatsiia 
stala beskonechnoi i bespredel’noj [Ukrainian Repirivitization Became Never-Ending and 
Limitless], IZVESTIA (Mar. 24, 2005, 7:59 PM), http://izvestia.ru/news/300943 
(illustrating the “never-ending and limitless” amount of corrupt reprivatization in 
Ukraine and its negative impact on Ukraine’s image among foreign investors).  
153  Gilson et al., supra note 9, at 190–91 (highlighting that “[c]ontracting 
parties must be able to count on the state’s enforcement monopoly if they are 
confidently to rely on novel forms of agreement”); D’Agostino & Lisciandra, supra 
note 78, at 8–17; Knack, supra note 114, at 9 (citing studies emphasizing that 
“governmental mechanisms for the effective enforcement of contracts . . . are 
associated with higher trust”). 
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probability P(t1) or look to enforcement.  Namely, 
 
 Just like with the evaluation of W and A, the general 
perceptions regarding the quality of public enforcement are 
embedded into pre-contractual assessments.  This variable is 
premised on the trust in the judicial efficiency, impartiality and 
expertise.   
Unfortunately, all these qualities are rare in the developing 
world.154  That is true even admitting that the actual propensity of 
                                                     
154  See, e.g., Irina Solomko & Aleksandr Il’chenko, Skol’ko stoit kupit’ sud’iu 
[How Much Does It Cost to Buy a Judge], SEGODNIA, Dec. 18, 2008, 
http://www.segodnya.ua/ukraine/ckolko-ctoit-kupit-cudju.html (discussing 
how much it costs to bribe Ukrainian judges in different courts); Assotsiatsiia s ES: 
Za nespravedlivye sudy Ukraine groziat torgovye sanktsii [Association with the E.U.: For 
Injustice in the Courts Ukraine Is Threatened with Trade Sanctions], SEGODNIA, Oct. 18, 
2013, http://www.segodnya.ua/economics/enews/Associaciya-s-ES-Za-
nespravedlivye-sudy-Ukraine-grozyat-torgovye-sankcii-468378.html (describing 
the European Union’s demands of Ukraine to reduce its level of corruption, and 
until it does so, the process for acquiring visas to enter the E.U. will not be 
simplified); Patrick Reevell, Legislation Merging Russia’s 2 Top Courts Stokes 
Worries, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2014, at A8, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/07/world/europe/merger-of-russias-two-
top-courts-worries-legal-experts.html?_r=0 (discussing changes to Russian courts, 
including the dismantling of Russia’s Supreme Arbitration Court by President 
Putin, referred to as “one of the few successful institutions in the often corrupt 
and ineffective Russian judicial system”); Black, supra note 2, at 790–91, 813; 
Hendley (2012), supra note 119, at 520–23, 526 (discussing the judicial “culture of 
impunity”); Aidis & Adachi, supra note 105, at 403 (emphasizing a large share of 
breached contracts and lack of enforcement); BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG, BTI 2012 – 
UKRAINE COUNTRY REPORT 12–13 (2012), http://www.bti-
project.de/uploads/tx_itao_download/BTI_2012_Ukraine.pdf (noting the lack of 
judicial training and independence); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (2013), supra note 86, at 1, 
5 (warning about the inconsistent application of law and lack of judicial 
independence in Kazakhstan); Glenn P. Hendrix, Business Litigation and Arbitration 
in Russia, 31 INT’L LAW. 1075 (1997); Karen Halverson, Resolving Economic Disputes 
in Russia’s Market Economy, 18 MICH. J. INT’L L. 59, 102–05 (1996); Judicial Reform 
Index for Ukraine, 2 AM. BAR ASS’N 1, 59, 68 (2005); Pistor et al., supra note 41, at 342 
(observing that “in Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine, three quarters of 
all enterprises do not trust the legal system to enforce their rights”); Glaeser & 
Shleifer, supra note 22, at 1195 (commenting on the practice of bribery in Russia); 
Glaeser et al. (2001), supra note 38, at 868, 897 (comparing legal and judicial 
indices for various transition economies and also observing that “where the costs 
of verifying the circumstances of specific cases and interpreting statutes are high, 
judges may not be sufficiently motivated to enforce legal rules”); Kathryn 
Hendley, Enforcing Judgments in Russian Economic Courts, 20 POST-SOVIET AFF. 46, 
 Expected Value = P(t0) x [P(t1) x V + [1 – P(t1)] x P(a) x E] 
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private parties to use post-Soviet courts and the weight the 
litigants assign to the judicial competence are unclear, 155  the 
amount of litigation is swelling,156 and, as some researchers argue, 
the overloaded judges are trying to do their best micromanaging 
cases argued by inept attorneys.157 
There are still potent reasons to doubt the judicial systems of 
the sample economies.  Bribery and corruption are considered 
pervasive and the quality and impartiality of public enforcement 
routinely doubted by the market and academics.158  Moreover, in 
case of a dispute between a private party and a clearing agency, 
directly or indirectly owned by the state, the private litigant may 
reasonably expect to lose.  
Even though in terms of such criteria as the timing and costs of, 
cumulatively, litigation and enforcement of judgments our three 
sample countries fare better than about a half of the jurisdictions 
surveyed by the World Bank,159 these formal indicators may be 
                                                     
78 (2004) (discussing judgment enforcement problems); Blumenfeld, supra note 15 
(generally criticizing the private law system in Russia); WORLD BANK (2011), supra 
note 121, at 50–57. 
155  Compare Hendley et al. (1999), supra note 125, at 30–32 (concluding that 
companies do use courts), with WORLD BANK (2011), supra note 121, at 50–57; 
Kathryn Hendley, Are Russian Judges Still Soviet?, 23 POST-SOVIET AFF. 240, 254–55 
(2007) (admitting that only 25% of decisions are well-reasoned, although the 
perception of judicial competence might have improved); Hendley (2010), supra 
note 117, at 447, 452 (documenting cases where companies preferred informal 
negotiations); and Hendley (2012), supra note 119, at 520–23 (noting that “present-
day Russian courts do a better job of living up to the ideals of independence and 
competence than did their Soviet counterparts,” and that judicial corruption 
largely arises in political cases, leaving “the vast majority of mundane cases” to be 
resolved by courts “in accord with the written law”). 
156  See, e.g., BTI 2012, supra note 154, at 13; Hendley (2012), supra note 119, at 
520–23 (“Individuals and firms are flocking to the [Russian] courts in ever-greater 
numbers.”). 
157  Hendley (2007), supra note 155, at 256–63. 
158  See generally supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
159  In 2013, Russia was ranked 112th with respect to the overall ease of doing 
business and 12th in terms of contract enforcement.  This can be contrasted with, 
Kazakhstan – 49th and 28th, respectively, and Ukraine – 137th and 42th, 
respectively.  See Doing Business: Economy Rankings, WORLD BANK (2014), 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings; Doing Business: Ease of Doing Business 
in Russian Federation, WORLD BANK (2015), 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/russia/#enforcing-
contracts (listing the rankings of 189 countries in these areas based on individual 
percentile rankings in particular sub-topics).  The “enforcing contracts” indicator 
is purely formal and procedural.  See also WORLD BANK (2011), supra note 121, at 
50–57 (explaining the importance of ”[a]n effective and efficient justice system” 
for “a growing market economy,” and describing enforcement as a “critical 
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misleading.  Neither do they have any bearing on the actual 
analysis of “trust” in the effectiveness of formal enforcement or 
“trust” in the impartiality of proceedings against the state.  
In addition, a large body of literature has shed light on the 
inadequacy of judicial expertise.160  Even admitting that procedural 
law and judicial expertise have recently improved,161 courts still 
lack the finest level of expertise necessary in complex capital 
market transactions, such as – for example – derivatives contracts, 
and sometimes unpleasantly surprise the market.  Among the 
pertinent cases was the January 2013 decision by the Moscow 
Circuit Court, arguably, a highly qualified judicial authority.  The 
Court annulled an interest swap agreement on the grounds that in-
between payments parties owed no obligations to each other and 
permitted unilateral termination of the agreement by one of the 
parties.162 
Unfortunately, the constant changeability of financial market 
practices and pre-existing regulatory focus on simple exchange-
traded securities as opposed to more complex financial 
instruments, rare in the sample economies, 163  leave the courts 
                                                     
component” of a “well-functioning court system”). 
160  See generally supra note 154 and accompanying text.   
161  See, e.g., Hendley (2007), supra note 155, at 254–63; Andrei Shleifer & 
Daniel Treisman, A Normal Country: Russia After Communism, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 
151, 171 (2005). 
162  Unfortunately, this case casts doubts on the expertise of, arguably, the 
most qualified judiciary in the country.  Postanovlenie FAS Moskovskogo okruga 
ot 30 Ianvaria, 2013 g. [Decision of the Federal Arbitration Court of the Moscow 
Circuit of Jan. 30, 2013], case No. A40-55358/12-100-391 (deciding that between 
the days of payment in a CDS, parties do not owe each other any other duty, and 
that after the date of a payment, a party may withdraw from the contract by 
informing the other of her intent to breach the contract). 
163  The authorities and regulations focus mostly on exchanges.  See, e.g., 
Strageia razvitia finansovogo rinka Rossiiskoi Federatsii na period do 2020 goda 
[The Strategy of Development of the Russian Financial Market of the Russian 
Federation Until 2020], Rasporiazhenie Pravitelstva Rossiiskoy Federatsii [Resol. 
of the Gov’t of the Russ. Fed’n] No. 2043-r, Dec. 29, 2008, available at 
http://www.fcsm.ru/ru/press/russia2020/strategy2020/ (Russ.); Red Book, infra 
note 300, at 299, 316 (discussing the role of the Russian Federal Financial Markets 
Service, the regulation of the four different stock exchanges in Russia, and the 
leading providers of trade, clearing, and settlement services on the Russian 
securities market); V.V. Mezentsev, Otsenka kreditnogo defoltnogo svopa na rossiiskie 
kompanii pri pomoshi redutsirovannoi modeli i modeli Mertona [Evaluation of Credit 
Default Swaps in Russian Companies with the Help of a Reduction Model the Merton’s 
Model], 1 ZHURNAL KORPORATIVNIE FINANCY [J. OF CORP. FIN.] 44, 48 (2012), 
http://ecsocman.hse.ru/data/2012/05/22/1272867933/cfj_21_44_57_mezentsev_
.pdf (mentioning that Russian companies are not active in the CDS market and 
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without any guidance.  The recent upgrade of the clearing 
transplants, in all probability, should entail analogous problems. 
Similarly, the Supreme Courts, often providing something like 
explanatory “codes of best practices,” may not do that in time.  
Coupled with the historical propensity for textualism, 164  this 
“novelty problem” may undermine the coherence of trial court 
decisions, at least in the short term. Alternatively, it is possible that 
courts may instinctively side with the expert regulators, which also 
happen to be the owners of the C&S facilities.165  To conclude, 
private parties’ pre-contractual expectations regarding the 
probable payoff from formal Enforcement (E) may be reasonably 
minimal.  
 
3.4.3. Broken Private Linkages:  The Model and Its Potential 
Implications for C&S 
 
Let us now summarize this willingness-ability-enforcement 
discussion by imagining two scenarios:  a normal market and the 
discussed above distorted one.  In the first one, there are two 
populations of market actors:  A and B.  The A companies have 
good reputation and during their long history, as confirmed by 
market analysts, regular corporate reports and the opinion of 
former contractual counterparties, have been in good standing. 
Their valuation is significantly higher than that of other companies 
within an economy.  The Bs, by contrast, are newer, untested 
companies whose former counterparties have had reasons to 
complain about Bs’ contractual defaults and/or the quality of their 
performance.  Equally, Bs’ assets may be located in jurisdictions 
where their counterparties cannot easily reach them through the 
formal enforcement of their agreement and/or Bs’ management is 
known for former asset tunneling, self-dealing and bankrupting 
other companies.166  Overall, the Bs may be seen as riskier and 
                                                     
commenting on the illiquidity of Russian CDS). 
164  See, e.g., Guseva, supra note 15, at 89–93; SHERSHENEVICH, supra note 14, at 
235–44.  
165  See infra Section 4 (discussing the evolution of C&S). 
166  For pertinent examples, see Bernard S. Black & Anna S. Tarassova, 
Institutional Reform in Transition: A Case Study of Russia, 10 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 211, 
232–61 (2003) (discussing the institutional flaws in the Russian legal and economic 
system and the effect of corruption); Black et al. (2000), supra note 38, at 1740–78 
(discussing the flawed privatization and self-dealing in Russia). 
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more likely to default.  
Finally, there is always a sliver of C companies.  This is a subset 
of A companies, which will be forced to default due to either 
internal causes, such as the rising agency costs and managerial self-
dealing, or external causes, including economic crises, embargoes, 
sizeable defaults by counterparties, etc.  In essence, a C becomes a 
B under pressure of exogenous and, more rarely, endogenous 
events. 
 One may present this market actors’ continuum as follows: 
 
First, under normal market circumstances, the share of the A 
companies is supposed to be larger.167  Second, contracting with 
the B companies will, potentially, add extra transaction costs and 
prompt parties to use specific contractual mechanisms.  The 
arsenal obviously varies depending on the types of the deals and 
includes higher price terms or interest rate, specific payment terms, 
price adjustment clauses, indemnity provisions, holdbacks, escrow 
accounts, numerous contractual covenants, and others.  Thus, the 
                                                     
167  Obviously, the population’s normal choices are affected by a variety of 
factors, including the institutional environment, strategic situations, etc.  Studies 
differ on the share and behavior of do-gooders in a population.  Fehr & Schmidt, 
supra note 83, at 25–30, 44 n.37 (discussing and problematizing various economic 
models about fairness behavior); Gilson et al., supra note 12, at 1393 n.42 (citing 
studies finding that by making public-good decisions, individuals contribute 
more than individually optimal contributions).  
A: Low Risk, Observable Quality
C: Conversion Possible 
and Observable
B: High Risk, High 
Observability and 
Visibility
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market itself may find ways to deal with the Bs.  That is, of course, 
provided the market knows which company is an A and which one 
is a B. 
Third, the fact of conversion from an A to a C and pertinent 
behavioral changes are observable by other counterparties and the 
market at large.  Particularly observable are the external causes of 
conversion and, sometimes, even internal causes.  To recap, this is 
due to adequate corporate and securities disclosure, prosecution of 
insider trading, well-tested institutional, reputational 
intermediaries or better lender monitoring, institutional investors, 
and newly emerging collaborative contractual practices, like 
braiding.  These mechanisms may all send early warning signals to 
the market and contractual counterparties.  Observability and a 
low number of Bs, which are variant species and not a market rule, 
become a norm.  Based on the discussion above, that normalcy may 
be seriously undermined in a developing economy. 
Let us summarize the trust-related deficiencies affecting the 
three sample jurisdictions.  First, due to the innate propensity to 
reciprocate and reasonable apprehensions of the commonness of 
defaults, all caused by the discussed above reputational and trust 
deficiencies coupled with enforcement problems, the B segment 
may be substantially larger than the A’s.168  Secondly, the fact of 
conversion from an A to a C may be blurred and principally 
unobservable, and, possibly, more difficult to detect than an ex 
ante determination of which company is a B and which one is a 
good-natured A.  To recap, corporate disclosure and capital market 
monitoring mechanisms are generally weaker in the developing 
economies, thus making the market less efficient and transparent 
and vitiating its signaling function.  Similarly, other capital 
providers do not operate as efficient monitors.   
Thirdly, previous cooperation may not be indicative of future 
compliance if the ex ante level of trust is low.  That is provided, of 
course, that trust cannot be improved endogenously through 
parties’ collaboration, changes in social attitudes or bespoke 
contractual mechanisms. 169   Fourthly, the exit strategies 
characteristic of emerging markets may make both external and 
internal causes of conversion latent and exit profitable.  Recall that 
even an average company, regardless of whether it is an honest A 
                                                     
168  MILL, supra note 73. 
169  See generally Gilson et al., supra note 12. 
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or an opportunistic B, may exercise its “exit by necessity” option 
and do so in an expedient and/or clandestine manner. Thus, the 
devolution from an A to a C or a B may be sporadic and comes as a 
surprise to outsiders.   





What is described here is a type of a situation that may be 
reasonably denoted a “lemons equilibrium,” 170  turning into a 
“thick market” “as measured by the number of actors who 
understand themselves to be transacting under similar 
circumstances.”171  The self-evident danger of a lemons equilibrium 
is that like in the markets for goods,172  performing and honest 
parties, i.e., the sector A, will be driven out of a domestic market 
since: (a) their performance is not rationally expected and, 
therefore, not properly awarded by the contractual counterparties 
                                                     
170  Black, supra note 2, at 784. 
171  Gilson et al., supra note 9, at 173 n.3. 
172  A reference to George A. Akerlof is required. George A. Akerlof, The 
Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 
488 (1970). 




B: High Risk Majority, Changed 
Normalcy, Lemons Equilibrium Possible
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through better prices for their products, cheaper capital raising 
opportunities, better C&S terms, etc., and (b) sporadic non-
performance is reasonably more profitable than performance. 
To an extent, the scenario reminds one of an extended 
exculpatory contractual or force majeure provision, which negates 
the value of the concept of “impracticability” since many atypical 
risks become at least expected, if not fully foreseeable, and 
impliedly undertaken by the parties.  The very nature of risk 
changes as the knowledge of “unknown but possible” is imputed 
to both parties.  If these extended risks are over- or underpriced, 
which may well happen when parties do not know the nature of 
the counterparties, cannot monitor their performance and, thus, 
assume the worst,173 there are more incentives to default. 
Some parties, as discussed above, can distinguish themselves 
through bonding or the voluntary acceptance of more transparent 
policies, thus creating a separating equilibrium.174  However, the 
stigma associated with their countrymen-Bs will put them at a 
price disadvantage compared to foreign companies,175 cross-listing 
is expensive, and adopting better accounting and corporate policies 
internally may suffer from the verifiability problem.176  Hence, the 
domestic lemons problem is not resolved and while “[i]ndividuals 
in higher-trust societies can spend less to protect themselves from 
being exploited in economic transactions,”177 the less fortunate As 
from low-trust jurisdictions must perish, join the Bs or 
overspend. 178   Recall that this “overspending” conclusion also 
                                                     
173  This is somewhat similar to a capital markets non-disclosure scenario.  
See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the 
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 683 (1984) (explaining that silence must 
be interpreted as the worst news possible in project investment).  
174  See, e.g., Iacobucci, supra note 33 (discussing equilibria and alternative 
methods for firms to signal their behavior). 
175  See, e.g., Black, supra note 2, at 820 (examining the discount on share 
prices of a Russian business traded on the NYSE due to potential for insider 
cheating and a distrust of Russian courts). 
176  Obviously, all markets have to deal with the verification costs.  See 
generally Allen Ferrell, The Case for Mandatory Disclosure in Securities Regulation 
Around the World, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 81 (2007); Ronald J. Gilson & 
Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The 
Hindsight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715, 736–38 (2003); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. 
Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 594–609 (1984).  
177  Knack, supra note 114, at 2. 
178  See, e.g., Black, supra note 2, at 841 (mentioning also that “[t]he better a 
country’s institutions, the more companies will be able to sell shares, relying 
partly on their own and partly on the country’s reputation.”); Fehr et al. (2007), 
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follows from the Expected Value of contract performance analysis:  
if the value of enforcement is low and so are A and W, then the 
value of the contract is abnormally low.  An additional risk 
premium is required to make contracting profitable.   
Now, let us place the C&S transplants within this peculiar 
socioeconomic environment. Imagine an originally foreign market 
structure that is placed in the middle of a large number of Bs and 
Cs in a low-trust jurisdiction such as the sample economies.  
Imagine further that this structure participates in each transaction 
involving specific assets, that it becomes a conduit of sorts and 
“interposes” itself between all buyers and sellers of a certain class 
of assets or several classes and that it also provides a guarantee 
that every trade will be completed according to its terms, including 
short-term exchanges, like trades in securities, or longer-term 
transactions, like derivatives trades. Such a structure becomes a 
form of insurance for all counterparties-members.  The cost of large 
defaults are spread among non-defaulting members.  Its other 
functions may include, e.g., registering trades and thus facilitating 
more transparent pricing by all As, Bs and Cs.   
How will the discussed above trust and reputational problems, 
aggravated within the distorted B-C-A population, affect such a 
transplanted structure? 179   How efficient will the transplanted 
structure itself be, if its members are all from the local B-C-A 
population? 
These are serious concerns that may undermine the operations 
of systemically important C&S transplants.180  Clearinghouses are 
faced with the same trust concerns as every market actor but due 
to their central position in a market have no other option but to 
properly assess factors A, W and E to determine the Expected Payoff 
and set up prices and internal safety valves accordingly. 
The following Section illustrates that the transplanted C&S 
models were not designed to mitigate the discussed above risks. 
Instead, the C&S mechanisms developed in response to completely 
different conditions and risks.  Hence, the original model is 
                                                     
supra note 136, at 126, 151 (discussing the importance of the percentage of the fair-
minded players vis-à-vis the defectors). 
179  Even “fair-minded actors” may be self-interested depending on 
circumstances.  Fehr & Schmidt, supra note 83, at 25–30.  The lemons equilibrium 
should only exacerbate these issues. 
180  Although the examples above refer mostly to CCPs, CSD are also affected 
by similar problems that may manifest themselves through fraudulent transfers of 
share ownership or registries fraud.  
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dangerous and systemically important and, at the same time, ex 
ante unsuitable for the transplant-recipients’ socioeconomic 
environment.  
 
4. THE ORIGINS OF THE TRANSPLANTS:                                                              
A CENTRALIZED SOLUTION TO TRUST CONCERNS 
4.1. Introduction:  A Different Set of Problems and Different Solutions 
 
In contrast to the discussed above phenomena, the 
transactional inefficiencies that the centralized C&S was designed 
for in the transplant-origins were completely different.  The origin-
markets were comparatively more efficient and transparent. There 
was plenty of repeat players, such as comparatively transparent 
corporate issuers, vigilant banks, and major brokerage houses 
concerned with their reputation.  The regulators, as opposed to 
their counterparts in the sample economies, wore a single 
regulatory hat.  State ownership of the conduits was (and remains) 
uncommon.  Finally, the “last period” and “exit by necessity” were 
comparatively rare.181  The expected willingness and ability of at 
least the majority of counterparties were ex hypothesi better 
observable. 
Instead, the new facilities were designed to reduce 
inefficiencies of a different nature.  Specifically, to complete a 
single transaction, broker-dealers had to exchange dozens of 
documents. 182   Without modern technology, mistakes were 
numerous and closings costly. 183    A sufficiently centralized, 
reliable and transparent C&S was rather a logical necessity than a 
caprice of a few industry sages, lobbyists or national regulators 
engaged in transplanting reforms. 
The evolution of C&S was marked by an explicit search for a more 
reliable, more “trustworthy” medium for asset exchange, the 
medium that simultaneously was more efficient and reduced the 
time and costs of a single transaction.  Simultaneously, 
                                                     
181  An obvious exception is, of course, market crashes and financial crises, 
which are by definition rare events.  
182  See, e.g., Bergmann, supra note 51 (explaining the old practices and the 
ability of central counterparties to decrease documentation through better 
processing). 
183  See infra Subsection 4.1.1.1. 
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centralization created economies of scale and, possibly more 
importantly, reduced the costs of an individual assessment of 
future performance.184   
This, logically, further reduced the need for individual 
assessments of the nature, willingness and ability of the market 
participants to perform.  From the perspective of private parties, W 
and A evaluations, particularly in smaller, routine transactions, 
were largely outsourced to the CCPs and CSDs, insured by their 
membership standards, margin payments, and reporting 
obligations.185  The conduits thus serve as proxies of the parties’ 
“trustworthiness.”  
 
4.2. The Industry:  History, Market Concentration and the State as a 
Monitoring Agent 
4.2.1. U.S. Markets:  Market Initiatives and Supporting Regulations 
4.2.1.1. The Origins of the Model 
 
The formation of a centralized C&S system began about forty 
years ago and was effectively completed by the beginning of the 
21st century.  Until the 1970s, however, there was no national 
clearing and settlement mechanism and each securities exchange, 
preserving market fragmentation,186  performed C&S through its 
own facilities.187  At the same time, depositories were virtually non-
existent.   
As a result, closings required exhaustive paperwork to execute 
a single trade.  Traditional brokerages had to exchange multiple 
documents to confirm the exact terms of a transaction and ensure 
delivery and payment.188  It is almost self-explanatory that without 
automated and centralized C&S systems, the resolution of 
                                                     
184  See infra notes 217–27 (assessing the regulatory and market responses). 
185  Bernanke, supra note 6, at 136–46 (describing the role of clearinghouses as 
financial intermediaries). 
186  See, e.g., Bradford Nat’l Clearing Corp. v. S.E.C., 590 F.2d 1085, 1096, n.13 
(D.C. Cir. 1978) (discussing the separate clearing agencies for each national and 
regional exchange).  
187  See, e.g., Thomas Lee Hazen, Law of Securities Regulation, 5 L. SEC. REG. § 
14.1 (6th ed. 2010); 48 Fed. Reg. 45167-02 (1983); 48 Fed. Reg. 45167-01 (1983) 
(examining the registration of the first clearing agencies).  
188  Bergmann, supra note 51. 
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uncompared trades, i.e., trades where a buyer and a seller submit 
documents indicating erroneous and nonmatching terms, is 
inefficient.189  Moreover, as is the case with any other contract, the 
longer the closing, the greater the risk of nonperformance will be. 
The financial community apparently viewed the status quo as 
untenable.  The NASD was working on designing more efficient 
clearing conduits,190 while the NYSE and several custodian banks, 
launched a one-year “Pilot Operation for Central Handling of 
Securities,” which simplified deliveries among members.191 
Unfortunately, the initiatives were only partially successful.  
For instance, NASD broker-dealers continued delivering 
certificates directly to counterparties.192  The NYSE’s clearinghouse, 
the Central Certificate Service dealing with book transfers of 
securities, 193  failed to process the growing volume, which 
ultimately reached the unprecedented 21.3 million on June 13, 
1968.194 
                                                     
189  See, e.g., DAVID M. WEISS, AFTER THE TRADE IS MADE: PROCESSING SECURITIES 
TRANSACTIONS 239–49 (3rd ed. 2006) (discussing various automated comparison 
processes and technological improvements, as well as the failures to deliver or 
receive).  See also OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, CONG. OF THE U.S., ELECTRONIC BULLS 
AND BEARS (Sept. 1990), Box 3A, §§ F, G, at 45 [hereinafter ELECTRONIC BULLS AND 
BEARS], http://www.fas.org/ota/reports/9015.pdf (explaining the confirmation 
and payment process of a trade). 
 Today, most retail and institutional securities trades flow through NSCC. 
Institutional trades may be combined with other broker-dealer’s activities netted 
through NSCC’s Continuous Net Settlement System.  See DTCC, Institutional 
Delivery Netting Service (2009), 
http://www.dtcc.com/products/cs/equities_clearance/idnet.php (describing 
how DTC, NSCC and Omgeo interface to combine the benefits of the CNS system 
and institutional equity trades).  Everything is done automatically.  There are also 
matching service providers and other parties, together with CCPs facilitating 
“straight-through processing” (“STP”) of transactions based on a series of 
automated transfers between the original parties and a number of intermediaries.  
SEC Release No. 8,398, supra note 6. 
190  See, e.g., Michael J. Simon & Robert L.D. Colby, The National Market System 
for Over-the-Counter Stocks, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 17, 89 n.349 (1986) (mentioning 
that in 1961, the NASD created the National OTC Clearing Corporation). 
191  Future of C&S, supra note 72, at 47. 
192  Simon & Colby, supra note 190.  Even by 1972, the NASD was still 
groping for an efficient C&S system.  REPORT OF THE SUBCOMM. ON SECURITIES, 
COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY, S. 
REP. NO. 93–13, at 90 (1973) [hereinafter SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY].  
193  See, e.g., Wall Street: Attack on the Snarl, TIME, May 24, 1968, 
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,844480,00.html 
(explaining the implementation of an 8 million-a-year NYSE clearinghouse 
system). 
194  SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY, supra note 192, at 28.  
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As problems grew, “[d]eliveries and transfers of securities 
became inexorably mired,” 195  in part, due to inadequate 
recordkeeping.196   Even corporate governance suffered as stock 
records differed.197  A perfect storm ensued.198 
It culminated in a combination of technical delivery problems, 
associated fraud, the depletion of the resources of market 
participants, a decline in securities prices, negatively affecting 
commission revenues and the value of securities held by firms and 
in proprietary accounts, serious changes in the trading volume,199 
and, most importantly, the absence of a reliable channel for C&S. 
This was exactly a scenario where the A-type companies, i.e., the 
brokerages that were formerly reputable, had to rapidly convert 
into C-defectors and be liquidated, primarily because of their 
internal inability to process the transactions and due to low 
revenues. 
By no means was there evidence of a pervasive lemons 
equilibrium.  Instead, the industry faced technical problems of how 
to ascertain that both parties were performing precisely what they 
agreed to and do so in an efficient way.  The second concern was 
minimizing the C category by making sure that brokerages would 
not convert from the good-natured As to Cs and would continue 
performing under stress conditions, by definition rare events. 
The exchanges’ response was precisely tailored to solve these 
problems as they ramped up the efforts to provide market 
participants with a reliable conduit.  Already in December 1969, 
the NASD created the new National Clearing Corporation, which, 
similar to modern CCPs, “interposed” itself between trading 
counterparties.200  It also interfaced with depositories and other 
clearinghouses.201  Similarly, by the early 1970s, the AMEX and the 
                                                     
195  SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY OF UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES OF 
BROKERS AND DEALERS, H.R. DOC. NO. 92–231, 92nd Cong., at 19 (1st Sess. 1971) 
[hereinafter UNSAFE AND UNSOUND]. 
196  Id. at 13–14; Guttman, supra note 69, at 446, n.61. 
197  UNSAFE AND UNSOUND, supra note 195, at 97 (discussing problems with 
unresolved dividend receivables). 
198  Id. at 13–19. 
199  Exchange Act Release No. 13,163, 42 Fed. Reg. 3916, 3918 (Jan. 21, 1977); 
UNSAFE AND UNSOUND, supra note 195, at 14, 18 (observing that increased trading 
“taxed the . . . virtually static . . . [processing] facilities”).  
200  Simon & Colby, supra note 190, at 73–74 n.349. 
201  See, e.g., 42 Fed. Reg. 3916, 3923–27 (1977) (discussing the exchanges’ 
application, rules, and history); SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY, supra note 192, at 90; 
Simon & Colby, supra note 190, at 89 (explaining how competition has led to 
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NYSE had improved their clearinghouses,202 soon operating in the 
continuous netting mode, interfacing with the other C&S entities 
and allowing participants to make book-entry settlements in 
DTC.203   
These early successes led to more mergers and more 
centralization.204  The major industry players, such as the Securities 
Industry Association, the NASD and the NYSE, united in search 
for a national clearing facility.205   
The state de facto backed these market-driven initiatives and 
centralization of the conduits.206   By 1977, pursuant to its new 
authority under the 1975 Amendments to the Exchange Act,207 the 
SEC granted temporary registration to as many as 13 clearing 
agencies, most of which were exchange subsidiaries.208  After a 
                                                     
positive changes). 
202  They jointly owned the Securities Industry Automation Corporation 
running processing facilities for their clearinghouses.  42 Fed. Reg. 3916, 3923–24 
(1977). 
203  Id. at 3927. 
204  See, e.g., 42 Fed. Reg. 3916, 3922, 3930 (1977). 
205  For instance, the industry organized the National Securities Processing 
Committee and exchanges signed an MOU regarding the establishment of either a 
single or heavily interfaced C&S system.  See, e.g., Single National Clearing and 
Settlement Organization, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10,631, 39 Fed. Reg. 
9884 (Mar. 14, 1974); Eli Weinberg, Joseph F. Neil Jr., Joseph P. Coriaci & David 
Rubin, Development of a National System for Clearing And Settling Securities 
Transactions, in 2 EXPLORATIONS IN ECONOMIC RESEARCH 3, 353–77 (National Bureau 
of Economic Research ed. 1975), http://www.nber.org/books/conf75-1. 
206  See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1 (2010) (explaining the national securities C&S 
system); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78k-1(a)(1), 78l-1(c)(5) (2012) (summarizing congressional 
findings concerning development of linkages among markets); Bradford Nat’l 
Clearing Corp. v. S.E.C., 590 F.2d 1085, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that the 
registration of a national system of securities clearance, the National Securities 
Clearing Corporation (NSCC), was valid under Section 17A); Bergmann, supra 
note 51, at 4–6 (describing the centralization of the formerly fragmented U.S. 
clearance system); Donald L. Calvin, The National Market System: A Successful 
Adventure in Industry Self-Improvement, 70 VA. L. REV. 785, 790–91, 800–09 (1984) 
(reviewing congressional debates, the underlying objectives of the Amendments, 
and the development of the national market system); Walter Werner, The SEC as a 
Market Regulator, 70 VA. L. REV. 755, 770–71 (1984) (commenting on the 1975 
Amendments and SEC’s actions).  
207  15 U.S.C. § 78q-1 (1975). 
208  See, e.g., 42 Fed. Reg. 3916, 3922–34 (Jan. 21, 1977) (granting temporary 
registration to several clearing agencies); 41 Fed. Reg. 38841 (Sept. 13, 1976) 
(providing notice of “proceedings to determine whether to grant or deny the 
registration . . . [of various] clearing agencies, . . . at the expiration of the 
registrations previously granted to the registrants . . . under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934”).  
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long and careful review, several clearinghouses and depositories 
for securities markets and the Options Clearing Corporation 
(“OCC”) were granted permanent registration. 209   The largest 
registrants were the currently active agencies – NSCC and its 
associated depository, DTC.210  In 1999, they transformed into a 
single holding company – the Depository Trust & Clearing 
Corporation (“DTCC”).211 
The reliability of the C&S facilities was tested several times.  
An example was the 1987 crash.  Recall that once a consolidated or 
interconnected system is created, it must evaluate the prospective 
performance of as many market actors as possible.  One of the 
major issues, which transpired in the crash, was precisely the 
inability of transacting parties and the C&S facilities to evaluate the 
A and W of others. 
As the interrelatedness of the markets for futures, options and 
equity grew, many clearing members operated in two or more 
markets and clearinghouses provided contra-clearing services.212 
The clearing agencies were often unable to assess the exposure of 
their clearing members to other markets and gauge possible 
failures.213  The concomitant lack of transparency and information 
exchange among clearinghouses threatened the whole industry. 
Overall, the newly interconnected C&S system exhibited 
                                                     
209  Registration as Clearing Agencies of Boston Stock Exchange Clearing 
Corp., and New England Securities Depository Trust Co., Securities Exchange Act 
Release No. 20,222, 48 Fed. Reg. 45167–01 (Oct. 3, 1983);, 48 Fed. Reg. 45167–02 
(1983) (granting registration to other major clearing agencies). 
210  By the early 1990s, they were processing almost all equity transactions. 
See, e.g., ELECTRONIC BULLS AND BEARS, supra note 189, at 107–29 (providing 
background and data on equity transactions since clearing agencies came about); 
Hazen & Markham, supra note 57 (discussing how transactions in the futures 
industry are handled by clearing agencies). 
211  Today, DTCC provides clearing, settlement and ancillary services to the 
U.S. equity and bond markets.  DTCC, THE U.S. MODEL FOR CLEARING AND 
SETTLEMENT: AN OVERVIEW OF DTCC 6–7 (2007). 
212  See generally Securities Exchange Act Release No. 27,044, 44 SEC Docket 
15, at 18 n.26, 1989 WL 550672, 4 n.26 (Jul. 18, 1989) [hereinafter Exchange Act 
Release No. 27,044] (observing that by the late 1980s, 848 broker-dealers 
participated in about 8 agencies, 541 of them—in two or more agencies, and 221—
in three or more); GAO, CLEARANCE AND SETTLEMENT REFORM, supra note 61 
(evaluating progress made following the release of the Brady Commission Report, 
and providing background information). 
213  Exchange Act Release No. 27,044, supra note 212, at 4–5 (underscoring the 
shared exposure of clearinghouses); BRADY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 61, at 
55. 
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vulnerability to unprecedented trading volumes,214 the “fear” of a 
default contagion,215 liquidity shortages, the resulting defaults by 
broker-dealers and liquidation of clearing members.216  
The regulatory and market responses were, again, carefully 
weighed and narrowly defined.217  To name a few, the reforms and 
proposals generally improved the speed,218 efficiency and safety of 
transactions; 219  emphasized the importance of information 
exchange across markets; 220  further immobilized securities 
certificates, amending U.C.C. Article 8 accordingly;221  improved 
intraday payments systems for derivatives exchanges;222 etc.   
                                                     
214  See generally SEC STAFF REPORT¸ supra note 70, at 10–26; Securities 
Exchange Act Release No. 27,044, supra note 212, at 5. 
215  See generally BRADY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 61, at 51–55; Bernanke, 
supra note 6, at 147–48; Jerry W. Markham & Rita McCloy Stephanz, The Stock 
Market Crash of 1987—The United States Looks at New Recommendations, 76 GEO. L.J. 
1993 (1988) (providing excellent examples of market “fears”). 
216  See, e.g., Bernanke, supra note 6, at 147 (describing problems faced by 
clearing members).  Securities Exchange Act Release No. 27,044, supra note 212, at 
6 (describing the positions that NSCC liquidated). 
217  The responses echoed the conclusions of several private and public 
assessment reports.  See, e.g., BACHMANN TASK FORCE, supra note 69, at 31–32; 
BRADY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 61, at 51–69; GAO, CLEARANCE AND 
SETTLEMENT REFORM, supra note 61, at 21, 28, 38–39, 50–51; SEC STAFF REPORT, supra 
note 70; ELECTRONIC BULLS AND BEARS, supra note 189, at 109–17.  See also Mark 
Carlson, A Brief History of the 1987 Stock Market Crash with a Discussion of the Federal 
Reserve Response, FED. RES. BD. (Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Working 
Paper No. 2007–13, 2006), available at 
www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2007/200713/200713pap.pdf (discussing the 
liquidity support provided by the Federal Reserve as well as other cooperative 
solutions). 
218  For instance, a uniform T+3 settlement cycle for securities markets was 
introduced. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c6-1 (1993).  See also 69 Fed. Reg. 12922-01 (Mar. 18, 
2004) (discussing the original adoption of the shortened settlement cycle rule and 
further initiatives); BACHMANN TASK FORCE, supra note 69, at 14–15 (reporting on 
the correlation between time and risk in C&S). 
219  69 Fed. Reg. 12922-01, 12926 (Mar. 18, 2004); GAO, CLEARANCE AND 
SETTLEMENT REFORM, supra note 61, at 33–34; Securities Exchange Act Release No. 
36,091, 1995 WL 493313, at 2–3, n.9, 10 (Aug. 10, 1995).  
220  GAO, CLEARANCE AND SETTLEMENT REFORM, supra note 61, at 37; Securities 
Exchange Act Release No. 27,044, 44 SEC Docket Release 15, 1989 WL 550672, at 
16. 
221  James S. Rogers, Policy Perspectives on Revised U.C.C. Article 8, 43 UCLA L. 
REV. 1431, 1435–36 (1996) (“The article 8 revision project was one part of 
worldwide efforts to assure that the clearance and settlement system for securities 
trading is adequate for the task of processing the ever-increasing volume and 
complexity of trading in the modern securities markets.”). 
222  GAO, CLEARANCE AND SETTLEMENT REFORM, supra note 61, at 42.  
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Within the securities markets, NSCC spearheaded the 
development of deeper operational linkages, 223  information 
exchange and better margining.224  Numerous operational links in 
cross-market C&S grew by leaps and bounds.225 
The interconnectedness of the system was further supported 
through the 1990 Market Reform Act, which required the SEC to 
promote linked facilities for C&S of securities, securities options, 
futures, and commodity options.226  The SEC was also granted the 
emergency authority227 in case of “a substantial disruption of the 
safe or efficient operation of the national system for clearance and 
settlement.”228  To an extent, the drafters of the Dodd-Frank Act 
have followed a similar approach towards a regulated national, 
and now international, system by expanding centralized 
clearing.229 
 
4.2.1.2. Coping with Market Concentration and Centralization 
 
An interconnected and highly concentrated market, in theory, 
may aggravate a number of risks, including the monopoly and 
                                                     
223  Hazen & Markham, supra note 57, § 13:5. 
224  See e.g., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 36,091, supra note 219, at 2–3 
(describing the provisions for access to information on margin deposits at 
different clearinghouses).  
225  For instance, the Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc. (“CBOE”) entered 
into an Interregional Interface Agreement with NSCC and MCC.  Order Relating 
to the Clearance of Securities Transactions Executed on the Chicago Board 
Options Exchange, Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 28,825, 48 SEC 
Docket 76, 76–78 (Jan. 25, 1991). 
226  The Market Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–432, 104 Stat. 963.  See, 
e.g., 15 U.S.C.A § 78q–1(a)(2) (2010) (finding that the Commission should use its 
authority to establish a national system for the efficient clearance and settlement 
of securities transactions); Hazen, supra note 187.  
227 The Commission may suspend registration or impose requirements or 
restrictions “with respect to any matter or action subject to regulation by the 
Commission or a self-regulatory organization . . . as the Commission determines is 
necessary in the public interest and for the protection of investors . . . (ii) to ensure 
prompt, accurate, and safe clearance and settlement of transactions in securities 
. . .” 15 U.S.C.A. § 78l(k)(2) (2012). 
228  15 U.S.C.A. § 78l(k)(7)(ii) (2012). 
229  See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-
Frank Act), Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C., 12 U.S.C., and 15 U.S.C.) (illustrating a system in 
which centralized clearing is expanded to derivatives). 
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systemic risk.  In C&S, the answer to these concerns was never the 
government, like it seems to be the case in Russia, Ukraine and 
Kazakhstan, but rather, improvements in the governance of private 
C&S institutions.  How does the concentrated U.S. system deal 
with those risks, while also preserving its status as a reliable 
conduit? 
Monopoly arguments do resurface in some C&S segments.230  
For instance, the CME dominates the market, even though, of 
course, there are other companies.231  Yet, although alert to the 
risks of insufficient competition, policy actors seem satisfied with 
the status quo.232 
Incidentally, similar centripetal tendencies may begin to affect 
the swap industry, historically clearing transactions over the 
counter (OTC) and recently modified by a host of post-Dodd-Frank 
regulations.233  Although it is too early to make specific predictions, 
                                                     
230  Already in the mid-1990s, most futures trading occurred and was settled 
at CBOT and CME.  GAO, CLEARANCE AND SETTLEMENT REFORM, supra note 61, at 
65; GAO, PAYMENTS, CLEARANCE, AND SETTLEMENT, supra note 60, at 68–75. 
231  Today, it is a leading Derivatives Clearing Organization.  See CME GRP., 
CME CLEARING FINANCIAL SAFEGUARDS 3 (2012), 
http://www.cmegroup.com/clearing/files/financialsafeguards.pdf (describing 
CME’s services and risk management policies for clearing derivatives).  Among 
other companies, a large market share in futures and credit default swaps belongs 
to ICE Clear.  See, e.g., The Clearing Corporation, ICE CLEAR, 
https://www.theice.com/clearing-corp (last visited Oct. 24, 2014) (presenting 
itself as one of the oldest independent clearinghouses in the world).  
232  See, e.g., Will Acworth, Justice Department Urges Treasury to Examine 
Clearing Arrangements in U.S. Futures Industry, FUTURES INDUS. MAG., Mar./Apr. 
2008, available at http://www.futuresindustry.org/downloads/Mar-
Apr_Wash_Watch.pdf.  The letter suggested that, “[i]f greater head-to-head 
competition for the exchange of futures contracts could develop, we would expect 
it to result in greater innovation in exchange systems, lower trading fees, reduced 
tick size, and tighter spreads, leading to increased trading volume.”  However, the 
general tone of the letter did not denounce mergers within the industry (the CME 
was at the moment discussing the acquisition of the New York Mercantile 
Exchange), but urged the Treasury to improve the regulatory structure in order to 
foster competition and innovation. 
233  See, e.g., Griffith, supra note 60, at 1317–24 (describing the resulting 
clearinghouse mandate of Dodd-Frank and the wide discretion left to the SEC and 
CFTC as “a highly detailed, largely perspective set of requirements”); CFTC, 
Exemptive Order Regarding Compliance With Certain Swap Regulations, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 43785 (Jul. 22, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R., ch. 1) (extending temporary 
relief to clearinghouses as “Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act goes into effect piece 
by piece”); Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Release: 
PR6684–13: CFTC Announces that the Third Phase of Mandatory Clearing of 
Certain Credit Default Swaps and Interest Rate Swaps Begins Today (Sept. 9, 
2013) (announcing the beginning of “the third phase of required clearing for 
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there are already a few C&S leaders.234 
Apparently, in the derivatives and securities markets, the 
regulators have decided that the centralization benefits may 
outweigh antitrust considerations. 235   Possibly, the market and 
regulators believe that insofar as all C&S entities are registered 
with the authorities and comply with the key registration 
principles, including the fair representation of users, conflicts of 
interest are minimized.236 
For instance, DTCC is among a few C&S entities based on the 
user-owned model, i.e., the principal users of DTCC’s services own 
its shares.  The holding operates on an at-cost basis, returning 
profits and excess revenue from transaction fees to the members in 
the form of rebates and discounts.237  Additional cost savings result 
from other infrastructural benefits.238 
Multiple stakeholders participate in the management, which ex 
hypothesi helps to mitigate potential conflicts of interest among the 
facility’s users and exchange-shareholders.239  The dialogue among 
all stakeholders is channeled through the Board of Directors, 
representing a variety of constituencies.240 
                                                     
certain credit default swaps (CDS) and interest rate swaps”); Exemptions for 
Security-Based Swaps Issued by Certain Clearing Agencies, Security Act Release 
No. 9,308 (Mar. 30, 2012); Exemptions for Security-Based Swaps Issued by Certain 
Clearing Agencies, 77 Fed. Reg. 20536–01 (Apr. 5, 2012) (listing exemptions “for 
security-based swaps issued by certain clearing agencies satisfying certain 
conditions”).  
234  See, e.g., Industry Filings, CFTC, 
http://www.cftc.gov/IndustryOversight/IndustryFilings/index.htm (providing 
information about various trading and clearing organizations). 
235  Order Granting Partial Permanent Approval, Exchange Act Release No. 
39,444, 62 Fed. Reg. 66703–01, 66705 (Dec. 19, 1997) (observing that the SEC is “at 
most required to decide that any anticompetitive effects of its actions are 
necessary or appropriate to the achievement of its objectives”). 
236  See, e.g., Ruben Lee, THE GOVERNANCE OF FINANCIAL MARKET 
INFRASTRUCTURE, OXFORD FIN. GRP., 277–79 (2010) [hereinafter Lee], available at 
http://www.oxfordfinanegroup.com/media/10347/gfmi%20ofg.pdf (discussing 
the reasons behind the SEC evaluation of DTCC). 
237  DTCC (2007), supra note 211, at 6–7. 
238  Id. at 7. 
239  All decision-making power rests with the stakeholder-users holding the 
voting shares of stock.  Lee, supra note 236, at 271–75.   
240  For information on the Board and its election process, see, e.g., Board of 
Directors, DEPOSITORY TRUST & CLEARING CORP., 
http://www.dtcc.com/about/leadership/board.aspx; The Board of Directors of 
Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., The Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation: 
Mission Statement and Charter (Apr. 2012) [hereinafter DTCC, 2012 Mission 
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In options, a number of exchanges still “share equal ownership 
of OCC.  This ownership, along with a clearing member-
dominated Board of Directors, ensures a continuing commitment 
to servicing the needs of OCC’s participant exchanges, clearing 
members and their customers.”241 
Such “centralized status quo” is associated with significant 
economies of scale and scope, network externalities and 
considerable cost savings, 242  putatively benefiting the investing 
public and the financial industry.243  As a result, the C&S industry 
provides high quality and low cost services244 and also aligns the 
risks and interests of its participants.245   Although this has not 
precluded antitrust suits against clearinghouses,246 the state did not 
pursue interventionist policies.  Instead, the conduits developed 
mostly through the process of evolution.  They improved their 
reliability and “trustworthiness” through cooperation with various 
stakeholders and strict participation standards and monitoring. 
 
                                                     
Statement and Charter], 
http://www.dtcc.com/~/media/Files/Downloads/legal/policy-and-
compliance/DTCC-BOD-Mission-and-Charter.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2014); The 
Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., Procedure for the Annual Nomination and 
Election of the Board of Directors (Apr. 2013) [hereinafter DTCC, 2013 Election 
Procedure], http://www.dtcc.com/~/media/Files/Downloads/legal/policy-
and-compliance/DTCC-BOD-Election-Procedure.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2014).  
241  OPTIONS CLEARING CORP., STATEMENTS FROM A FORWARD-LOOKING 
COMPANY: THE OPTIONS CLEARING CORPORATION 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 12 (2010), 
http://www.theocc.com/about/corporate-information/annual-reports/ (last 
visited Oct. 25, 2014).  
242  See, e.g., Exchange Act Release No. 39,444, 62 Fed. Reg. 66703–01, 66705 
(Dec. 19, 1997) (approving the Philadelphia Stock Exchange proposals to 
withdraw); Decision by the Philadelphia Stock Exchange, Incorporated to 
Withdraw, Exchange Act Release No. 39,220, 62 Fed. Reg. 53848, 53849 (Oct. 16, 
1997) (discussing the withdrawal of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange from the 
C&S businesses). 
243  Exchange Act Release No. 39,444, 62 Fed. Reg. 66703–01, 66705 (Dec. 19, 
1997) (mentioning that smaller C&S facilities withdrew from the business 
voluntarily). 
244  Id.  See generally DTCC (2007), supra 211, at 6–19. 
245  DTCC, 2012 Mission Statement and Charter, supra note 240, at 5, A-1.  
246  See, e.g., the cases indicated in infra note 381.  
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4.2.2. European Markets:  Industry Concentration and the Limited 
Role of Public Actors 
 
The European C&S services and regulators to some extent 
follow in the footsteps of those in the U.S. Originally, each 
exchange had its own clearinghouse and/or a CSD tasked with 
C&S of trades and custodial services.247  Some countries did have 
centralized CCPs, while in others, divisions of local exchanges 
cleared and settled transaction with securities listed solely on the 
respective exchanges.248  Just like in the U.S., albeit about 20 years 
later, the European C&S market has become less fragmented.249 
Already by 2010, five CSDs accounted for 81% of the total value of 
all delivery instructions250 and there were only about 20 CCPs,251 all 
                                                     
247  See, e.g., Lee, supra note 236, at 280 (discussing the research findings of the 
European Securities Forum and their resulting C&S proposals); EUR. CENT. BANK, 
FINANCIAL INTEGRATION IN EUROPE 23 (Apr. 2010) [hereinafter ECB, FINANCIAL 
INTEGRATION], 
www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/financialintegrationineurope201004en.pdf  (last 
visited Oct. 25, 2014) (“There were 22 legal entities operating a central securities 
depository (CSD) in the euro area in 2009.”).  
248  See, e.g., HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, SECURITIES LAW 
SERIES, 10B INT’L CAP. MKTS. & SEC. REG. §§ 39A:2, 39A:11 (2009) (describing 
Spain’s central government and its power to make securities market law, and 
explaining that Spain’s local clearing and settlement practices are not centralized, 
yet are moving towards an interconnected system). 
249  See e.g., Beata Wróbel et al., NAT’L BANK OF POLAND ET AL., SECURITIES 
SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS IN POLAND AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 51–58 (2009) 
[hereinafter NAT’L BANK OF POLAND], 
http://www.nbp.pl/en/system_platniczy/securities_settlement_systems.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 25, 2014) (describing the role of central counterparties and the 
current trend towards centralization in the EU); EUR. CENT. BANK & FED. RES. BANK 
CHI., THE ROLE OF CENTRAL COUNTERPARTIES 49–60 (July 2007), 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/rolecentralcounterparties200707en.p
df (last visited Oct. 25, 2014) (presenting results of an ESCB survey assessing the 
degree of integration between CCPS); Future of C&S, supra note 72, at 5 
(presenting a report that sides with the centralization side of “the current debate 
on creating an efficient and integrated clearing and settlement infrastructure for 
Europe”). 
250  See ECB, FINANCIAL INTEGRATION, supra note 247, at 56 (“With close to 40 
CSDs operating in the EU in 2009 . . . and with the five largest of these CSDs 
accounting for 81% of the total value of delivery instructions processed in the 
market, harmonisation is likely to trigger a process of consolidation and re-
orientation.”). 
251  Central Counterparties, EUR. SEC. & MKTS. AUTH., 
http://mifiddatabase.esma.europa.eu/Index.aspx?sectionlinks_id=24&language=
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closely interlinked throughout the EU. 252   Moreover, American 
DTCC’s EuroCCP and NASDAQ OMX’s subsidiary also launched 
CCP services for various European markets and their Boards were 
recently entertaining a possibility of a merger.253  
Overall, the playing field looks almost as concentrated as in the 
U.S. For instance, one of the leading CCPs is LCH.Clearnet Group. 
The Group operates subsidiaries servicing trades executed on a 
variety of exchanges, including Euronext and the LSE.  The Group 
is basically a product of the merger of the London Clearing House 
(LCH) and Clearnet, which were originally established around 
1888 to clear trades in commodities.  Their ownership system, 
however, profoundly differed, with LCH being a not-for-profit 
limited company owned primarily by its members,254 and Clearnet 
operating in a vertical silo structure with Euronext.255  
Just like in the U.S., the ownership structure was revised to 
achieve better efficiency and fair user representation. 256   As a 
result, the majority of the Group’s shares were owned by the users 
of its services.257  Similar to the case of DTCC, most of the directors 
represented the users, i.e., large financial institutions and 
investment banks.258 
The settlement system closely affiliated with NYSE Euronext, 
the LSE and Clearnet’s clearing services is Euroclear, established in 
                                                     
0&pageName=CENTRAL_COUNTERPARTIES_Display&subsection_id=0 (last 
visited Oct. 25, 2014). 
252  NAT’L BANK OF POLAND, supra note 249, at 51–58. 
253  See, e.g., Clearing Solutions for All to See: Annual Report 2012, EMCF, at 4, 
10–11 (2012)  
http://www.euroccp.com/sites/default/files/annual_report_2012_final_0.pdf  
(last visited Oct. 25, 2014) (“On 14 March 2013 . . . [t]he owners of EMCF and the 
current owner of EuroCCP . . . (DTCC)—along with BATS Chi-X Europe . . . 
entered into a memorandum of understanding to become equal shareholders in 
the new combined clearing house.”). 
254  HASENPUSCH, supra note 47, §§ 8.2.1.1.1, 8.2.1.1.2. 
255  Id. §§ 8.2.1.1.2, 8.2.1.1.4. 
256  Id. §§ 8.2.1.1.3, 8.2.1.1.4; Lee, supra note 236, at 347–56; LCH.CLEARNET 
GRP. LTD., REPORT AND CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 2004, at 5 (2004), 
http://www.lchclearnet.com/documents/731485/762550/LHC.Clearnet+Annual
+Report+and+Consolidated+Financial+Statements+2004.pdf/902b88fd-8244-
4b94-92e4-c9673b9314bd  (mentioning cost-related integration problems). 
257  LCH.CLEARNET, EQUITYCLEAR SERVICE DESCRIPTION 5 (2012), 
http://www.lchclearnet.com/documents/515114/515783/EquityClear+service+
description/399acff5-a59e-48ef-a975-ded76bcabd62.  
258 Board of Directors, LCH.CLEARNET, http://www.lchclearnet.com/about-
us/governance/board-of-directors.   
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1968 by Morgan Guaranty Trust Company.259  Its local subsidiaries 
provide settlement for trades in equity, bonds and investment 
funds in more than 80 countries.260 
Considering its complex multijurisdictional structure and 
continuous corporate expansion, this major clearinghouse seems to 
be struggling with intra-group depository cooperation, which had 
to be bolstered by the disclosure, user communication and anti-
conflicts-of-interest mechanisms.261  For this reason, the boards of 
its holding companies also decided to voluntarily comply with the 
UK Combined Code on Corporate Governance, although none of 
them was a publicly traded entity.262 
Another major group of players are incorporated within a 
vertical silo created under the umbrella of Deutsche Borse AG.  As 
a vertically integrated holding company, it operates a number of 
subsidiaries, including Eurex Clearing and Clearstream. Eurex 
Clearing AG provides CCP services for a range of instruments 
traded on all Eurex exchanges, trades executed on the Frankfurt 
Stock Exchange, transactions on the Irish Stock Exchange and 
others.263  In turn, Clearstream acts as a CSD for most transactions 
cleared through Eurex Clearing, as well as other entities. 
Originally, Clearstream’s predecessor, Cedel, operated as a 
user-owned cooperative, where “no single shareholder was 
                                                     
259  See, e.g., Hazen & Markham, supra note 57, § 13:20 (2010); Lee, supra note 
236, at 301–12 (stating that Morgan Guaranty created Euroclear in 1968 to process 
the Eurobonds settlement). 
260  Euroclear was traditionally built on the user ownership model and, to 
preclude single shareholder control, the articles of association imposed a 5% 
voting cap on shares.  As is typical in the industry, most non-executive directors 
of the boards within the Holding represent the service users.  Id. at 297–300, 313–
14; Hazen & Markham, supra note 57, § 13:20 (discussing the Group’s history).  
261  Lee, supra note 236, at 313–20.  See also Market Advisory Committees, 
EUROCLEAR, https://www.euroclear.com/en/about/our-structure/macs.html 
(explaining that the Committees harmonize the markets in which Euroclear is the 
central securities depositary). 
262  In addition, by preserving a high ratio of user representation on the 
boards and balancing the interests of all users and shareholders, the group assures 
continuous compliance with C&S standards.  See, e.g., Lee, supra note 236, at 313–
20; NAT’L BANK OF BELGIUM, ASSESSMENT OF THE EUROCLEAR SYSTEM AGAINST CPSS-
IOSCO RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SECURITIES SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS 110 (2005), 
http://www.nbb.be/doc/cp/nl/settle/fsr2005cpps.pdf (reporting the 
observance of CPSS-IOSCO recommendation by the Euroclear System).  
263  HASENPUSCH, supra note 47, 8.1.2.1.1; Lee, supra note 236, 287–91; 
Organizational Structure, EUREX CLEARING, 
http://www.eurexclearing.com/clearing-en/about-us/corporate-
overview/organizational-structure/. 
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permitted to own more than 5% of Cedel’s share capital.” 264  
Today, both clearinghouse groups operate within a vertical silo 
whose corporate governance is premised on the two-tier board 
structure, typical of German companies.265  
The European public authorities, just like their counterparts 
across the ocean, seem to be keen on facilitating such 
interconnected marketplace through both technological 
improvements, such as the Trans-European Automated Real-time 
Gross Settlement Express Transfer, a payment transfer 
infrastructure, 266  and a network of Directives promoting C&S 
centralization and uniform standards for securities and various 
derivatives.267  
Policy actors also have long entertained an idea of creating a 
single pan-European C&S facility. 268   However, the industry 
merely became more consolidated, while policymakers refused to 
take the initiative ahead of private entities.269 
 
                                                     
264  Lee, supra note 236, at 292–93.  
265  Shareholders did not fully support the move from a user-owned system 
to a vertical silo with a two-tier board.  Cedel, e.g., formed a joint venture with 
Deutsche Borse over objections of its shareholders.  Lee, supra note 236, at 293–95.  
On the pros and cons of the two-tier board models and related litigation against 
corporate management, see, e.g., Martin Gelter, Why Do Shareholder Derivative 
Suits Remain Rare in Continental Europe?, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 843, 848–52 (2012).  
See also Griffith, supra note 63 (proposing targets for regulatory attention and its 
links to derivative tools).  
266  See generally EUR. CENT. BANK, INFORMATION GUIDE FOR TARGET2 USERS 
(Oct. 2009), http://www.ecb.int/paym/t2/shared/pdf/infoguide_V3_1_0.pdf.   
267  See infra Section 4.3.  
268  See, e.g., Lee, supra note 236, at 279–81; Future of C&S, supra note 72, at 21–
38 (explaining the benefits of consolidation and proposing a method of achieving 
it); Eur. Sec. Forum, ESF’s Blueprint for a Single Pan-European Central Counterparty 
11 (Dec. 6, 2000) [hereinafter ESF], 
www.csdl.lt/en/data/legal/inter/2_Blueprint_pdf_as_of_11dec.pdf 
(highlighting the benefits of the unification of the CPP). 
269  See, e.g., EUR. COMM’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF WISE MEN ON 
THE REGULATION OF EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS 16 (Feb. 15, 2001), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/lamfalussy/wisemen/fina
l-report-wise-men_en.pdf (underscoring that “[m]arket forces should mainly 
determine the contours of European clearing and settlement”).  
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4.3. Regulatory Philosophy and Its Risk Premises 
4.3.1. U.S. Regulators as Standard Setters 
 
The regulatory policies in the transplant-origins developed 
through the process of local market evolution as policymakers 
acted in response to narrow and specific risks of an existing 
industry.  The key characteristics of the regulatory approaches may 
be taxonomized as follows.  First, all clearing organizations must 
register with the CFTC or the SEC, or both, unless exempted from 
registration.270  The Commissions are at the center of the national 
C&S standard setting,271 guided by such key policy objectives as 
investor protection and market efficiency concerns. 272   The 
centrality of the Commissions resonates through case law as 
“Congress did not impose any specific standards of efficiency and 
instead relied on the Commission [the SEC in that case] to regulate 
the clearing agencies.”273 
Second, the Commissions generally support the industry’s 
initiatives, while assuring the transparency and fairness of the 
utilities and maintaining the internal stability of the centralized 
systemically important facilities. For instance, from the beginning, 
the SEC required agencies 274  (1) to assure nondiscriminatory 
                                                     
270  15 U.S.C § 78c(a)(23) (2013); 7 U.S.C. § 7a-2 (2013); 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1(b) 
(2013); 7 U.S.C § 7a-1 (2013); 15 U.S.C. § 78s (2013); Amendment to Rule Filing 
Requirements for Dually-Registered Clearing Agencies, Exchange Act Release No. 
69,284, 78 Fed. Reg. 21046–01 (Apr. 9, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240, 
249); 17 C.F.R. § 240.17Ab2–1 (2014). 
271  See, e.g., 15 U.S.C § 78s(b) (2013) (providing guidelines for “proposed rule 
changes; notice; proceedings”); 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1 (2013) (discussing the “[n]ational 
system for clearance and settlement of securities transactions”); 7 U.S.C § 7a-2 
(2013) (presenting the “common provisions applicable to registered entities”); 7 
U.S.C. § 7a-1 (2013) (concerning the registration requirement for derivatives 
clearing organizations); 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-4 (2013) (prioritizing these functions as 
central among the roles of the Commission). 
272  See, e.g., 15 U.S.C § 78c(f) (2013). 
273  Whistler Inv., Inc. v. Depository Trust and Clearing Corp., 539 F.3d 1159, 
1167 (9th Cir. 2008). 
274  These principles reflect the statutory language and are also embedded 
into the post-Dodd-Frank new regulations.  15 U.S.C § 78q-1(b) (2013); Clearing 
Agency Standards, Exchange Act Release No. 68,080, 77 Fed. Reg. 66220–01 (Nov. 
2, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240); 17 C.F.R. § 240.17Ad–22 (2013).  The 
CFTC’s registration policy is based on a number of generally similar “core 
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participation standards, 275  which also translates into “fair 
representation” and participation of shareholders in the election of 
directors and management, 276  (2) to have adequate capacity to 
enforce rules and discipline participants observing due process 
requirements,277 the requirements mirrored in the corresponding 
obligation to monitor participants and deny participation to 
disqualified or incompetent applicants,278 and (3) to disseminate 
various reports to participants.279  Agencies were also required to 
apprise participants of fee increases and to provide appropriate 
notices of proposed rule and management changes to 
participants.280 
Since “thou shall not steal,” the SEC required clearinghouses 
safeguard securities and funds, assure prompt and accurate C&S 
and have proper organizational and processing capacity, verified 
by proper accounting policies and audit controls.281  The regulators 
also acknowledged the centrality of clearing funds as a cushion 
protecting clearinghouses against defaults by participants and 
general market distress.  This understanding translated into 
specific standards of care concerning clearing fund contributions, 
evaluation of the financial and operational safety of participants, 
maintaining liquidity of the funds, liquidity risk assessments, and 
others.282   
The financial crisis of 2008 and the ensuing rules promulgated 
under the Dodd-Frank Act were purported to strengthen these 
traditional statutory requirements by calling for more transparency 
and data reporting in C&S as well as more centralized clearing and 
                                                     
principles.”  7 U.S.C § 7a-1(c)(2) (2013). 
275  Regulation of Clearing Agencies, Exchange Act Release No. 16,900, 45 
Fed. Reg. 41920, 41921–23 (June 23, 1980). 
276  Id. at 41923–24. 
277  Id. at 41924; 15 U.S.C § 78q-1(b)(5) (2013). 
278  See, e.g., 15 U.S.C § 78q-1(b)(3) (2013) (requiring that a clearing agency not 
be registered unless it is efficiently organized and capable to “facilitate the prompt 
and accurate clearance and settlement” and to ensure compliance of participants 
with its rules). 
279  Regulation of Clearing Agencies, Exchange Act Release No. 16,900, 45 
Fed. Reg. 41920, 41923–31 (June 23, 1980).  
280  Id.  
281  Id. at 41925. See also 17 C.F.R. § 240.17Ad–22(c) (2013) (requiring 
clearinghouses to maintain proper records and conduct annual audits). 
282  Regulation of Clearing Agencies, Exchange Act Release No. 16,900, 45 
Fed. Reg. 41920, 41929–30 (June 23, 1980).  See also 17 C.F.R. § 240.17Ad–22(d) 
(2013) (requiring clearinghouses to establish certain safeguard procedures). 
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netting, including clearing of swaps, in order to prevent systemic 
risk accumulation.283  In this sense, the new regulations target the 
same old combination of policy objectives in application to more 
financial instruments.284 
 
4.3.2. European Regulations:  Pan-European Harmonization 
 
The European regulations have generally developed in 
response to the same policy objectives and market concerns.  The 
primary difference, however, was the diversity of the regulatory 
regimes within the EU.285  Therefore, with the growth in cross-
border securities and derivatives trading, the regulators focused on 
the harmonization of C&S across the EU and, recently, in accord 
with their international commitments and the U.S. reforms, 
derivatives C&S. 
First, a new “linchpin” has begun to emerge as the post-crisis 
regulations streamlined the formerly heterogeneous approach to 
C&S supervision. Facilities like trade repositories, as well as 
traditional CCPs and CSDs, register with local and European 
authorities (or the European Securities and Markets Authority 
(“ESMA”) in the case of repositories).  The agencies may be 
monitored by colleges of regulators including the authorities from 
other countries-stakeholders, as well as ESMA itself.286  
                                                     
283  See, e.g., Griffith, supra note 60, at 1317–24.  See also CFTC, Final 
Exemptive Order Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 858–01 (Jan. 7, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. ch. 1) (promulgating new 
regulations that administer C&S transactions); CFTC, Clearing Requirement 
Determination Under Section 2(h) of the CEA, 77 Fed. Reg. 74284–01 (Dec. 13, 
2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 39, 50) (requiring certain classes of credit 
default swaps to be cleared by a clearing derivatives organization); CFTC, End-
User Exception to the Clearing Requirement for Swaps, 77 Fed. Reg. 42560-01 (Jul. 
19, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 39); Clearing Agency Standards, Exchange 
Act Release No. 68,080, 77 Fed. Reg. 66220–01 (Nov. 2, 2012) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pt. 240) (establishing minimum requirements for clearinghouses’ risk 
management, procedures and controls). 
284  For instance, the new Rule 17Ad-22 requires better financial disclosure, 
risk management practices, participant monitoring, performance and credit 
exposure assessment, and margining policy.  17 C.F.R. § 240.17Ad–22 (2013).   
285  See, e.g., Future of C&S, supra note 72 (discussing the multiple regulatory, 
fiscal, and legal regimes across the EU); ESF, supra note 268, at 4–8 (drawing 
parallels between the U.S. and European C&S structures). 
286  See, e.g., Regulation 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC Derivatives, Central Counterparties and Trade 
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The search for uniformity has fostered a cooperative reform 
environment.287  About a decade ago, the European Commission 
established a number of task forces, including the Legal Certainty 
Group (LCG), a group of securities law experts, with the objective 
to advise national and European authorities on the removal of legal 
barriers related to cross-border securities holdings and trade 
settlement. 288   The LCG’s suggestions effectively seconded the 
concepts proposed by industry groups, such as the European 
Securities Forum,289 as well as the Giovaninni Reports,290 the Final 
Lamfalussy Report291 and the ECB Studies.292   
                                                     
Repositorities, 2012 O.J. (L 201) 1, art. 17–18, 55; recitals § 74 (discussing the 
establishment of colleges of regulators); Regulation 575/2013, of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013, on Prudential Requirements for 
Credit Institutions and Investment Firms and Amending Regulation No. 
648/2012, 2013 O.J. (L 176) 1 (requiring the applicant CPP to submit to 
authorization by a “competent authority of the Member State where it is 
established”).  For an overview of the reforms in the area of derivatives and the 
April 2014 Regulation on Securities Settlement and on Central Securities 
Depositories adopted by the European Parliament, see Derivatives/EMIR, EUR. 
COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial-
markets/derivatives/index_en.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2014) (providing 
information regarding legislation, reports, regulation, and other topics concerning 
derivatives/EMIR); Central Securities Depositories, EUR. COMM’N, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial-
markets/central_securities_depositories/index_en.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2014) 
(providing links for historical background and proposals concerning central 
securities depositories). 
287  For the list of task forces and their participants, see Clearing and 
Settlement, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial-
markets/clearing/index_en.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2014). 
288  Legal Certainty Group, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_ 
market/financial-markets/clearing/certainty/index_en.htm#maincontentSec2 
(last visited Oct. 23, 2014).  The 2008 LCG Recommendations, emphasizing the 
creation of a successful framework for the intra-EU trading, called for further 
integration of C&S services, greater legal certainty with respect to book-entry 
transfers and better contract enforceability in C&S.  Legal Certainty Group, Second 
Advice of the Legal Certainty Group: Solutions to Legal Barriers Related to Post-Trading 
Within the EU, EUR. COMM’N (Aug. 2008), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial-
markets/docs/certainty/2ndadvice_final_en.pdf. 
289  Lee, supra note 236, at 380–82; ESF, supra note 268. 
290  Second Report on EU Clearing and Settlement Arrangements, GIOVANNINI 
GRP. (Apr. 2003), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial-
markets/docs/clearing/second_giovannini_report_en.pdf. 
291  Committee of Wise Men, supra note 269. 
292  See, e.g., ECB, Financial Integration, supra note 247 (providing a report that 
complements the European Commission’s findings regarding financial integration 
and uniformity); Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
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These joint efforts germinated multiple policy initiatives, 
regulations and directives, starting with the Settlement Finality 
Directive and the Financial Collateral Directives and including 
more homogenous rules for CSDs and CCPs, ultimately setting 
forth a uniform foundation for a pan-European regime.293  On the 
market side, clearinghouses developed the European Code of 
Conduct for Clearing and Settlement.294  The Code dovetailed with 
the provisions of the original Directive on Markets in Financial 
Instruments (“MiFID”), which required, inter alia, access to 
national C&S by investment firms from all EU countries, disclosure 
of post-trade rules by regulated markets and application of 
nondiscriminatory standards to participants.295  
The post-crisis changes to MiFID and other new regulations do 
not significantly change these basic premises except for the 
requirements regarding OTC derivatives settlement and pricing.296 
To the extent that the key European initiatives focus on the 
disclosure, transparency, nondiscriminatory policies and 
strengthened prudential and organizational requirements for 
clearinghouses, they are principally consonant with the U.S. 
                                                     
Parliament: Clearing and Settlement in the European Union – Main Policy Issues and 
Future Challenges, COM (2002) 0257 Final (2002), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52002DC0257:EN:HTML 
(providing links to historical documents concerning the LCG and discussing what 
was subsequently adopted). 
293  For examples of these multiple policy initiatives, see Directive 
2009/44/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009, 
Amending Directive 98/26/EC on Settlement Finality in Payment and Securities 
Settlement Systems and Directive 2002/47/EC on Financial Collateral 
Arrangements as Regards Linked Systems and Credit Claims, 2009 O.J. (L 146) 37; 
Directive 98/26/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 
1998 on Settlement Finality in Payment and Securities Settlement Systems, 1998 
O.J. (L 166) 45; Directive 2002/47/EC, of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 6 June 2002 on Financial Collateral Arrangements, 2002 O.J. (L 168) 43; 
Directive 2010/78/EC, 2010 O.J. (L 331) 120; Decision ECB/2011/20, of the 
European Central Bank of 16 November 2011, Establishing Detailed Rules and 
Procedures for Implementing the Eligibility Criteria for Central Securities 
Depositories to Access TARGET2-Securities Services, 2011 O.J. (L 319) 117.  See 
also the Directives listed in supra note 286. 
294  Federation of European Securities Exchanges et al., European Code of 
Conduct for Clearing and Settlement, EUR. COMM’N (Nov. 7, 2006), at 1, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial-
markets/docs/code/code_en.pdf.  
295  Directive 2004/39/EC, arts. 34, 42, 45, 46, 2004 O.J. (L 145) 1; Directive 
2008/10/EC, 2008 O.J. (L 76) 33; Directive 2014/65/EU, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 349. 
296  See supra notes 286, 293; Directive 2014/65/EU, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 349. 
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homologues 297  and with the CPSS and IOSCO’s Principles for 




To conclude, the C&S history underscores that the principal 
industry models and respective regulations evolved in response to 
narrow and temporary transactional inefficiencies.  Their 
formation was not influenced by fundamental socioeconomic 
distortions or cultural phenomena.  Instead, the market reforms 
addressed transitory infrastructure inefficiencies and operational 
risks of C&S facilities.  The ultimate C&S models were premised on 
the principles of transparency, self-reliance, member monitoring, 
and “trustworthiness” of operations, governance and risk 
management.   
Transplanting these facilities into the sample economies of 
Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan as is would be a typical example 
of a failed methodology.  As discussed above, all three economies 
suffer from a number of fundamental inefficiencies affecting 
transactional exchange.  Using foreign law in hopes of achieving 
similar transactional efficiencies, i.e., the national law-market 
paradigm, is emblematic of the criticisms of transplanting.  
Self-evidently, under such circumstances, local conditions 
would call for transplant modifications, i.e., the introduction of a 
domestic “gradient.”  Such a gradient should, in theory, remedy 
local aberrations.  The following Sections discuss the gradient 
devised by the three sample jurisdictions. 
 
                                                     
297  Both the EU reforms and the Dodd-Frank proceed from the global 
consensus hammered out at the international level starting with the Pittsburgh 
G20 Summit.  The Summit called for concerted efforts to reduce the counterparty, 
non-disclosure and operational risks in OTC derivatives C&S and trading.  G20 
Statement, supra note 3.  
298  CPSS, supra note 3. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol36/iss2/4
GUSEVA (DO NOT DELETE) 4/20/2015  12:13 PM 
2014] KGB’S LEGACY 611 
 
5. SAMPLE JURISDICTIONS:  COMBINING PUBLIC OWNERSHIP WITH 
REGULATION IN PRIVATE MARKETS? 
5.1. Introduction 
 
My analysis of the C&S statutes and facilities in Russia, 
Ukraine and Kazakhstan has identified only one principal 
modification of the western C&S models.  That “gradient” is the 
state ownership of financial market institutions.  Presumably, this 
adaptation was purported to respond to the local market 
inefficiencies and adjust the transplant to the conditions of the 
three sample economies.  In most other respects, the three 
jurisdictions and their C&S statutes are in compliance with the 
western and international C&S standards and pursue regulatory 
policies similar to those of the transplant-origins.  
 




Considering the absence of similar research, this Section must 
delve into the details of the local regulatory and market 
landscapes.  Let us start with the Russian C&S structure, which is 
currently in flux due to a deluge of new regulations.   
Generally, Russian C&S entities operate within the vertical silo 
structures of several major trading platforms and exchanges, 
although there are also a few facilities that belong to “oligarchic” 
resource corporations.299  The two formerly independent securities 
                                                     
299  See, e.g., "Kliringovyi tsentr MFB”: Obshchaia informatsiia [General 
Information About the “Clearing Center of the Moscow Stock Exchange“], KLIRINGOVYI 
TSENTR MFB [CLEARING CENTER OF THE MOSCOW STOCK EXCH.], 
http://www.mse.ru/docs/mfb/(last visited Dec. 23, 2014) (presenting the 
registration information about the Moscow clearing center, including its services 
and contact information); Novosti [News] SANKT-PETERBURGSKAIA VALUITNAIA 
BIRZHA [ST. PETERSBURG CURRENCY EXCH.], 
http://www.spcex.ru/clearing/index.stm (last visited Dec. 23., 2014) (listing 
updates made to the St. Petersburg clearing center to maintain legal compliance); 
GODOVOI OTCHET ZAKRYTOGO AKTSIONERNOGO OBSHCHESTVA "RASCHETNO-
DEPOZITARNAIA KOMPANIIA” ZA 2O12 GOD [ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2012 OF THE CLOSED 
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and derivatives markets – the Moscow Interbank Currency 
Exchange Group (MICEX Group) and the Russian Trading System 
Group (RTS Group) – deserve a closer look.  The first one 
historically operated in the stock, government debt and derivatives 
markets, including, inter alia, options and futures based on shares 
of stock, interest rates, currencies and commodities, while the 
second was a major trading platform for both stock and bond 
markets and derivatives based on stocks and stock indices.300 
The major Russian groups merged in 2011, forming the 
Moscow Exchange.301  As a result, a multistep C&S merger ensued 
in order to reduce the duplicate C&S facilities.  By 2013, the 
industry mainly comprised (1) the National Clearing Center 
(“NCC”), owned by the joint exchange,302 (2) the Depository and 
Clearing Company, merged into the new Central Securities 
Depository – the National Settlement Depository (“NSD”), which, 
in turn, is a member of the MICEX-RTS Group, Moscow 
Exchange.303  There also were the two entities owned through the 
RTC structure:  the Clearing Center of the RTC and the Payment 
[Transfer] Chamber of the RTS.304 
                                                     
CORPORATION “CLEARING AND DEPOSITARY COMPANY] 26 (2013), 
http://www.sdco.ru/about/files/RDK_GO_2012_w.pdf (describing the structure 
and principles of management); Centralization of Clearing, infra note 306 
(commenting on the centralization of the Moscow Exchange, the St. Petersburg 
Exchange and the Moscow Energy Exchange into one group on Dec. 3, 2012). 
300  COMM. ON PAYMENT AND SETTLEMENT SYS., BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, 
PAYMENT, CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS IN THE CPSS COUNTRIES 316 (Sept. 
2011) [hereinafter RED BOOK], http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss97.pdf.  
301  MMVB i RTS podpishut dogovor o sliianii do serediny aprelia [Moscow 
International Stock Exchange and Russian Fund Index Sign an Agreement on Merging 
by the Middle of April], RBK (Jan. 1, 2011), 
http://top.rbc.ru/economics/01/02/2011/536598.shtml; Welcome to Moscow 
Exchange, MOSCOW EXCH., http://moex.com/s348 (last visited Dec. 23, 2014). 
302  Nat’l Clearing Ctr., Shareholders, MOSCOW EXCH. GRP., 
http://www.nkcbank.com/viewCatalog.do?menuKey=37. 
303  Obhshaya Informatsia [General Information], NATSIONAL'NYI RASCHETNYI 
DEPOZITARII: GRUPPA MOSSKOVSKAIA BIRZHA [NAT’L SETTLEMENT DEPOSITORY, 
MOSCOW EXCH. GRP.], https://www.nsd.ru/ru/about/info/; National Settlement 
Depository, THOMAS MURRAY LTD. (2013), 
http://ds.thomasmurray.com/sites/default/files/downloads/nsd_csd_public_r
ating_20130301.pdf (last visited Dec. 23, 2014).   
304  See Zakrytoe aktsionernoe obshchestvo "Kliringovyi tsentr RTS" [Private Joint-
Stock Company “Clearing Center RTS”], RTS [RUSSIAN TRADING SYSTEM], available at 
https://archive.today/TA4UV  (last visited Apr. 17, 2012) (archiving 
http://www.rts.ru/s155, which described the license and functions of the 
Clearing Center of the Russian Trading System); NKO "Raschetnaia palata RTS" 
[Credit Union “Financial Organization], RTS, available at 
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The C&S and depository arms of the merged exchanges 
traditionally operated as CCPs and CDS, providing book-entry 
transfers of assets and records, and ran centralized depositories.305 
The NCC, of course, still works as a CCP.  In December 2012, it 
consolidated the clearing operations for the Moscow Exchange, the 
St. Petersburg Exchange and the Moscow Energy Exchange.306 
The NSD acts as a CSD of the new group.  Together with the 
NCC, it facilitates DVP settlement, a significant development for 
the sample markets.307  It also serves as an OTC trade repository for 
derivatives and repo contracts.  The NSD owns the DCC, which 
serviced RTC transactions, transferred records among RTC and 
MICEX accounts and, by and large, worked closely with its 
parent.308  The Depository may also become an important player in 
the swap market when the new Moscow Exchange’s derivatives 
CCP project takes off.309 
The ownership structure and, correspondingly, corporate 
governance of the Russian CSDs and CCPs is, to a large degree, a 
“domestically oriented” vertical silo.  The new Statutes on C&S 
support this trend.  For instance, as discussed in more detail below, 
only Russian legal entities may be stockholders of a CSD.310  The 
rules are slightly different with respect to other clearinghouses and 
merely impose a 5% voting cap on certain stockholders, 
particularly entities from either offshore jurisdictions, from 
countries with inadequate disclosure regulations, or whose licenses 
have been annulled.311  An applicant for a C&S license must be a 
                                                     
https://archive.today/iXkLJ (last visited Apr. 17, 2014) (archiving 
http://www.rts.ru/s162, which described the functions of the RTS group). 
305  RED BOOK, supra note 300, at 316. 
306  Tsentralizatsia Kliringa [Centralization of Clearing], MOSCOW STOCK EXCH., 
http://www.nkcbank.ru/viewCatalog.do?menuKey=194 (last visited Dec. 23, 
2014). 
307  For more on DVP and RVP, see generally SEC Release No. 8,398, supra 
note 6; Kliringovye uslugi – osushchestvlenie rascchetov na usloviiah DVP [Cleaning 
Services – Settling Accounts Under the Terms of DVP], CLEARING CTR. OF THE 
MOSCOW STOCK EXCH., https://www.nsd.ru/ru/services/clearing/ (last visited 
Dec. 23, 2014). 
308  Uslugi DKK [Services of the DCC (Depository Clearing Company)], NAT’L 
SETTLEMENT DEPOSITORY, MOSCOW EXCH. GRP., http://www.dcc.ru/ru/serv/serv/ 
(last visited Dec. 23, 2014). 
309  Produkty [Products], MOSCOW EXCH., http://moex.com/s942 (last visited 
Dec. 23, 2014). 
310  FZ RF CD, supra note 15, art. 4(1) (Russ).  
311 FZ RF Clearing, supra note 15, arts. 7(1), 26 (Russ.).  An application for a 
clearing license should include information on all shareholders of 5% of the 
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domestic corporation.312   
Who owns the major C&S facilities?  It is mainly the major 
exchanges. The National Clearing Center is, e.g., 100% owned by 
the merged exchange group.313  This vertical silo, however, is not 
similar to that of Deutsche Bourse or other western silos.  The key 
difference is a large share owned by the state through either the 




The C&S system of Kazakhstan is equally geared towards 
domestic players.  The primary distinction is that it is more 
centralized compared to its Russian counterparts.  In contrast to 
the still merging neighbors to the north, Kazakhstan’s capital 
markets are a one-player structure with one exchange and one 
CSD, both marked by a heavy government participation.  
First, the Kazakhstan Stock Exchange (“KASE”) is the key 
trading platform for most securities and derivatives products in 
the country.315  Second, since 1997, there has been just one single 
CSD acting as a nominal holder of securities, settling trades, 
providing a payment guarantee and holding securities in a 
dematerialized form.316  The exchange sends all trades to the CSD 
as matched trades, and the CSD does matching for broker-dealers 
in the OTC markets.317 
In contrast to the CSD, the clearing business was somewhat less 
developed.  For years, there were no CCPs in Kazakhstan, and all 
clearing was on a trade-by-trade and gross DVP basis.  Therefore, 
                                                     
applicant’s voting stock. 
312 Id. art. 5(1).  
313  Aktsionery [Shareholders], NATSIONAL'NYI KLIRINGOVYI TSENTR GRUPPY 
MOSKOVSKAIA BIRZHA [NAT’L CLEARING CTR. OF THE MOSCOW EXCH. GRP.] 
http://www.nkcbank.ru/viewCatalog.do?menuKey=7 (last visited Dec. 30, 2014). 
314  Korporativnye dokumenty [Corporate Documents], MOSCOW EXCH., 
http://moex.com/s798 (last visited Dec. 30, 2014); Shares and Dividend Policy, 
MOSCOW EXCH. (Dec. 23, 2013), 
http://moex.com/en/Report/2013/aktsii_page.html. 
315  NAT’L BANK OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN & COMM. ON PAYMENT & 
SETTLEMENT SYS., PAYMENT SYSTEMS IN KAZAKHSTAN 4 (Nov. 2003) [hereinafter 
PAYMENT SYSTEMS IN KAZAKHSTAN], http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss57.pdf. 
316  Id.  
317  Id. at 13. 
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there, by definition, were “no counterparty credit risk exposures to 
manage . . . [and] a settlement guarantee fund [did] not exist.”318 
While this structure took care of the exposure to large defaults 
and market disruptions in the first two decades of the transition, 
more recent regulations have overturned the status quo.  In mid-
2012, for instance, one clearing license was granted to the clearing 
subsidiary of the KASE, which now operates as a CCP and 
provides netting services to participants.319 
Just like in Russia, an important characteristic of the Kazakh 
market is a distinct focus on domestic players and active state 
participation in the economy.320  For instance, by law, the CSD is 
more than 50% owned by the National Bank of Kazakhstan 
(“NBK”) and the rest of the shares are owned by the KASE and 
commercial banks and brokers.321   The list of potential private, 
domestic and international, owners shall be approved by the 
regulators.322  
The state participation is in fact not capped at 50.1% since the 
KASE itself is majority owned by the NBK, while various banks 
and broker-dealers have a minority stake. 323   Perhaps for this 
reason, the KASE for years did not even have to be an SRO per se.324 
To conclude, just like in the Russian vertical silos, the CCP 
functions are carried out through the partially state-owned KASE. 
 
                                                     
318  IMF Report No. 04/338, supra note 103, at 50.   
319  PRAVILA OSUSHESTVLENIA KLIRINGOVOY DEYATELNOSTY PO SDELKAM S 
FINANSOVIMY INSTRUMENTAMY [Rules of Clearing Activity Concerning Transactions 
with Financial Instruments], АKTSIONERNOE Оbshchestvo “KAZAKHSKAYA 
FONDOVAYA BIRZHA” [JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “KAZAKHSTAN STOCK EXCHANGE”] 
[KASE] 2013, available at 
http://www.kase.kz/files/normative_base/clearing_rules.pdf. 
320  Transition Report 2012: Country Assessments: Kazakhstan, EUR. BANK FOR 
RECONSTR. & DEV. 121 (2012), http://tr.ebrd.com/tr12/index.php/country-
assessments/kazakhstan. 
321  PAYMENT SYSTEMS IN KAZAKHSTAN, supra note 315, at 13; ZRK RCB, supra 
note 15, art. 78 (Kaz.). 
322  Id. art. 78(2).  
323  Shareholders, KAZ. STOCK EXCH., http://www.kase.kz/en/shareholders 
/index. 
324  IMF Report No. 04/338, supra note 103, at 37. 
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Similar to its neighbors to the east, in Ukraine, equity and debt 
instruments dominate domestic trading, while complex derivatives 
remain a rarer animal.325  Today, the recently modernized C&S 
facilities provide depository services and function as CCPs 
although some trades traditionally were and still are cleared 
OTC.326   
The C&S of the trades executed on exchanges is mainly 
conducted through the Settlement Center (“SC”), which, among 
other services, operates as a CCP, a bank and, until October 2013, a 
depository providing, inter alia, book-entry transfers, 
dematerialization of securities, their immobilization and settlement 
of OTC trades.327  There is also the National Depository (“ND”), 
which handles transactions with government securities and, since 
October 2013, has taken over most CSD functions.328  This C&S 
structure was, similar to those of the other sample jurisdictions, 
established in the mid-1990s as a CSD.  More recently, the SC 
evolved into a full-fledged clearing center.329  
The country shares significant structural similarities and ties 
with its former USSR “sister-republics,” which is reflected in its 
market structure.  For instance, some major stock exchanges are 
currently 43% and 50% owned by the above-mentioned Russian 
                                                     
325  UNICREDIT, supra note 44, at 7–10. 
326  Id.  
327  Id. at 11–14; Poslugi [Services], PUBLICHNOE AKTIONERMOE TOVARISTVO 
ROZRAHUNKOVIY CENTR [SETTLEMENT CENTER FOR CONTRACTS IN FINANCIAL 
MARKETS] [hereinafter RC],  
http://www.settlement.com.ua/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&i
d=8&Itemid=100021 (last visited Dec. 30, 2014). 
328  UNICREDIT, supra note 44, at 12, 13.  See also ZU DS, supra note 15, art. 1(5) 
(Ukr.) (defining the “depository business” and the role of the Settlement Center); 
Poslugi z rozmishennia CP na fondovih birzhah [Services for Placing Securities on Stock 
Exchanges], NATIONAL DEPOSITORY OF UKRAINE 
http://csd.ua/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4543&Itemid=2
82&lang=en (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (furnishing an updated list of services 
offered by the National Depository since October 12, 2013). 
329  For a description, see, e.g., Public Joint-Stock Company “Settlement Center,” 
ASS’N OF EURASIAN CENT. SEC. DEPOSITORIES (AECSD), 
http://aecsd.com/en/aecsd/members/irsu/. 
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exchange group,330 although there are, of course, several bourses 
with a different ownership structure.331   Similar to the Kazakh 
market, the National Bank of Ukraine (“NBU”) owns about 
seventy-eight percent of the shares of stock of the public 
corporation SC, which may seem like a significant increase in the 
state ownership accompanying the conversion of the company 
from a closed to a publicly owned corporation in 2013. 332  
Furthermore, as of December 2012, the NBU and the National 
Capital Markets Committee cumulatively owned 50% of the ND.333  
By the first quarter of 2014, state presence through the National 
Bank and state-related companies increased dramatically.334  
Such majority-ownership is not a statutory prerequisite for 
either the SC or the ND.  It may merely function as a short-term 
transitional mechanism.  However, there is still, for instance, a 25% 
plus one share statutory minimum for permanent state 
participation in a national depository335  To summarize, in all three 
                                                     
330  See, e.g., UNICREDIT, supra note 44, at 8–9 (presenting basic data on the 
Ukrainian Exchange and the PFTS Stock Exchange, including their ownership 
structure); About Exchange, UKRAINIAN EXCH., http://www.ux.ua/s111 (noting 
that the Moscow Exchange has a 43% stake in the Ukrainian Exchange).  
331  For the list of exchanges clearing transactions through the national 
depository system, see Exchanges, NDU, 
http://www.csd.ua/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=178&Ite
mid=105&lang=ru.  Some exchanges have their own clearinghouses. 
332  Informatsia pro vlasnikiv istotnoy uchasti v banku [Information About Major 
Shareholders of the Bank], RC, 
http://www.settlement.com.ua/content/doc/about_company/pablik_informati
on/stryktyra_vlasnosti.pdf (last visited Dec. 30, 2014); AECSD, supra note 329 
(explaining the old ownership structure).  
333  NATSIONALNIY DEPOZITARIY UKRAYNY / NATIONAL DEPOSITORY OF UKRAINE, 
RICHNYI ZVIT / ANNUAL REPORT 57 (2012), available at 
http://www.csd.ua/images/stories/pdf/ndu_annual_report_2012.pdf. 
333 CSD’s Ownership Structure, NATIONAL DEPOSITORY OF UKRAINE (2014), 
http://www.csd.ua/images/stories/pdf/CSD_ownership_structure.pdf; 
NATSIONALNIY DEPOZITARIY UKRAYNY / NATIONAL DEPOSITORY OF UKRAINE, RICHNYI 
ZVIT / ANNUAL REPORT 73 (2013), 
http://www.csd.ua/images/stories/pdf/ndu_annual_report_2013.pdf 
(reporting the following ownership shares of the National Depository: corporate 
pension fund of the National Bank of Ukraine – 10.979%; State represented by the 
National Securities and Stock Market Commission – 25%; National Bank of 
Ukraine – 25%; State Savings Bank of Ukraine, Public Joint-Stock Company – 
24.99%). 
334  CSD’s Ownership Structure, supra note 333; ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 
333, at 73. 
335  See ZU NDS, supra note 15, art. 10 (Ukr.) (providing that no party may 
provide more than twenty-five percent of the capital for the depository); ZU DS, 
supra note 15, arts. 9(4)(Ukr.) (requiring the Central Bank of Ukraine to have 
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jurisdictions, extensive public ownership is a surprising aspect of 
centralized C&S. 
 
5.3. Ostensible Compliance with International Standards and Foreign 
Models 
5.3.1. Clearing Facilities 
 
Just like in the West, all C&S entities are licensed and regulated 
by their respective national regulators and the rules appear to be 
prima facie compliant with the international requirements and 
foreign transplants.  Until mid-2013, the Russian “SEC,” the 
Federal Financial Market Service, was a member of the IOSCO and 
federal regulator in charge of supervising a range of capital 
markets and financial services providers, including C&S.  Today, 
after a total overhaul of the regulatory system and a bold move 
away from the twin-peak regulatory system, all financial market 
regulation is consolidated under the aegis of the Central Bank. 336 
In Ukraine, the national “SEC” and the National Bank of 
Ukraine (“NBU”) regulate C&S activities.337  In addition, market 
entities may establish SROs.338 Kazakhstan, by contrast, is a single 
regulator country.  Since the first regulations on payments, clearing 
and fund transfers of 1995-1998 and disregarding a short break 
between 2003 and 2011, the regulations have been centered on the 
National Bank of Kazakhstan (“NKB”).339 
                                                     
twenty-five percent plus one of the shares of the Central Depository). 
336  Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii No. 645 [Decree of the President of 
the Russian Federation No. 645] Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii 
[SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 2013, No. 30 (Part II), Item 
4086. 
337  See generally ZU DS, supra note 15 (Ukr.) (Ukrainian regulation of the 
depository system); ZU NDS, supra note 15, arts. 2, 8 (Ukr.) (describing the two-
tiered structure of the NDS and the responsibility of the National Bank of Ukraine 
to operate governmental securities and depository activities in participation with 
the National Commission on Securities; and establishing that the National 
Securities Commission, in collaboration with the National Bank of Ukraine and 
the Ministry of Finance of Ukraine, set rules and operational standards for 
clearing and securities operations); ZU on Securities (2006), supra note 16, arts. 19, 
19–3; ZU on Securities Market Regulation (1996), supra note 16, art. 7 (outlining 
responsibilities of the National Commission on Securities and the Stock Market).   
338  ZU on Securities (2006), supra note 16, art. 2.  
339  See generally Istoriia Sozdaniia Komiteta [History of the Establishment of the 
Committee], KOMITET PO KONTROLIU I NADZORU FINANSOVOGO RYNKA I 
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The C&S Laws have recently undergone a series of structural 
and conceptual changes across the sample.  For instance, in 
Kazakhstan, a new, albeit somewhat undetailed, Chapter on 
Clearing was inserted into the 2003 Law on Securities Markets.340 
In Ukraine, the 2012 Statute converted the ND into the key national 
CSD and de facto required it to complete the dematerialization of 
securities, improve finality of settlements and simplify the 
exchange of trade instructions between clients and custodians.341 
Similarly profound reforms occurred in Russia. 
Perhaps most importantly, the Statutes endorse certain western 
ССP and CSD concepts, like “netting,” changing bankruptcy law or 
recognizing netting in derivatives accordingly.342  Following the 
                                                     
FINANSOVYKH ORGANIZATSYI NATSIONAL’NOGO BANKA [KKNFRFO] [COMMITTEE 
FOR THE CONTROL AND SUPERVISION OF THE FINANCIAL MARKET AND FINANCIAL 
ORGANIZATIONS OF THE NATIONAL BANK OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN] (May 7, 
2012), http://www.afn.kz/?docid=516 (describing the stages of development of 
the financial and banking sector in Kazakhstan, and describing the role of the 
Committee for supervision); Ukaz Prezidenta Respubliki Kazakhstan No. 25 
[Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan No. 25] SOBRANIE AKTOV 
PREZIDENTA I PRAVITEL’STVA RESPUBLIKI KAZAKHSTAN [SAPP RK] [COLLECTION OF 
ACTS OF THE PRES. AND GOV’T OF KAZ.] 2011, No. 31, Item 387 (transferring 
responsibility for monitoring financial activity from two separate governmental 
organizations to the National Bank of Kazakhstan); PAYMENT SYSTEMS IN 
KAZAKHSTAN, supra note 315, at 1–3, 12–13 (discussing earlier statutes and rules on 
clearing); Postanovlenie Soveta Direktorov o Komitete po Kontroliu i Nadzoru 
Finansovogo Rynka i Finansovykh Organizatsyi Natsional’nogo Banka ot 7 
fevralia 2013, No. 28 [Decision of the Board of Directors of the NBK on the 
Committee for the Control and Supervision of the Financial Market and Financial 
Organizations of the National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan of Feb. 7, 2013, 
No. 28] NATSIONAL’NYI BANK RESPUBLIKI KAZAKHSTAN [NBK] [NATIONAL BANK OF 
THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN] art. 12(28), 12(48), 12(51) (authorizing the National 
Bank of Kazahkstan to monitor investments, trades, and clearing and other 
financial transactions). 
340  ZRK RCB, supra note 15, at ch. 15.1 (Kaz.) (added by the Statute No. 524-
IV, Dec 28, 2011).  
341  See, e.g., Issue 5: UKRAINE - Law on the Depository System of Ukraine - 
Summary of Market Changes, RBC INVESTOR & TREASURY SERV. (Oct. 10, 2013), 
http://gmi.rbcits.com/rt/GSS.nsf/news/34F550D297EAB52B85257C0000481029?
opendocument. 
342  See, e.g., FZ RF Clearing, supra note 15, arts. 2(11), 14 (Russ.) (regarding 
CSD concepts); ZU DS, supra note 15, arts. 1, 11-2, 19-4 (Ukr.) (2012) (concerning 
CCPs).  At an earlier time, netting might have been traditionally analogized with 
“setoff” and was virtually inoperative in the context of insolvency.  
Accompanying legislation on bankruptcy also needed to be amended.  See, e.g., 
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western prototypes, the new regulations focus on risk 
management, corporate governance, disclosure and membership 
standards.  On the regulatory side, the Laws delineate the key 
policies, which C&S entities must pursue, 343  and detail the 
authority of the national regulators concerning the mandatory 
registration and licensing of C&S facilities, disclosure of their 
clearing rules, and rule approvals.344   
Information asymmetry problems are tackled along the 
following dimensions:  between clearing houses and regulators, 
and between the houses and their members.  To assure 
transparency, clearinghouses must provide public access to their 
rules, are often required to indicate their depositories and banking 
institutions managing their clearing pools, should specify the size 
of their capital and guarantee funds, and need to ensure adequate 
disclosure and publish annual corporate and financial reports.345 
                                                     
March%202011.pdf (discussing the introduction of netting rules in regard to 
derivative instruments). 
343  See, e.g., Postanovlenie Pravleniia Natsional’nogo Banka Respubliki 
Kazakhstan o Vnesenii Izmenenii i Dopolnenii v Nekotorye Normativnye 
Pravovye Akty Respubliki Kazakhstan po Voprosam Kliringovoi Deiatel’nosti s 
Finansovymi Instrumentami ot 4 iiulia 2012 No. 205 [Resolution of the Board of 
the National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Making Changes and 
Amendments to Certain Normative Legal Acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
Concerning Clearing Activity with Financial instruments of July 4, 2012 No.205], 
KAZAKHSTANSKAIA PRAVDA [KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA] 2012,  No. 375-376, Stat. 
27 (requiring establishment of and compliance with rules on monitoring, capital 
contributions, and other aspects of clearing activity); ZU DS, supra note 15, § 1, art. 
5.6 (defining the relationship between various governmental bodies in the 
regulation and management of securities accounts); id. § 9, arts. 19(3)–19(4) 
(establising a national system for the regulation of clearing activity and outlining 
a set of deliverables for the rules on clearing activity). 
344  FZ RF Clearing, supra note 15, arts. 4, 5 (Russ.); ZRK RCB, supra note 15, 
arts. 77(1), 81 (Kaz.); ZU on Securities, supra note 16, art. 19-3; ZU on Securities 
Market Regulation, supra note 16, art. 11 (Ukr.); ZU DS, supra note 15, arts. 9(7), 12, 
15 (Ukr.). 
345  See, e.g., FZ RF Clearing, supra note 15, art. 19 (Russ.) (requiring 
companies to disclose information about their activities, as defined by the Central 
Bank of Russia, and to provide easy access to that information by publishing it on 
their website); ZU DS, supra note 15 (Ukr.) (establishing reporting and monitoring 
requirements generally); Statut Publichnogo Aktsionernogo Tovaristva 
“Rozrakhunkovyi Tsentr z Obslugovuvannia Dogovoriv na Finansovykh 
Rynkakh” [Charter of the Public Joint–Stock Company “Clearing Center for the 
Service of Contracts on the Financial Markets”] 2013, available at 
http://www.settlement.com.ua/content/doc/about_company/pablik_informati
on/Statut.pdf (containing, in article 3.13.11 of the bank's charter, an example of a 
joint-stock company's disclosure rules in conformity with Ukrainian law and 
supporting the trading infrastructure established in the Law on the Depository 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol36/iss2/4
GUSEVA (DO NOT DELETE) 4/20/2015  12:13 PM 
2014] KGB’S LEGACY 621 
Regular reporting to public authorities, including, in some 
instances, data on the membership or members in default, is also 
required.346 
Clearing agreements should impose extensive reporting 
requirements on clearinghouse members.  The reports include 
items ranging from compliance with specific operational and 
financial membership standards to risk management, margining, 
guarantee funds, and others.347 
                                                     
System in Ukraine); Vnutrishni Dokumenty [Internal Documents], ROZRAKHUNKOVYI 
TSENTR Z OBSLUGOVUVANNIA DOGOVORIV NA FINANSOVYKH RYNKAKH [CLEARING 
CENTER FOR THE SERVICE OF CONTRACTS ON THE FINANCIAL MARKETS] 
http://www.settlement.com.ua/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&i
d=123&Itemid=153 (last visited Nov. 22, 2014) (providing a list of internal 
documents of the Clearing Center for the Service of Contracts on the Financial 
Markets); Rules of Clearing Activity Concerning Transactions with Financial 
Instruments, supra note 319, §§ 26, 38 (Kaz.) (containing the Kazakhstan stock 
exchange rules for funds for clearing activity and on the fees associated with 
using the stock exchange); Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Securities 
Market, supra note 16, arts. 87–88 (instituting when and in what cases the stock 
exchange can charge users for the finance of its services, and describing the 
function of the stock exchange, including organizing auctions for various financial 
instruments).  
346  Postanovlenie Pravleniia Natsional’nogo Banka Respubliki Kazakhstan 
ob Utverzhdenii Pravil Predstavleniia Otchetnosti Kliringovymi Organizatsiiami 
ot 26 marta 2012 No. 119 [Resolution of the Board of the National Bank of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan on the Approval of the Laws Regarding How Clearing 
Organizations Should Report Their Activities of Mar. 26, 2012 No.119], 
KAZAKHSTANSKAIA PRAVDA 2012, No. 256–257; FZ RF Clearing, supra note 15, arts. 
7, 25, 26 (Russ.); Natsionalna komissia z tsinnih paperiv ta fondovogo rinku, 
Rishennia, “Pro zatverdzhennja Polozhennja pro porjadok zvіtuvannja depozitarnimi 
ustanovami do Nacіonal'noї komіsії z cіnnih paperіv ta fondovogo rinku,” June 11, 2013, 
No. 992 [Decision of the National Commission on Securities and the Securities 
Market of Ukraine on the Approval of the Procedure for Depository Institutions to 
Report to the National Commission on Securities Market No. 992], OFITSIINYI 
VISNYK UKRAINY [OFFICIAL BULLETIN OF CURRENT LEGIS. OF UKRAINE] 2013, No. 59, 
Item 2123; Law of Ukraine on the National Depository System and Special 
Features of Electronic Circulation of Securities in Ukraine, supra note 15, arts. 28, 
29; Pravila Publіchnogo Akcіonernogo Tovaristva “Rozrakhunkovyi Tsentr z 
Obslugovuvannia Dogovoriv na Finansovykh Rynkakh” [Rules of the Public Joint-Stock 
Company “Clearing Center for the Service of Contracts on the Financial Markets”] 
ROZRAKHUNKOVYI TSENTR Z OBSLUGOVUVANNIA DOGOVORIV NA FINANSOVYKH 
RYNKAKH [CLEARING CENTER FOR THE SERVICE OF CONT. ON THE FIN. MARKETS] ch. 
17, available at 
http://www.settlement.com.ua/content/doc/doc/Rules_SC_Bank_24092013.pdf
. 
347  See, e.g., FZ RF Clearing, supra note 15, arts. 4, 24(9), 24(11) (Russ.) 
(establishing the rules and functions of a collective clearing fund, which operates 
as an insurance system to guarantee the payments of clearing companies by 
taking fees from firms in the form of cash and assets; in the case of a breach, 
withdrawing the value of unpaid obligations first from the assets contributed by 
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The Statutes weigh fairness against risk management 
considerations.  Clearinghouses generally are not supposed to 
                                                     
the firm in breach; and, when such assets are insufficient, taking money from the 
collective fund, which the breaching firm is obligated to pay back); Rules of the 
Public Joint-Stock Company “Clearing Center for the Service of Contracts on the 
Financial Markets,” supra note 346, at ch. 4, 7, 12 (describing general rules for 
establishing, developing and using the guarantee fund; identifying the clients of 
the “Clearing Center;” and installing a system for the  analysis and management 
of risks); Reglament obslugovuvannja klієntіv v publіchnomu akcіonernomu tovaristvі 
"Rozrahunkovij centr z obslugovuvannja dogovorіv na fіnansovih rinkah" No. 41 
[Customer Service Plan of the Public Joint-Stock Company “Clearing Center for the 
Service of Contracts on the Financial Markets” No. 41], PRAVLINNIA PUBLICHNOGO 
AKTSIONERNOGO TOVARISTVA "ROZRAHUNKOVIJ CENTR Z OBSLUGOVUVANNJA 
DOGOVORІV NA FІNANSOVIH RINKAH", [BOARD OF THE PUB. JOINT-STOCK COMPANY 
“CLEARING CENTER FOR THE SERVICE OF CONT. ON THE FIN. MARKETS”] 2013, arts. 4.3, 
4.5, available at  
http://www.settlement.com.ua/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&i
d=123&Itemid=153 (establishing proper procedures for corporate entities to open, 
first, accounts and, second, correspondent accounts); Pravila prodvazhennia 
kliringovoy dialnosty publichnogo akcіonernogo tovaristva "Rozrahunkovij centr z 
obslugovuvannja dogovorіv na fіnansovih rinkah” [Rules on Clearing Activity of the 
Public Joint-Stock Company “Clearing Center for the Service of Contracts on the 
Financial Markets”] 2013, available at  
http://www.settlement.com.ua/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&i
d=123&Itemid=153 (outlining rules on clearing activity for the Clearing Center 
that  harmonize with the laws on the Ukrainian depository system, and with other 
regulations on the securities and capital market); Vіdkrittja Klіringovogo Rahunku 
[Opening of a Clearing Account], ROZRAKHUNKOVYI TSENTR Z OBSLUGOVUVANNIA 
DOGOVORIV NA FINANSOVYKH RYNKAKH [CLEARING CENTER FOR THE SERVICE OF 
CONT. ON THE FIN. MARKETS], 
http://www.settlement.com.ua/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&i
d=629&Itemid=100074 (last visited Nov. 23, 2014) (listing the steps to enrolling 
with the Clearing Center, including consenting to the Center's procedures and 
regulations, providing disclosure documents, and agreeing to use the clearing 
system); Postanovlenie Pravleniia Natsional’nogo Banka Respubliki Kazakhstan  
ob Utverzhdenii Pravil Osushchestvleniia Kliringovoi Deiatel’nosti po Sdelkam s 
Finansovymi Instrumentami ot 24 fevralia 2012 No. 58 [Resolution of the Board of 
the National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the Approval of the Rules on 
Clearing Activities in Deals with the Financial Instruments of Feb. 24, 2012 No. 
58], KAZAKHSTANSKAIA PRAVDA 2012,  No. 199-200, §§ 5, 6, 7, 21–27 (defining how a 
corporation can become a clearing market participant; that clearing market 
participants must provide financial reports and pay fees  in accordance with the 
clearing organization's rules to enter the market; that participants must inform the 
clearing organization if they are under sanctions or participants to lawsuits; and 
lastly, delineating the clearing organization's disclosure obligations and other 
rules of activity); Birzhevoi Sovet AO “Kazakhstanskaia Fondovaia Birzha” 
[KASE Board of Directors], Poriadok Osushchestvleniia Monitoringa i Kontrolia 
Kliringovykh Uchastnikov [Procedure of Clearing Participants Monitoring and 
Control] July 23, 2012, No. 9, available at 
http://www.kase.kz/files/normative_base/clearing_monitoring.pdf (providing 
rules for clearing participants). 
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discriminate against single members within various clearing groups 
(i.e., individual members may be assigned to groups) based on 
financial stability and other criteria.  This requirement is either 
directly spelled out in the laws or supposedly proceeds from the 
standardized rules, which the C&S entities must establish.348  
Just like in the West, the regulators also seemingly 
acknowledge the dangers of the vertical silo structure, including 
commingling of assets of a clearinghouse and its parent 
exchange. 349    Violations of the fund safety rules are feasible, 
particularly considering that an exchange may keep reserve and 
guarantee funds on its own accounts.350  The three jurisdictions in 
question approach this problem with various degrees of clarity 
and, therefore, affirmative signaling. 
A promising provision in the Russian Statute, for example, is 
that it attempts to safeguard the guarantee fund from potential 
expropriation by the clearinghouse’s own management, a 
circumstance well known to emerging markets.351  Perhaps for the 
same reason, and, again, just like in the West, the Statutes often 
require Chinese walls be built in order to segregate non-clearing 
businesses from clearing divisions of a C&S facility and limit the 
use of funds to the CCP obligations of the clearinghouse.352 
Another encouraging signal is the special treatment of claims 
and assets included in a clearing pool.  Protective rules may apply 
                                                     
348  See, e.g., FZ RF Clearing, supra note 15, art. 11 (Russ.) (establishing that 
participants of different categories may be treated differently but that participants 
of the same category must be treated identically); KASE Board of Directors, 
Procedure of Clearing Participants Monitoring and Control, supra note 347; Rules 
of Clearing Activity Concerning Transactions with Financial Instruments, supra 
note 319, § 6 (Kaz.) (requiring all companies to provide financial reports every 
quarter and in specified formats); Resolution of the Board of the National Bank of 
the Republic of Kazakhstan on the Approval of the Rules on Clearing Activities in 
Deals with the Financial Instruments of Feb. 24, 2012 No. 58, supra note 347, § 6 
(establishing that clearing market participants must provide financial reports and 
pay fees  in accordance with the clearing organization's rules to enter the market). 
349  See infra note 419 and accompanying text. 
350  Rules of Clearing Activity Concerning Transactions with Financial 
Instruments, supra note 319, §§ 27–28 (Kaz.). 
351  FZ RF Clearing, supra note 15, art. 24 (Russ.) (requiring collateral for loans 
from guarantee funds). 
352  Id. art. 5; Resolution of the Board of the National Bank of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan on the Approval of the Rules on Clearing Activities in Deals with the 
Financial Instruments of Feb. 24, 2012 No. 58, supra note 347, § 3; Rules of Clearing 
Activity Concerning Transactions with Financial Instruments, supra note 319, § 
26(1). 
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with respect to margin payments and collateral set aside by 
clearing members in separate clearing accounts.353  Such statutory 
provisions assure the status of clearinghouses as conduits 
concerned with the safety of asset transfers, their reliability and 
finality of settlements, which is precisely in line with the 
international standards and the IOSCO requirements.  The strength 
of such direct statutory signaling varies. 
For instance, a positive signal was sent with respect to tax 
claims.  Considering the history of dubious prosecutorial actions in 
Russia, tax-related obligations are a notorious subset of claims after 
the YUKOS affair.354  They are specifically enumerated as claims 
that cannot be used as a ploy for either a seizure of the assets of 
clearing members or suspension of transfers. 355   The Ukrainian 
statute merely limits state intervention to circumstances provided 
for in law, supports asset segregation and leaves the determination 
of the guarantee fund policies to the regulators.356   
The regulators have also directed their attention to corporate 
governance as a source of agency risk, particularly strong in an 
opaque centralized marketplace.  By way of example, “fraudsters” 
are often directly banned from being appointed as directors or 
executive officers.  The candidates to the key D&O positions must 
comply with certain qualification requirements.357   The national 
                                                     
353  See, e.g., Rules of Clearing Activity Concerning Transactions with 
Financial Instruments, supra note 319, § 16 (Kaz.) (discussing the liability of the 
clearinghouses).  See also FZ RF Clearing, supra note 15, art. 23(22) (Russ.) 
(providing that in the absence of an agreement regarding a company’s individual 
funds to the contrary, companies consent to the use of their individual funds to 
protect the health of the overall fund).  The Russian Statute also, for instance, 
explicitly ensures that assets included in a clearing pool are segregated from other 
assets of not only the clearinghouse itself but also its members in case of their 
insolvency or the execution of judgment liens.  Id. art. 18. 
354  See, e.g., Allen v. Russ. Fed’n, 522 F. Supp. 2d 167 (D.D.C. 2007) 
(dismissing investors’ lawsuit  against the Russian Federation and several Russian 
leaders concerning the renationalization of Yukos Oil Co.); In re Yukos Oil Co., 
321 B.R. 396, 400–04 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) (regarding Yukos’s bankruptcy that 
was the result of unpaid taxes). 
355  FZ RF Clearing, supra note 15, art. 18 (Russ.).  
356  ZU DS, supra note 15, arts. 19(7), 19(10) (Ukr.); Natsionalna komissia z 
tsinnih paperiv ta fondovogo rinku, Rishennia ta fondovogo rinku 26.03.2013 
[Decision of the National Commission on Securities and the Securities Market of 
Mar. 26, 2013] 2013, No. 429, §§ II.16.2, VI.11 (Ukr.).  
357  See, e.g., FZ RF Clearing, supra note 15, art. 6 (establishing a list of 
requirements to hold a position as a director or key officer, including department 
heads, chief accountants, and risk managers); Postanovlenie Pravleniia 
Natsional'nogo Banka Respubliki Kazakhstan ot 24 fevralia 2012 goda No. 59 Ob 
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regulators are supposed to serve as the primary safety valve in 
charge of screening all candidates to key positions.358 
Furthermore, not anyone may be a shareholder of the 
clearinghouses.  In Ukraine, e.g., the law limits the types of the 
stockholders to only the NBU, licensed capital market participants, 
and international C&S entities.  In a similar vein, the SC is 
regulated not only as a C&S facility but also as a bank that should 
comply with the management requirements applied to licensed 




The brand new provisions on CSDs complement the Clearing 
Statutes or, alternatively, cover mixed C&S facilities.360  Just like in 
the U.S. and other “developed C&S jurisdictions,” improving 
efficiencies through such means as prompt settlement, 
immobilization of securities and better information exchange are 
important premises of the depository reforms.  For instance, there 
are requirements applied to communications between depositories 
                                                     
utverzhdenii Trebovanii k sisteme upravleniia riskami kliringovoi organizatsii, 
usloviiam i poriadku monitoringa, kontrolia i upravleniia riskami v kliringovoi 
organizatsii [Resolution of the Board of the National Bank of Kazakhstan from 
February 24, 2012, 59, on Approval of the Requirements for the Risk Management 
System of the Clearing Organization, Conditions and Procedures for Monitoring, 
Control and Risk Management in the Clearing Organization] 2012, No. 59, §§ 24–
28 (introducing new requirements for monitoring and reporting); Polojenie o 
Birzhevom sovete [Position of the Exchange Council], KASE, §§ 31-36, Mar. 31, 
2011, No. 07 (establishing institutional requirements for the independence of 
directors). 
358  Position of the Exchange Council, supra note 357. 
359  See, e.g., Zakon Ukrainy “Pro banki і bankіvs'ku dіjal'nіst” [Law of 
Ukraine on Banking Activities], VІDOMOSTІ VERKHOVNOI RADY UKRAINY [GAZETA 
VERKHOVNOI RADI OF UKRAINE] Sept. 20, 2001, No. 2740-III, art. 19 (listing 
responsibilities and requirements of executive management); ZU DS, supra note 
15, art. 15 (Ukr.) (specifying the entities, which may become shareholders of the 
clearing facilities, empowering the SC to perform certain roles exclusive to banks, 
and requiring the National Bank of Ukraine to maintain a twenty-five percent 
plus one share in the SC); ZU on Securities, supra note 16, art. 27 (setting 
requirements for stock market players).  
360  See, e.g., ZRK RCB, supra note 15, art. 80(2.1) (establishing that when the 
central depository has licenses for special banking operations, it may manage 
payments between brokers and dealers); ZU NDS, supra note 15, art. 1 (Ukr.) 
(defining depositories and clearing depositories). 
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and other parties.361  To promote immobilization, CSDs are allowed 
to open accounts in their nominee’s name, i.e., just like DTC’s 
Cede&Co in the U.S.362  
Another set of structural provisions fall under the rubric of 
corporate governance and risk management.  The corporate 
governance principles are generally similar to those of 
clearinghouses.  A CSD should have a board of directors, 
management board, separate executive officer and risk 
management, auditing and monitoring division.363  In a somewhat 
Sarbanes-Oxley style, such divisions may be obligated to report 
directly to the board.  In order to improve the integrity of CSDs, 
persons without necessary professional qualifications, disqualified 
members of securities and derivatives markets and investment 
managers, insolvent entities, individuals whose licenses have been 
revoked or those having “blemished” reputation are prevented 
from serving on the boards of directors or management boards of 
CSDs.364 
A curious local peculiarity related to corporate governance is 
the mentioned above tilt toward domestic, both private or public, 
stockholders and the limitations on the shareholder voting power. 
Recall that some western clearinghouses did limit shareholder 
                                                     
361  For example, communications between a CSD and transfer agents and 
record keeping must be electronic.  See, e.g., FZ RF CD, supra note 15, arts. 12, 29 
(requiring electronic records); Pravila osushhestvlenija  depozitarnoj dejatel’nosti 
[Rules on the Implementation of Depository Activities], SVOD PRAVIL AO 
“TSENTRAL’NYI DEPOSITARII TSENNYKH BUMAG” KAZAKHSTANA [KCSD] [COLLECTION 
OF RULES OF THE JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “CENTRAL DEPOSITORY OF SEC.” OF KAZ.] 
Sept. 5, 2011, arts. 11, 14, 69 (describing electronic copies of orders, and discussing 
the reporting to account holders); ZRK RCB, supra note 15, art. 18 (Kaz.) 
(establishing obligations for electronic reporting within one month of a change in 
obligations).  
362  FZ RF CD, supra note 15, art. 24 (Russ.); Rules on the Implementation of 
Depository Activities, supra note 361, art. 2; UNICREDIT, supra note 44, at 26 
(indicating that Ukrainian law in this area is less settled). 
363  FZ RF CD, supra note 15, arts. 5, 7; ZU DS, supra note 15, art. 12 (Ukr.); 
ZRK RCB, supra note 15, art. 79 (Kaz.) (adding a state representative to the 
management structure); Organizatsionnaia struktura [Organizational Structure], 
KACD, http://www.kacd.kz/ru/about_KACD/structure/ (last visited Dec. 31, 
2014); Postanovlenie Pravleniia Agentstva Respubliki Kazakhstan po 
regulirovaniiu i nadzoru finansovogo rynka I finansovykh organizatsii ot 29 
dekabria 2008 [Decision of the Board of the Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
for Regulation and Oversight of Financial Market and Financial Organizations of 
Dec. 29, 2008] 2008, No. 238, available at http://normativ.kz/view/23673/. 
364  FZ RF CD, supra note 15, art. 5 (Russ.); ZRK RCB, supra note 15, art. 54 
(Kaz.); ZU on Securities, supra note 16, art. 27 (Ukr.). 
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voting rights with the purpose to assure fair and 
nondiscriminatory corporate policies, fee setting and membership 
mechanisms.  It was accomplished primarily by the clearinghouses 
themselves.  In the sample, by contrast, these practices were 
promoted by the state.  This raises the question whether such 
statutory restrictions are de facto an idiosyncratic way to exert 
control over the management. 
For instance, the Kazakh statute imposes a 5% ownership cap 
on all private shareholders, which, of course, leaves the state as the 
majority holder.365  The Ukrainian provisions are more ambivalent 
and apparently attempt to strike a balance between the historically 
domestically-oriented policies and the need to attract foreign 
investments and to capitalize on international expertise.  In this 
vein, the Charter of the ND and pertinent Statutes restrict holdings 
by a single stockholder and affiliates to 5% while simultaneously 
allowing the international financial organizations and C&S entities 
to own up to 25%, but preserving the 25% plus of stockownership 
of the NBU.366 
By contrast, the Russian CSD law is surprisingly more lenient 
with respect to prescriptive ownership requirements.  The law 
primarily focuses on the types of shareholders, who, in a nutshell, 
should be Russian entities and mainly licensed capital market 
participants. 367   In certain cases, e.g., in application to CCPs, 
holding of 5% or more of shares must be merely reported to the 
Russian securities regulator.368 
                                                     
365  ZRK RCB, supra note 15, art. 78(2) (Kaz.). 
366  Statut Publichnogo aktsionernogo tovarystva “Natsional’nyi depozitarii 
Ukrainy” [Charter of the National Depository of Ukraine], Oct. 9, 2013, art. 4.4, 
available at http://www.csd.ua/images/stories/pdf/ndu_statut.pdf.  See also ZU 
NDS, supra note 15, art. 10 (limiting the holdings of one shareholder to no more 
than twenty-five percent of the depository’s capital); ZU DS, supra note 15, art. 9 
(Ukr.) (requiring the National Bank of Ukraine to hold twenty-five percent of the 
shares of the national clearinghouse plus one share, allowing foreign depositories 
to hold twenty-five percent, and limiting the holdings of other shareholders to 
five percent). 
367  FZ RF CD, supra note 15, arts. 4–8 (Russ.); Prikaz Ministerstva Finansov 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 13 aprelia 2012 g. N 46n “Ob utverzhdenii Poriadka 
prisvoeniia statusa tsentral’nogo depozitariia” [Order of the Ministry of Finance 
of the Russian Federation of Apr. 13, 2013 No. 46n “Concerning the Approval of 
the Process for Receving the Status of Central Depository”], ROZ. GAZ. 2012, Item 
No. 5795, § 2. 
368  FZ RF Clearing, supra note 15, art. 7 (Russ.); Prikaz Federal’noi sluzhby po 
finansovym rynkam ot 4 dekabria 2012 g. No. 12-103/pz-n "Ob utverzhdenii 
Polozheniia o trebovaniiakh k ob”emu, poriadku, srokam i forme predstavleniia v 
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The adverse selection, discrimination and fair participation 
concerns are also touched upon in the regulations.  The CSDs must, 
similarly to clearinghouses, apprise their members of all rule 
changes, publish financial reports, disclose all rules and tariffs,369 
and may have to follow a code of conduct of depositories370 or use 
only the tariffs preapproved by the government authorities. 371 
Since nondiscriminatory membership is an international rule of 
thumb, the regulations and bylaws call for member equality and 
standardize the rules and CSD agreements.372 
In some cases, the Statues specifically permit inter-linkages 
with foreign CSDs and set forth germane precautions.373  Russian 
CSDs, e.g., should not participate in offshore and suspicious 
transactions through opening accounts on behalf of their members 
in foreign CSDs in jurisdictions other than the members of the 
OECD or signatories to several anti-money-laundering and anti-
                                                     
federal’nyj organ ispolnitel’noi vlasti v oblasti finansovykh rynkov uvedomlenii 
litsami, ukazannymi v abzatse pervom chasti 1 stat’i 7 Federal’nogo zakona “O 
kliringe i kliringovoi deiatel’nosti” [Order of the Federal Financial Markets 
Service (FFMS of Russia) of Dec. 4, 2012 No. 12-103/pz-n "On Approval of the 
Requirements (Volume, Order, Timing and Form) of Presentations of 
Notifications to the Federal Executive Authority on Financial Markets; and 
Regarding Persons Referred to in the First Subparagraph of Paragraph 1 of Article 
7 of the Federal Law ‘On clearing and clearing activity’"], ROZ. GAZ. 2013, Item 
No. 62. 
369  FZ RF CD, supra note 15, art. 17 (Russ.); ZRK RCB, supra note 15, art. 81 
(Kaz.); Rules on the Implementation of Depository Activities, supra note 361.  See 
also ZU DS, supra note 15, arts. 25, 28 (highlighting the confidentiality of 
information and granting the authorities discretion regarding specific disclosure 
rules). 
370  FZ RF CD, supra note 15, arts. 10–11 (Russ.).  
371  ZU DS, supra note 15, arts. 9(10)–(11) (Ukr.).  
372  FZ RF CD, supra note 15, art. 9(3) (Russ.); Ostanovlenie pravleniia 
natsional'nogo banka respubliki kazakhstan ot 25 noiabria 2011 goda No. 180 O 
vnesenii izmenenii i dopolneniia v postanovlenie Pravleniia Agentstva Respubliki 
Kazakhstan po regulirovaniiu i nadzoru finansovogo rynka i finansovykh 
organizatsii ot 29 dekabria 2008 goda No. 238 "Ob utverzhdenii Pravil 
osushchestvleniia deiatel'nosti tsentral'nogo depozitariia" [Resolution of the Board 
of the National Bank of Kazakhstan from Oct. 25, 2011 No. 180 on Making 
Amendments and Additions to the Resolution of the Board of the Agency of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan for Regulation and Oversight of Financial Market and 
Financial Organizations on December 29, 2008, No. 238 "On Approval of Rules of 
Activity of the Central Depository"], KAZAKHSTANSKAIA PRAVDA 2011, No. 102-03, 
§ 30 (amending the Decision of the Board of the Agency of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan for Regulation and Oversight of Financial Market and Financial 
Organizations of Dec. 29, 2008, supra note 363).  
373  FZ RF CD, supra note 15, art. 25(4) (Russ.).  
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terrorism treaties. 374   Finally, when it comes to the actual 
operational risks of CSDs, the clarity and generality of the 
regulations differ, although there is, ostensibly, nothing patently 
contrary to the international requirements or the original western 




To conclude, the sample markets are transplanting followers, 
borrowing foreign statutory structures.  They have modeled their 
C&S facilities after the western templates, along the lines of their 
international commitments.  Just like in the West, their public 
authorities have become the linchpin of standard setting and 
monitoring policies and should be consulted regarding all rules of 
clearinghouses.375  The following Sections examine whether such 
replication, upending the models onto preexisting entities operating 
within a preexisting institutional and transactional culture, is 
                                                     
374  FZ RF CD, supra note 15, art.  24.  See also Rules on the Implementation of 
Depository Activities, supra note 361, art. 4 (requiring a Board’s approval of 
accounts in foreign depositories, unless such depositories are ICSD or CSD 
registered by foreign regulators).  
375  See, e.g., FZ RF CD, supra note 15, arts. 9(4), 32 (Russ.) (providing that 
internal documents – including those outlining rules for the activities of the 
central depository, regarding internal controls, establishing a code of professional 
ethics of the CD, risk management, and disclosures – must be approved by the 
Federal Executive Authority in Financial Markets; and also providing that the 
federal executive authority regulates and monitors activities of the CD, establishes 
requirements for internal documents of the CD, takes measures to detect 
violations of the requirements of the federal law, and enforces observance of the 
law); ZRK RCB, supra note 15, arts. 77-1, 81 (Kaz.) (listing the principles and rules 
of clearing entities and the central depository); Nacіonal'naya Komіsіja z Cіnnih 
Paperіv ta Fondovogo Rinku [National Commission on Securities and Securities 
Market], Reguljuvannja dіjal'nostі Central'nogo depozitarіju Ukraїni [Regulation of 
the CSD of Ukraine], available at http://www.nssmc.gov.ua/activities/depozitary 
(last visited Dec. 31, 2014) (Ukr.) (defining how to acquire the status of “Central 
Depository” and that the National Commission on Securities and the Stock 
Market must approve the status of CDs); Nacіonal'naya Komіsіja z Cіnnih Paperіv 
ta Fondovogo Rinku [National Commission on Securities and Securities Market], 
Lіcenzіjna dіjal'nіst' [Licensing Activity], available at 
http://www.nssmc.gov.ua/activities/license (last visited Dec. 31, 2014) (Ukr.) 
(establishing that the National Commission on Securities and Stock Market issues, 
re-issues, annuls, and regulates the rules governing licenses on such stock market 
activities as: dealer/broker activities on securities trading, depository activities, 
managing assets of institutional investors, keeping pension funds, and clearing 
activities). 
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rational and efficient. 
Recall that the reforms and recent mergers of C&S entities 
potentially enable those facilities to clear and settle most domestic 
transactions, a priori converting them into systemically important 
institutions.  The regulators, therefore, must act with particular 
care within this market segment.  
The key factor that should bear on the future implementation 
of the reforms is the heavy state participation in the C&S industry 
through not only policy guidelines and enforcement but also the 
partial ownership of those facilities. Hence, the key analytical 
question is whether, ceteris paribus, the C&S entities and their local 
supervisors can mend the discussed above “trust linkages” and 
serve as a centralized solution, reducing transaction costs in the 
sample markets.  Does the domestic “gradient,” focusing primarily 
on local actors, properly address the local market inefficiencies?  If 
so, is the “gradient” a friend or foe?   
 
6. ASSESSMENT OF THE TRANSPLANT GRADIENT 
6.1. Introduction 
 
The sample economies have modified the transplant by 
enhancing the role of the state. This Section examines the status of 
the state as not only a regulatory authority but also a majority 
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actors should trust the state in its now dual capacity as an efficient 
standard setting and monitoring agent and a major shareholder.  If 
strong regulators and public ownership are to reduce transaction 
costs, an environment conducive to trust must be created.  It is 
only logical that in order for this to happen, market participants 
should believe that the state has the adequate licensing capacity 
and that the enforcement agencies can assure orderly C&S.  
Simultaneously, market participants must believe the state-related 
C&S institutions are both willing to exercise oversight and capable of 
properly monitoring their private members.376 
 
6.2. Regulatory “Ability” and “Willingness” and Policy Signaling 
6.2.1. Regulators as the Locus of Trust 
 
Let us evaluate the gradient and state’s performance through 
the same trust components of Ability and Willingness.  Using the 
same trust metrics is justified to the extent that, by virtue of the 
state ownership, the regulators become somewhat analogous to 
other market actors.  
Their ability to be a proper “trust-enhancing” locus is a 
function of several factors, including, inter alia, the expertise, 
understanding of the nature and value of the monitored processes, 
and capacity to react fast to stabilize the system and deploy 
sophisticated financial analysis to rectify the errors of others.377 
The centrality of the Ability and Willingness components hinges 
on the actual authority of national regulators.  To recap, the law in 
the sample makes the regulators the fulcrum of the domestic C&S 
systems.  At this early stage, the reforms depend on their making a 
proper judgment call.  By contrast, the functions of the market 
actors and courts are somewhat derivative.  Specifically, it is not 
clear if there is an explicit private right of action in case of, e.g., 
clearinghouses’ failures to enforce their own rules, 378  including 
                                                     
376  See, e.g., Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 37, at 335 (observing that well-
transplanted Russian statutes “failed because the institutions purportedly created 
were not credible – they did not provide the protection promised by the statute”). 
377  The concept of expertise, of course, often serves as a general justification 
of the regulatory state.  See, e.g., Bruce Kraus & Connor Raso, Rational Boundaries 
for SEC Cost-Benefit Analysis, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 289, 325–36 (2013) (discussing the 
economic analysis in SEC decision-making). 
378  That issue is not surprising in itself.  Indeed, it is common in jurisdictions-
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both direct and derivative suits by members or shareholders.379 
Instead, most complaints should be reviewed by regulators and 
C&S facilities or SROs in the first place, although aggrieved parties 
                                                     
transplant-origins.  See, e.g., Kusch v. Mishkin (In re Adler, Coleman Clearing 
Corp.), 1998 WL 551972, at 426–29 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
379  Public enforcement seems to remain the most useful form enforcement of 
C&S provisions.  See, e.g., the sources listed in supra note 95 (describing class 
actions).  See also Zakon Respubliki Kazakhstan ob Aktsionernykh Obshchestvakh 
[ZRK ob AO] [Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Joint-Stock Companies], 
VEDEMOSTI PARLAMENTA RESPUBLIKI KAZAKHSTAN [VP RK] [GAZETTE OF THE 
PARLIAMENT OF THE RESPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN] 2003, No. 10, Item 55, arts. 58.8, 
63.2 (imposing on shareholder derivative actions: 1. a scienter requirement, and 2. 
a requirement that the shareholder(s) hold(s) at least five percent of the 
outstanding stock); Zakon Respubliki Kazakhstan o Rynke Tsennykh Bumag 
[ZRK] [Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the Securities Market] VEDEMOSTI 
PARLAMENTA RESPUBLIKI KAZAKHSTAN [VP RK] [GAZETTE OF THE PARLIAMENT OF 
THE RESPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN] 2003, No. 14, Item 119, arts. 108–11, 113 
(establishing the authority of national regulators and liability provisions); KODEKS 
RESPUBLIKI KAZAKHSTAN OB ADMINISTRATIVNYKH PRAVONARUSHENIIAKH [KOAP RK] 
[CODE OF ADMINISTRATIVE VIOLATIONS] VEDEMOSTI PARLAMENTA RESPUBLIKI 
KAZAKHSTAN [VP RK] [GAZETTE OF THE PARLIAMENT OF THE RESPUBLIC OF 
KAZAKHSTAN] 2001, No. 5-6, Item 24, arts. 193–94, 195–96; GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS 
RESPUBLIKI KAZAKHSTAN (OBSHCHAIA CHAST’) [GK RK] [CIVIL CODE (GENERAL 
SECTION)] arts. 292, 378–405 (Kaz.) (containing provisions on securities and civil 
liability that appear more suitable for more typical trading in securities than C&S); 
Zakon Ukrainy pro Derzhavne Reguliuvannia Rynku Tsіnnykh Paperіv v Ukrainі 
[Law of Ukraine on State Regulation of the Securities Market] 1996, No. 51, Item 
292, art. 8–11 (authorizing a national commission to regulate the Ukrainian 
securities and stock markets); ISPOLNITEL’NYI KOMITET SNG, supra note 96, at 31–32 
(providing statistics on regulatory actions of securities trading within the CIS 
states); TSYVIL’NYI KODEKS UKRAINY [CIVIL CODE], supra note 16, arts. 194–98 (Ukr.) 
(defining and providing general information about securities); Asters, Shareholder 
Derivative Action as a Possible Protection Mechanism in the Ukrainian Corporate 
Legislation, US-UKR. BUS. COUNCIL (Oct. 23, 2013), 
http://www.usubc.org/site/member-news/shareholder-derivative-action-as-a-
possible-protection-mechanism-in-the-ukrainian-corporate-legislation; ASTERS, 
supra note 95, at 33–34 (discussing improvements in the legal protection of rights 
of minority shareholders to address the abuse of the dominant position by 
majority shareholders in Ukraine); Federal’nyi Zakon RF o Zashchite Prav i 
Zakonnykh Interesov Investorov na Rynke Tsennykh Bumag, [Federal Law of the 
Russian Federation on the Protection of the Rights and Legitimate Interests of 
Investors in the Securities Market], SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI 
FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [RUSSIAN FEDERATION COLLECTION OF LEGISLATION] 1999, No. 10, 
Item 1163 (describing the role of Russian regulators and investor associations in 
investor protection); Federal’nyi zakon RF ob Aktsionernykh Obshchestvakh 
[Federal Law of the Russian Federation on Joint-Stock Companies], SZ RF 1996, 
No. 1, Item 1, art. 71 (imposing a one percent ownership threshold on certain 
derivative suits in corporate law disputes); APK RF, supra note 16, art. 53 (Russ.) 
(expounding on representative actions in Russia); FZ RF on Securities, supra note 
15, arts. 42, 44, 51 (on the authority of federal regulators). 
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often may appeal their decisions in local courts.380 Appealing first 
to the de facto owners, in turn, raises the “willingness” and 
conflicts of interest concerns and may delay dispute resolution.   
The second germane issue is that it is unclear how courts in the 
sample would treat such cases.  Even in the transplant-origin 
jurisdictions, courts often exhibit deference to the judgment of 
expert regulators like the SEC.381  After all, clearing and settlement 
industry is very complex.  It would not be surprising if Russian, 
Ukrainian and Kazakh courts, just like their homologues in the 
transplant-origins, followed the same route. The crucial difference 
would be, of course, that the sample courts would be deferring to 
the opinion of the state-owners-regulators.  
 
6.2.2. Generalist Judiciary and Policy Signaling 
 
Conflicts of interest aside, another problem is that there are no 
regulatory decisions to consult and respect.  Considering the 
generality of statutory law, regulators typically need to set forth 
interpretative ex ante guidelines for the courts and the market.382 
                                                     
380  Compare FZ RF Clearing, supra note 15, art. 25 (Russ.) (providing the 
Central Bank of Russia with regulatory authority and responsibilities), and FZ RF 
on Securities, supra note 16, art. 51 (Russ.) (setting forth the liability principles, 
describing enforcement actions, and providing for the right to appeal public 
enforcement decisions in court), with ZRK RCB, supra note 15, arts. 98–100, 113 
(providing that decisions regarding SRO membership are appealable in court but 
that a refusal by an SRO to review a complaint against a member should be 
reported to the regulators).  
381  See, e.g., Pet Quarters, Inc. v. Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., 559 F.3d 
772, 777–82 (8th Cir. 2009) (dismissing a claim on the basis of federal preemption 
that the defendants’ SEC-approved program drove down the market price for 
plaintiff’s shares and eventually put it out of business); Capece, Jr. v. Depository 
Trust & Clearing Corp., 2005 WL 4050118, at 3–9 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (dismissing 
plaintiff’s motion for remand, which alleged that Defendant’s failure to monitor 
the Stock Borrow Program (SBP), an SEC-approved program, devalued Plaintiffs’ 
CYBR holdings); Olde Monmouth Stock Transfer Co., Inc. v. Depository Trust & 
Clearing Corp., 485 F. Supp. 2d 387, 394, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (concluding that 
plaintiff’s claims under Section 2 of the Sherman Act and the equivalent New 
Jersey antitrust statute “fail as a matter of law” and “[a]llegations that DTC has 
been arbitrary and capricious in excluding Olde Monmouth from the FAST 
Program are properly addressed to the SEC, which oversees DTC’s activities as a 
registered clearing agency”); Nanopierce Techs., Inc. v. Depositary Trust & 
Clearing Corp., 168 P.3d 73, 76 (Nev. 2007) (affirming the decision that “federal 
law in the area of clearing and settling securities transactions preempted 
appellants’ claims”). 
382  This may be, in part, an extension of the theory of incomplete law 
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Such policy guidelines are particularly important where the 
generalist judiciary may mistakenly apply well-trodden corporate 
law concepts or misunderstand the nature of C&S processes.   
Consider the following scenario.  A court may unwind a 
transaction or correct securities records.383  In a centralized C&S 
structure, these simple judicial functions may cause a serious 
securities market disruption. By way of example, about ten years 
after the establishment of national C&S services in the U.S., the 
Delaware Court of Chancery, reviewing a routine takeover claim, 
encountered the following issue.384  In short, plaintiffs sought to 
enjoin trades in the amount of $1.6 billion.  If the court granted the 
relief sought by the plaintiffs, the participant broker would 
 
be disabled from making payment to the NSCC.  The 
NSCC’s function is to match, in every stock trade, the 
buyer’s payment to the seller’s delivered stock.  In order to 
assure the liquidity and reliability of the market, the NSCC 
in effect becomes both the buyer and the seller in all not-
yet-consummated trades.  It does so by ‘netting’ the amount 
owed not only for a particular stock, but also for all stocks 
traded on the Exchange. . . . Should all the sellers of 
[specific] stock deliver their . . . stock to the NSCC, and 
should [the broker] not make payment against those 
deliveries, the NSCC would likely be unable to pay the 
sellers, thereby defaulting on the trades.  As a consequence 
of the $1.6 billion shortfall, NSCC would be unable to pay 
numerous brokers, including brokers that were not even 
involved in the . . . stock trades [at issue].385  
 
This is a typical scenario where a default by a sizeable 
                                                     
positing regulators as better enforcers when the law is incomplete and 
externalities substantial.  Chenggang Xu & Katharina Pistor, Law Enforcement 
Under Incomplete Law: Theory and Evidence from Financial Market Regulation 35 (LSE 
STICERD Research Paper No. TE442, 2002), http://ssrn.com/abstract=396141.  See 
also Glaeser et al. (2001), supra note 38, at 855–57, 863, 897 (suggesting that 
regulators are more motivated to properly understand the law even though they 
may be more politically biased).  
383  It is, of course, a common procedure.  See, e.g., ZU DS, supra note 15, arts. 
6–7 (listing the various powers of courts over the depository systems records and 
functions).  
384  Ivanhoe Partners, supra note 60, at 677. 
385  Id. at 677–78. 
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participant can trigger a chain reaction affecting unrelated 
parties.386  Specific reasons for the default or unwinding may be 
irrelevant from an efficiency perspective, i.e., it is immaterial why 
the party-obligor defaults.  In other words, the fact that a single 
sizeable obligor belongs to the population of Bs, i.e., opportunists, 
or Cs, i.e., unfortunate As, is almost irrelevant:  a CCP and the 
“survivors” may suffer the consequences and risks of the unwound 
transaction all the same.  If the ultimate default is sizeable enough 
to topple the CCP’s risk management and exceed the member’s 
contribution to the guarantee funds and margin payments, the 
other CCP members will be affected and losses spread around. 
Similarly important risks threaten CSDs.  It is for the courts, 
often deferring to the regulators, to decide, for example, whether 
“parties [did or] did not intend that [a CSD] insure” deposits of its 
participants, making it responsible for the losses incurred in 
voidable transactions.387   
It would be only natural if less experienced courts, absent clear 
policy guidelines as a reference point, relied on the well-tested 
principles of corporate or bankruptcy law and incidentally 
disrupted C&S operations.  In this sense, the swiftness of the 
transplanting reforms leaves something to be desired, as the 
regulators have not yet paid much attention to providing policy 
guidelines to the judiciary. 
 
6.2.3. Ex Ante Registration Policies and Expertise 
 
The breathtaking speed of the reforms implies another 
unfortunate problem.  Although all sample regulators seem to 
have experienced a very steep learning curve improving their 
regulatory capacity,388 the countries might still have overestimated 
their assessment ability, rushed into action and registered the C&S 
                                                     
386  On the risks of centralized C&S and CCPs, see supra notes 60–61 and 
accompanying text.  
387  Barney v. Liechtensteinische Landesbank, 866 F.Supp. 114, 118 (S.D.N.Y. 
1994). 
388  IMF Report No. 04/338, supra note 103, at 39–41 (discussing the 
improvements in Kazakhstan between 2000 and 2004); Ahdieh, supra note 86, at 
303–13, 326–47 (discussing the limited but growing role of Russian regulators in 
promoting market practices).  All three sample countries are ordinary members of 
IOSCO.  IOSCO Membership and Committee Lists, IOSCO, 
http://www.iosco.org/lists/. 
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facilities too quickly.389  This precipitousness, even ignoring the 
common doubts about the quality of the regulatory expertise and 
monitoring in certain transplanting economies,390 may be a serious 
lapse in judgment. 
By contrast, the SEC started with granting a temporary 
registration and only in a little less than a decade did it 
permanently register the major entities.391  It also worked slowly 
through the maze of vertical silos to make sure the policies of the 
new facilities were fair, nondiscriminatory, safe and sound.  For 
example, PHLX’s SCCP provided some percentage of its clearing 
fund to participants – mostly exchange specialists but also 
proprietary and customer omnibus margin accounts – for paying 
for securities.  The SEC carefully evaluated those policies and 
mandated SCCP to “collect further assurances” regarding financial 
stability of its participants and deliveries to insolvent or defaulting 
participants.392  Similarly, after a careful review the Pacific Stock 
Exchange’s C&S arms, the SEC emphasized that it was planning to 
continue monitoring the agencies, even though it approved the 
interim improvements in the fair representation of participants in 
the management and financial responsibility standards for 
applicants. 393 
Even if the less experienced regulators in the sample are 
currently conducting similar assessments of their domestic vertical 
silos, they are evaluating already fully functioning market 
monopolies.  Potential mistakes are costly as a more concentrated 
C&S marketplace creates new opportunities for fraudulent 
practices. 
 
6.2.4. Ex Post Monitoring 
 
 The timing problems impact not only the ex ante policy 
                                                     
389  See, e.g., Monetary & Cap. Mkts. Dep’t, Russian Federation: Financial System 
Stability Assessment, INT’L MONETARY FUND, 31, 54–76 (Sept. 2011), 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2011/cr11291.pdf (discussing the 
need for ex post and ex ante regulatory assessments).  Id. at 75. 
390  See e.g., Black, supra note 2, at 817 (observing that the culture of an honest 
and competent regulatory apparatus is “the hardest to transplant.”). 
391  See, e.g., Exchange Act Release No. 20,221 (Sept. 23, 1983), 48 Fed. Reg. 
45167-02 (Oct. 3, 1983) (ordering the registration of nine clearing agencies).  
392  Id. at 45176–77. 
393  Id. at 46177–78. 
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signaling and registration decisions but also the regulatory 
monitoring capacity and integrity.  Although clearinghouses are 
merely conduits, they can be fraudulent ones, favoring selected 
preferred constituencies.  By way of example, it took years for the 
more experienced SEC to detect massive C&S fraud and commence 
an action against MCC and MSTC.394  The fraudulent “cash float” 
produced by the agencies reached as much as $35 million a day.395 
Hence, the two resultant, closely intertwined questions are the 
ability and willingness of the sample regulators to uncover and 
prosecute similarly profitable fraud schemes.  Would the sample 
markets reasonably believe that a state-regulator-owner would 
forego a direct pecuniary gain to uphold the law and improve 
market efficiency?  Can potential prosecutorial oversight result not 
only from the temporary inexperience leading to the inability to 
detect and prosecute violations but also from the permanent 
unwillingness to do so?  The answer is unclear at this point.  
 
6.2.5. Developing Proper Policy Guidelines:                                     
The Spillover Effect and Uncertainty 
 
The risks of C&S structures are often not self-contained and 
may spill over to corporate management and other unrelated areas 
of business law.  For instance, the sample jurisdictions, as 
discussed above, promote certificateless and indirect securities 
holding mechanisms and immobilization of securities.396  Indirect 
ownership registration and certificateless, “street name” and 
“direct registration system” holdings are commonplace efficiency-
maximizing cogs of the modern C&S machine.397  Even though 
physical certificates registered in an investor’s name on the issuer’s 
books have become a rare animal, indirect holdings, surprisingly, 
still stir up corporate governance disputes. 
                                                     
394  Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Civil Penalty, SEC v. Midwest 
Clearing Corp., No. 92CV07191, 1992 WL 12617990 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (enjoining the 
clearing agency’s practices as in violation of several regulations of the Exchange 
Act). 
395  Id. §§ 11–13 (alleging that MCC and MSTC, subsidiary clearing agencies, 
entered false bookkeeping entries). 
396  See supra Section 5.  
397  Incidentally, they also help to mitigate share certificate fraud and fix 
brokerage recordkeeping problems.  See, e.g., UNSAFE AND UNSOUND, supra note 
195, at 145–50 (describing germane industry problems in the 1960s). 
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An example is the exclusion of shareholder proposals from 
proxy materials if a shareholder fails to show stock ownership.  
The national rules both in the West and in the sample may be clear, 
simple and self-explanatory:  hold, propose and vote.398  A wrinkle 
is the intricacy of the modern multilayered holding system, where 
there is often an introducing broker, who “clears its customers’ 
trades through and establishes accounts on behalf of its customers 
at a broker-dealer that is a participant of a registered clearing 
agency,”399 a clearing broker-member of a CSD and the CSD itself. 
As a result, proving ownership may become problematic if all 
shares are registered in the CSD nominee’s name and the 
introducing broker, let alone her customers, has nothing to do with 
the CSD.400 
Unfortunately, if the management has reasons to prevent 
shareholders from raising certain issues or voting, such 
bureaucratic uncertainties may be a way to go.  It is the regulators’ 
no-action letters that provide the primary point of reference to the 
industry and courts and ensure that “petty games-playing” by the 
management will not be tolerated.401 
Looking back at the sample economies, the obvious question is 
what if the enterprise in question belongs to politically connected 
individuals or is majority owned by the state?  Will the market 
perceive that as an additional reason to label the putative 
“regulatory owner-intermediary” and its no-action letters as 
“untrustworthy”? 
 
                                                     
398  Compare 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8 (2011) with FZ RF ob AO, supra note 16, arts. 
51, 53 (Russ.) (determining shareholders of record and providing that a holder of 
at least two percent of shares may submit a proposal); ZRK ob AO, supra note 16,  
arts. 14, 39 (Kaz.) (describing general voting rights and limiting the right to make 
most proxy proposals to the holders of more than ten percent of voting stock); ZU 
pro AT, supra note 16, arts. 25, 34, 38 (specifying basic shareholder rights, 
composition of shareholder lists and proposals, which may be submitted by any 
shareholder, although only 5% shareholders’ proposals must be included by law).   
399  Letter from William A. Hines, Special Counsel, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, to 
Denise Faltischeck, Assoc. Gen. Couns., Hain Celestial Grp. (Oct. 1, 2008); SEC 
No-Action Letter, Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 2008 WL 4717434 (Oct. 1, 2008). 
400  Id.  See also Apache Corp. v. Chevedden, 696 F. Supp. 2d 723, 726–27 (S.D. 
Tex. 2010) (discussing how a multiparty C&S system operates).  
401  Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 WL 129804, at 3 
(Mar. 4, 1999).  See also Apache Corp. v. Chevedden, 696 F. Supp. 2d 723, 735–37 
(S.D. Tex. 2010) (holding that a corporation may exclude proposals from an entity 
that cannot show proof of stock ownership under SEC regulations). 
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6.2.6. Sliver of Silver Lining 
 
Self-evidently, there can be cases where it is in the best interest 
of the state, whether an owner or not, to protect C&S facilities.  A 
germane example is the famous Elliott litigation, 402  which 
prompted EU countries to shield clearing agencies from similar 
disputes in the future.403  Another example is bankruptcy cases. 
What happens if, for instance, in contentious bankruptcy 
proceedings, a C&S entity distributes the proceeds to stockholders 
identified in the instructions provided by another SRO, like an 
exchange, and such instructions happen to differ from the list of 
shareholders entitled to the distribution as of the effective date of a 
reorganization plan?404  Should a clearinghouse be held liable? 
Imagine another scenario where a CSD, as a disbursing agent 
in reorganization, disburses funds to the subordinated noteholders, 
and senior noteholders, obviously, contest the distribution and file 
claims for turnover and money damages.405  In which case would a 
CSD be liable for performing ministerial conduit functions and 
have to unwind transactions?406 
These are all possible examples where enhanced pro-state 
sentiments may assure the protection and independence of C&S 
facilities.  The apparent results would be an alignment of the C&S 
                                                     
402  Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion, General Docket No. 
2000/QR/92 (Court of Appeals of Brussels, 8th Chambers, Sept. 26, 2000) (looking 
through the ministerial nature of C&S facilities as third-party payment conduits).  
See also Michael Bradley et al., The Market Reaction to Legal Shocks and Their 
Antidotes: Lessons from the Sovereign Debt Market, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 292–93 
(2010) (discussing the Elliott litigation and the success of a hedge fund against 
Peru for unpaid debt). 
403  An injunction was issued against a settlement agent, Euroclear in that 
case, to protect sovereign debt holders.  Euroclear, obviously, was not even a 
party to the disputed indentures.  See, e.g., Jonathan Blackman & Rahul Mukhi, 
The Evolution of Modern Sovereign Debt Litigation: Vultures, Alter Egos, and Other 
Legal Fauna, 73 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 57 (2010) (describing generally a 
corporation’s efforts to enforce its judgment against Peru under the pari passu 
theory).  
404  Dexter v. Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., 406 F. Supp. 2d 260, 262 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that a self-regulatory agency was immune from a suit for 
“conduct falling within the scope of the SRO’s regulatory and general oversight 
functions”) (quoting D’Alessio v. NYSE, 258 F.3d 93, 105 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
405  In re Onco Inv. Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank MN Nat’l Assoc., 222 Fed. Appx. 
100, 2007 WL 173779 (3rd Cir. 2007).  
406  Dexter v. Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., 406 F. Supp. 2d 260, 264–65 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
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model with state interests. 
 
6.2.7. Public Ownership and Questionable Willingness to Enforce 
the Law 
 
Let us now have a closer look at the Willingness component. 
Much ink has been spilt on the common buzzwords such as 
“corruption” and “political risks” and their behavioral and 
economic foundations,407 naturally undermining such willingness. 
The two other preeminent issues are:  (1) the conflicts of interest 
due to the domestic gradient of state stockownership and (2) the 
belief that the national governments should support systemically 
important institutions when a financial calamity breaks out. 
First, in the sample countries, C&S facilities operate in a fairly 
monopolistic market.  Such structure may be typical elsewhere and 
it is not unusual for regulators to support the single-utility 
approach.  In the Bradford case, for instance, the SEC supported 
market concentration and argued that although the regulators 
must not impose undue burden on competition, a national clearing 
system would be more efficient than its alternatives.408 
The primary difference with the sample economies, of course, 
is the direct or indirect state ownership of the national C&S 
facilities.  Even assuming away the negative correlation between 
state ownership and efficiency, for the sake of the argument,409 the 
most conspicuous danger is the combination of state ownership, 
the regulatory authority of the state, and the monopoly power of 
the centralized clearinghouses. 
Centralized entities even in the West are prone to flex their 
muscles, prompting antitrust disputes.  The perpetual evolution of 
                                                     
407  For an excellent overview of the behavioral and “rational” aspects of 
corruption in Post-communist economies, see generally Stephan (1997), supra note 
37; Stephan (1999), supra note 121. 
408  The first major decision in this area was, obviously, the Bradford case, 
where regional exchanges located outside New York and their clearing agencies 
challenged the NSCC registration arguing that it was on the way to becoming a 
monopoly.  Bradford Nat’l Clearing Corp. v. S.E.C, 590 F.2d 1085, 1107–11 (D.C. 
Cir. 1978). 
409  In this respect, the sample countries should not differ from the rest of the 
world.  See, e.g., Valentin Zelenyuk & Vitaliy Zheka, Corporate Governance and 
Firm’s Efficiency: The Case of a Transitional Country, Ukraine, 25 J. PROD. ANALYSIS 
143, 144 (2006) (generally confirming previous findings on a negative association 
between the share of state ownership in a firm and its efficiency). 
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C&S services constantly generates new opportunities and 
incentives for a monopoly to push rival entities, like transfer agents 
or smaller private inventors of similar software products, out of 
business.410  “[A] monopoly over the entire securities depository 
[and/or clearing] industry,”411 theoretically, may be in a position to 
arbitrarily and capriciously exclude certain undesirable parties or 
categories of parties from participation in its programs or retaliate 
against members.412 
In the sample countries, the danger is palpable.  The state 
ownership may generate conflicts of interest and reduce the 
willingness of the local regulators to promote competition or 
investigate member complaints at the expense of partially state-
owned entities.  The courts in the sample might simply follow the 
state policies in such a complicated matter.  
The second issue is the financial stability of the clearinghouses 
and the willingness of the state to support such systemically 
important entities in case of a crisis.  It is, of course, self-
explanatory that states prefer to incentivize C&S facilities to be 
more self-reliant and prudent by means of better membership 
rules, margining policies, and other mechanisms.  The underlying 
policy objective is minimizing the expectation of possible bailouts 
and moral hazard concerns.413  At the same time, it is obvious to 
the market and policymakers that in exigent circumstances the key 
facilities may rationally expect to be bailed out or, at the very least, 
that the state will provide liquidity or support them in other ways 
necessary to keep the national C&S system afloat.  The major 
example would be the actions of the Fed during the 1987 market 
crash.414 
The policies of our sample economies, by comparison, upend 
these hopes.  If history and statistics are any guide, market actors 
                                                     
410  See, e.g., Chapdelaine Corp. Securities & Co. v. Depository Trust & 
Clearing Corp., 2006 WL 2020950 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (denying a motion to dismiss 
antitrust claims). 
411  Olde Monmouth Stock Transfer Co., Inc. v. Depository Trust & Clearing 
Corp., 485 F. Supp. 2d 387, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
412  Id. at 389–91. 
413  See supra Section 3. 
414  See, e.g., Bernanke, supra note 6 (concluding that the Federal Reserve was 
important in protecting the clearing and settlement systems during the crash); 
Carlson, supra note 217, at 17 (“In an effort to restrain the declines in financial 
markets and to prevent any spillovers to the real economy, the Federal Reserve 
acted to provide liquidity to the financial system and did so in a public manner 
that was aimed at supporting market confidence.”). 
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may mistrust their governments and question whether they would 
provide assistance in time of need.  The most illustrative example 
is the financial crisis of 1998, caused by defaults on sovereign debt. 
The crisis ultimately wiped out the national banking systems.415  A 
more recent case is the impromptu February 11 decision of the 
Kazakh National Bank to devalue the national currency by 20%.416 
Would the state ownership be a sufficient incentive to spend 
public resources on monitoring and support of clearing agencies? 
Alternatively, would the sample states prefer to manipulate their 
scarce resources in favor of certain institutions and then 
recapitalize the system once the storm has blown over?  The 
answers to these questions are again uncertain. 
 
6.3. “Willingness” and “Ability” of C&S Facilities as Standard Setters                                                                    
         6.3.1. Willingness or Lack Thereof 
 
If the trust linkages between the state and the market and 
among market participants malfunction, in theory, private parties 
may find respite in the ability and willingness of clearinghouses to 
act as expert intermediaries among all involved participants.  In 
this sense, a conduit like a clearinghouse must remain neutral 
while maintaining certain standards of membership quality, 
determine its exposure, and ostracize defaulting Bs.  By doing so, it 
is supposed to maintain and raise the level of trust and 
transparency as performance proceeds and ultimately reduce 
transaction costs for all parties concerned.417  The willingness of a 
clearinghouse to perform its obligations impartially is the fulcrum 
of an orderly C&S process. 
Unfortunately, all clearing agencies are sometimes prone to 
favor affiliated parties, members or exchanges and may violate 
corporate governance and fund safety rules.  In Europe, for 
instance, Clearstream was a subject of a protracted money-
laundering investigation, which led to changes within the 
                                                     
415  See supra note 104 and accompanying text (referencing sources on the 
1998 market crash).  
416  See, e.g., Jack Farchy & Delphine Strauss, Kazakhstan Devalues Tenge by 
Almost 20%, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5a30f3e4-
931a-11e3-b07c-00144feab7de.html#axzz2tDpvACbG.  
417  See supra Section 3. 
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management, long-term litigation and fines.418  In the U.S., in 1997, 
administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings were instituted 
against SCCP and Philadep, which covered parent-exchange’s cash 
deficits by transferring funds from their operating account.419  In 
the end, the agencies exited the C&S industry. 420   Due to the 
centrality of only a few clearinghouses to the sample economies, 
the consequences of similar favoritism or conscious disregard of 
the corporate governance and financial stability rules may be both 
serious and unpredictable. 
Another host of issues arise when members and investors are 
underrepresented in the management of a non-user-owned 
structure.  For instance, an options clearinghouse may adjust the 
unit of trading, the exercise price, or the underlying security in 
such cases as, e.g., stock distributions, splits, reorganizations or 
mergers. Writers of options are sometimes naturally suspicious of 
the adjustments. 421   If they are not fairly represented in the 
management, market participants will always be uncertain 
whether an adjustment is motivated by valid business reasons. 
What if, on the top of it, the dubious adjustment involves a hostile 
takeover undertaken by persons affiliated with the clearinghouse, 
the state or other “almighty” parties?422  How much should a party 
trust the clearinghouse and the regulators approving its rules and 
how much should the decision by the house be shielded from 
scrutiny by the business judgment rule and the regulatory 
approval by the state-owner? 
Alas, even if the members are represented in the governance 
structure and a C&S facility is a SRO, that does not ensure the 
operational fairness and nondiscriminatory decision-making.  The 
nature of a SRO is such that potentially low quality members may 
                                                     
418  Chris Kentouris, Clearstream Shakeup Tips Balance, 13 SEC. INDUS. NEWS 21 
(May 21, 2001); Patricia Hurtado, Clearstream Banking and Iran Central Bank Probed 
by U.S., BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 01, 2014), 
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2014-04-01/clearstream-banking-and-
iran-s-central-bank-probed-by-u-dot-s. 
419  In the Matter of Stock Clearing Corp. of Phila. and Phila. Depository 
Trust Co., Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-9360, 1997 WL 457495, at 3 (Aug. 
11, 1997). 
420  Id. at 8. 
421  See, e.g., Brawer v. Options Clearing Corp., 633 F. Supp. 1254 (S.D.N.Y. 
1986) (detailing a claim that the clearing agency failed to follow its rules on option 
contracts adjustment in response to a plan of recapitalization). 
422  Aidis & Adachi, supra note 105, at 398 (noting that in Russia, bankruptcy 
serves as a method of hostile takeover). 
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unite into low quality SROs.  Such a licensed infrastructural 
intermediary may be prone to favor certain groups and will be a 
fortiori unwilling to screen out market abuses, charge appropriate 
risk-based margins and fund contributions or improve the quality 
of its members.  East European economies are familiar with such 
examples only too well.423 
Finally, due to the lack of competition in the C&S segment, the 
complying As might have to join potentially low-quality 
clearinghouses and be outnumbered by Bs.  Recall that by law, 
C&S entities must be incorporated as domestic entities in all three 
jurisdictions.424  If the numbers of local Bs are substantial, so will 
their command of the management.  The low-quality opportunistic 
B-members, all sharing similar low-trust expectations regarding 
counterparty’s performance and the state’s ability and willingness to 
intervene, may find additional benefits in shirking. 425   This, 
theoretically, may convert the moral hazard of centralized C&S 
into a more systemic, trust-related issue. 
 
6.3.2. Doubtful Monitoring and Enforcement Ability 
 
Now, let us assume that, theoretically, a clearinghouse is 
willing to properly perform its monitoring and risk-mitigating 
requirements, meaning that only the ability aspect of the trust 
linkage is questionable.  In that scenario, an important issue is how 
a C&S facility operating in a low-trust jurisdiction but acting in 
good faith is supposed to assess the riskiness of the population of 
market actors-members, establish efficient risk-management 
policies, such as guarantee funds and margining, monitor 
compliance as transactions proceed, and introduce other risk-
management policies. 
The first concern, particularly acute in volatile developing 
markets, should be the underestimation of the joint and individual 
participants’ exposure by the novice-like clearinghouses.  Proper 
risk management always requires a very broad knowledge of the 
creditworthiness of C&S members.  Measuring certain risks is 
                                                     
423  See, e.g., Black, supra note 2, at 789 n.9 (citing sources examining how 
powerful members of Czech SROs engaged in tunnelling). 
424  See supra Section 5. 
425  By shirking here I mean socially wasteful shirking in contrast with 
efficient breach.  See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 128. 
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difficult even for a more experienced clearinghouse operating in a 
stable market.  This concern is exacerbated by the “trust problems” 
in the sample. 
Large numbers of low-quality members of an honest, A-type, 
clearinghouse may intentionally obstruct information exchange. 
Even if a clearinghouse can verify certain prudential and capital 
requirements at member registration, in the long term, it may not 
necessarily be aware of the post hoc instances of shirking as 
companies begin to ignore proper risk management and internal 
operational requirements.426  Continuous policing of these rules 
and the observability of shirking become the key to efficient C&S. 
A range of internal or external causes, obstructing the observability 
of the members’ nature and financial soundness, are similar to 
those of the private-private scenario.  In addition, the increased 
complexity of contractual arrangements, particularly in derivatives 
markets, may interfere with monitoring and enforcement 
efficiency. 
 Furthermore, a shortage of resources, such as expertise and 
capital, and the discussed above market volatility and opacity may 
hinder oversight.  A clearinghouse under stress may 
simultaneously lose the capacity to process information efficiently 
and assess future exposure.427   In the sample jurisdictions, if the 
statutory minimum capital requirements are any indication, 
clearinghouses, not taking into account member contributions, also 
have minimal financial resources. 428   Similarly, SROs in some 
sample economies have historically had limited capacity and 
resources to effect proper oversight.429 
                                                     
426  Other parties might also be unable to use the existing rules due to 
misunderstanding, low awareness of the available mechanisms, etc.  See, e.g., IMF 
Report No. 04/338, supra note 318, at 45–47 (mentioning that “[w]hile there are 
requirements for internal control procedures to assure compliance with the laws 
and regulations, as well as requirement of risk management capacity and 
procedures aside from the requirement to meet minimum excess capital, 
participants do not perceive any significant changes yet. Increasing awareness 
and understanding of these procedures through workshops and campaigns is 
required.”). 
427   See, e.g., Bernanke, supra note 6, at 144 (describing the potential 
weaknesses leading to the inability of the clearinghouse to function under stress). 
428  Taking the Russian market, the largest in the sample, as a benchmark, the 
agencies’ capital requirements are clearly minimal.  FZ RF Clearing, supra note 15, 
art. 8 (Russ.); FZ RF CD, supra note 15, art. 15 (Russ.).  
429  IMF Report No. 04/338, supra note 318, at 38 (discussing the limited 
capacity of SROs in Kazakhstan). 
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A market may become aware of the analytical and financial 
limitations of a C&S institution.  Self-evidently, it may lead to more 
instances of shirking and raise moral hazard concerns.  In addition, 
a mere apprehension of defaults may shake up the system, just as it 
almost happened during the U.S. 1987 market crash.430  The sample 
economies have not addressed these issues properly. 
The Statutes in some sample economies do attempt to minimize 
the need for ex ante assessments by limiting the liability of a 
clearinghouse to only its contractual obligations.  Clearinghouses 
are granted certain discretion in this area.431  The question remains 
whether they can exercise that discretion properly. 
Often, a party facing the challenges of long-term contracting in 
a market laden with uncertainty collaborates with its 
counterparties and exchanges more information in order to reduce 
its risks and achieve mutually beneficial outcomes.  As discussed 
earlier in this Article, western C&S entities have long resorted to 
such mechanisms through the user-owned structures, market 
advisory committees and other channels. The sample economies 
may, self-evidently, transplant the same ideas and enhance 
collaborative feedback mechanisms. 
There is a reason to be cautious however.  Assuming many 
parties in the sample operate in an endgame scenario with plentiful 
exit strategies and there are comparatively fewer reputable long-
term players, the value of cooperation becomes questionable.  So 
does the ability of a clearinghouse to punish the defectors. 
Coming back to the A-W-E analysis, it means that as a 
corollary, fair-type clearinghouses would have to set up higher 
margins and guarantee fund payments that would not be 
necessary under normal market circumstances.  Higher post-
trading costs increase the cost of capital, potentially producing a 
negative effect on trading and GDP432 and undermining the value 
of the transplanted clearinghouses as efficiency-enhancing 
facilities.  Moreover, the existing gradient of state ownership is ill-
suited to the task of alleviating these concerns and improving C&S 
efficiency. 
                                                     
430  Many brokers and FCMs were in dire straits and mere rumors regarding 
participants’ solvency might prompt return of securities in exchange for collateral. 
See generally supra notes 215–16 and accompanying text. 
431  See, e.g., FZ RF Clearing, supra note 15, arts. 3, 13, 14 (Russ.) (evaluating 
contractually determined liability limits and avoiding performance). 
432  Schulze & Baur, supra note 5, at 17–18. 
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7. IN LIEU OF CONCLUSIONS:  POLICY PROPOSALS 
 
To conclude, there is a danger that the discussed above 
behavioral and socioeconomic patterns, left unaddressed by the 
regulatory reforms and state ownership requirements, may create a 
C&S model characterized by the following principal features.  First, 
future performance assessment and long-term cooperation remain 
broken along the following “trust linkages”:  (1) between the state 
and the market, (2) among private market actors themselves, and 
(3) among market groups including clusters of private parties, such 
as broker-dealers, the state and intermediaries like self-regulatory 
organizations. 
Second, in these muddy waters, conversion of private parties 
from the reputable to the opportunistic and nonperforming is 
unobservable to the market, regulators and SROs.  Third, with time, 
micro-level transactional opportunism may transform into “thick 
market” contractual practices.  Consequently, it is conceivable that 
the segment of complying parties, A-parties, begins to shrink over 
time, according to the described above lemons equilibrium 
scenario.  Simultaneously, the B-members of C&S facilities, or their 
customers, remain continuously incentivized to defect. 
In this sense, the domestic “gradient” in the foreign 
transplants, viz., a protectionist statutory focus on the national 
actors and state ownership of the regulated institutions, creates a 
circular self-propagating system that feeds on itself.  By 
exacerbating the foregoing dangers, the gradient questions the “fit” 
of the transplant.  As a result, these deficiencies may produce a 
chilling effect on trading and undermine the value of C&S 
arrangements as transaction-cost-minimizing transplants. 
The purpose of this Article is, of course, to highlight these 
concerns.  However, I would like to tentatively suggest a few 
corrective strategies, which, by themselves, merit further research. 
In short, it is probably impossible to change behavioral patterns or 
socioeconomic conditions fast and by means of transplanting.  A 
more successful method, perhaps, is to mend the broken trust 
linkages by breaking with the “national law-market paradigm” 
and introducing a foreign institutional umpire. 
As a potential avenue for reforms, national policymakers might 
consider the following options.  Certain transactions may be 
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cleared abroad. Most importantly, however, to the extent that 
transactions should be cleared locally, the rules regarding domestic 
ownership, particularly state ownership, of C&S facilities should 
be amended. 
In this vein, national policymakers should allow the national 
C&S entities be acquired by reputable foreign entities, such as 
DTCC, Clearnet and others.   Alternatively, a joint venture with a 
majority participation and control of a reputable foreign 
clearinghouse may be formed.  Such an entity would have 
sufficient expertise to introduce and maintain proper risk 
management and margining policies.  As a certain form of 
guarantee of performance by domestic participants, some margin 
payments and guarantee funds might be transferred to the 
accounts operated by the foreign majority-owner in a jurisdiction 
outside of the sample countries. 
To recapitulate, the purpose of this foreign participation is 
mending the broken “trust linkages.”  First, private parties and the 
state per se may be more inclined to trust such international and 
highly reputable self-regulatory organization, monitored by expert 
foreign supervisors in the countries where the transplants 
originated at least half a century ago.  Second, transacting private 
parties should feel reassured that the entity would act as a reliable 
conduit for all trades. 
Finally, in order to minimize the risks of the foreign participant 
itself, there is a clear need to provide some form of an explicit 
government guarantee, both economic and legal, to mend the 
public-private trust linkage.  This, self-evidently, may take a 
variety of forms, including stabilization and anti-expropriation 
clauses, sovereign immunity waiver clauses, arbitration 
agreements and other mechanisms.  Provided that the foreign C&S 
participant is capable of designing and maintaining appropriate 
risk management systems, waterfall structures, prudent margining 
and other safety valves, the state must also reciprocate and 
credibly commit to its role as a financial “guarantor.”  Such 
guarantee should operate as a “lender of last resort” of sorts, 
assuring the foreign investor and the local market actors that they 
would be made whole in case of an unforeseen severe contingency 
like a financial crisis.  By doing so, the state would signal to both -  
the national market and the now foreign-owned domestic 
clearinghouse – that it would not defect. Instead, it would be ready 
to stand by as the “insurer” in case of a serious risk to the financial 
stability of a C&S facility. 
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To conclude, such a structure would allow the national markets 
to capitalize on the positive externalities produced through 
extensive reliance on reputable foreign actors.  The developing 
economies may effectively borrow reputational and trust-related 
mechanisms through foreign entities, as opposed to legal 
frameworks distorted by unnecessary and inefficient “domestic 
gradients.”   
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